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This dissertation is an investigation into the nature 
of theory, particularly in contemporary political and social 
science. It examines the complicated relationship between 
phenomena investigated by political and social scientists 
and the conceptual structures and processes employed to 
organize information about these phenomena. Although there 
are several possible forms of this relationship, the focus 
here is upon the form characteristic of science. Science 
is presented as a particular framework for providing expla­
nations. A theory is an extension of a scientific explana­
tory framework. The purpose of a theory is to provide an 
explanation of phenomena under investigation. The reason 
for selecting scientific explanation and theory as the 
object of this inquiry is because it is the predominant 
pattern of explanation among most contemporary investigators 
of political and social phenomena.
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There is considerable disagreement concerning what 
properly constitutes a scientific explanation and about the 
proper form of a theory. Although this dispute has mostly 
been conducted among philosophers of science, it is signifi­
cant to political and social scientists for two reasons.
The first is that the acceptance of a concept of explanation 
and a model of theory is a prescriptive activity which helps 
to structure how particular investigations are conducted.
It aids in the determination of what is to be considered 
a problem, of how investigations are to be conducted, of 
what is or is not to be counted as evidence, and of how that 
evidence is to be interpreted. The second reason is that 
political and social scientists have been influenced by one 
particular version of the nature of scientific esqplanation 
and theory, the Received View. The thesis of this disserta­
tion is that the consequences of the adoption of the Received 
View by political and social scientists have not been 
entirely beneficial, and that many of the theoretical and 
methodological problems of social scientific inquiry are in 
part the result of the acceptance of the Received View 
version of what scientific explanation and theory should be.
After outlining the nature of the problem of explana­
tion and its relation to political theory, a general defi­
nition of explanation is presented. This definition empha­
sizes socio-cultural, group and individual factors which 
influence the proposal and acceptance of explanations. An 
original, tri-partite model of the general structural
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elements of an explanation, as well as the relationships 
between these elements, is also developed.
This is followed by an extensive discussion of the 
concept of scientific theory. A model of the generally 
accepted components of a theory is presented. Considerable 
attention is devoted to the Received View model of scien­
tific eaqplanation and theory as developed by Hempel and 
others.
The influence of the Received View model on political 
and social theory is analyzed in terms of three specific 
sets of problems. The problems, as well as the proposed 
solutions to them, further demonstrate the impact of 
Received View thinking on political and social science.
Finally criticisms of the Received View emanating from 
philosophers of science are investigated and alternative 
versions of scientific explanation and theory are examined. 
The relatively limited impact of these alternative versions 
on political and social science is discussed. The conclusion 
is reached that, although the Received View appears to be 
inadequate to the solution of theoretical and methodological 
problems in political and social science, there is no 
apparent, well-accepted successor to it. Different strate- 
gies for dealing with the absence of an adequate account of 
eaqplanation and theory for political science are enter­
tained; and the suggestion is made for the tentative 
acceptance of the definition and model of explanation pre­
sented in the second chapter of this work.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Problem and Its Scope
This dissertation is an investigation into the nature 
of theory, particularly theory in contemporary political and 
social science. Its intention is to shed light on the per­
plexing and frequently complicated problem of the relation­
ship between the phenomena we investigate and the conceptual 
structures and processes that we employ to organize informa­
tion about those phenomena. Although there are several 
possible forms of this relationship, I will be primarily 
interested in only one— the form typical of science.
It is my contention that the purpose of a theory is to 
provide an esqplanation of the phenomenon under investigation. 
A theory is the characteristic explanatory "tool" of science. 
There are other forms of explanation, each of which has an 
explanatory "tool" appropriate to it. Mythology, for example, 
is a form of explanation, and myth is its explanatory "tool". 
Religion is another, and dogma is its explanatory "tool".
All of these different forms of ejqplanation share a common 
purpose: to organize the world in such a way that it becomes
understandable. Indeed, I would argue that ejqplanation is a 
general activity, and that different forms of explanation—  
different forms of understanding— are at least partially the 
result of the use of different esqplanatory tools. This is
not to say that the selection of an explanatory tool is a 
matter of no consequence. On the contrary. It is a matter 
of considerable importance because it is this choice that 
determines what particular order the world is to have for a 
particular investigation at a given time.
I have decided to select scientific explanation and 
theory as the form and tool of explanation for this inquiry 
because it is the pattern of explanation of choice among 
most contemporary investigators of political and social phe­
nomena. But scientific explanation itself is not a simple 
and homogeneous activity. There is considerable disagreement 
about what properly constitutes a scientific explanation, and 
about the proper form of a theory. The dispute, though gen­
erally carried on within the confines of the philosophy of 
science, is important to political and social science. As 
was the case in choosing between alternative forms of expla­
nation, the choice between different notions of scientific 
explanation and different models of theory is of no little 
consequence. The selection of a framework of inquiry (i.e., 
a notion of explanation and a model of theory) is a prescrip­
tive activity. It not only determines what kinds of topics 
are amenable to investigation, but also indicates how those 
investigations ought to be conducted, what forms of analysis 
are fruitful or unfruitful, what kinds of information ought 
to be gathered, what should and should not be counted as 
evidence and how that evidence ought to be interpreted, and 
even what shall be considered a problem in the first place.
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Obviously, choices of this kind are important in contempo­
rary political and social science. And, as will be shown 
later, political and social scientists are beginning to be­
come more aware of the consequences of these choices.
In this endeavor, the philosophy of science has been 
most influential, especially through the impact of one par­
ticular version of scientific explanation and one model of 
theory, the Received View. This influence may be interpreted 
in either of two senses. In the weak sense, the Received 
View has been influential indirectly, as a source of general 
notions of what scientific inquiry ought to be. In the 
strong sense, it has been directly and specifically influen­
tial by being either suggested or employed as a model for 
scientific social and political theory and esqplanation.
The consequences of the adoption of this model by polit­
ical and social scientists, possibly the result of a desire 
to achieve the status of "science" for these areas of inquiry, 
have not been entirely salutory. The Received View itself 
has been subjected to severe criticism among philosophers of 
science. Today there are few philosophers of science who 
advocate this position in the form that is accepted by most 
political and social scientists. Further, it may, and will, 
be argued that many of the theoretical and methodological 
problems of scientific social inquiry are at least partially 
the result of the acceptance of the Received View version of 
what a scientific explanation or theory should be.
It might, with some justification, be asked what busi­
ness a political theorist has in approaching the problem of
explanation. As a group political theorists are generally 
seen as curators and critics of the ideas of great, usually 
dead, political thinkers, as students of and commentators on 
political theoretical concepts such as "justice," "the good 
society," "power," "representation," "law," and the like, or 
as weavers of more or less intricate conceptual frameworks 
for analyzing or synthesizing "pluralism," "political partic­
ipation, " "coalition formation," "civic culture," or "the 
systems approach" to international or domestic politics.
This view is not far from accurate. Furthermore, these are, 
for the most part, legitimate and valuable pursuits. Such 
activities are, however, on.' "f the tip of the theoretical ice­
berg. What a David Easton and a Leo Strauss, a Williaiti Riker 
and an Eric Voegelin, an Arnold Brecht and a Hans Kelsen have 
in common is that all are attempting to explain certain as­
pects of socio-political phenomena. It is an enterprise they 
share with political thinkers through the ages. Explanation 
is the matrix of theory. It is the two-thirds of the iceberg 
that is rarely seen and only infrequently considered. In 
researching this topic, I have been led to study philosophers, 
anthropologists, philosophers of science, theoretical physi­
cists, and sociologists. Political theorists, it seems, have 
relatively little to say about the nature of esqolanation as 
it relates to their discipline. This lack of critical, theo­
retical self-awareness is reflected in our theory. It would 
seem that we describe a great deal, but esqplain very little. 
The distinction is subtle but important. It will take the
better part of this inquiry to establish the difference, as 
it will to justify the interest of a political theorist in 
this subject.
There is another perhaps more "practical" reason for 
approaching political theory from the perspective of expla­
nation. Although I am not by temperament crisis oriented, 
and despite the fact that I am generally loathe to add to 
the recent spate of crisis-centered literature, I feel that 
it is valid to regard the current, frequently discussed, 
social, political, religious, and moral rebelliousness, 
alienation, and malaise as the result of a "crisis of expla­
nation." For whatever reasons, the explanations of the past 
are viewed as inadequate to our understanding of the present. 
There is a gap between our experience and the time-honored 
forms by which we have been taught to interpret that experi­
ence. The two are out of phase, asynchronized, the former a 
heartbeat to an age ahead of the latter. It is this sunder­
ing of experience and esqpectation, of observation and under­
standing that is partially responsible for our cumulative 
self-dissatisfaction.
I am not contending that this is either unusual or par­
ticular to Western culture at this time. On the contrary, 
this tendency of experience to outstrip explanations of it 
seems to pervade most periods of Western history. It is 
this condition of dynamic tension between forms of under­
standing and experience that provides the impetus to the 
development of new answers to old questions, as well as to
the generation of questions never before conceived. The 
intellectual history of man can be written in terms of the 
resolution of conflict between existing cognitive frames of 
reference and the broadening of experience, information and 
insight which leads men to question traditionally accepted 
perspectives and presuppositions.
There is, however, a countervailing tendency on the 
part of most people to view their particular age as the most 
advanced, the most civilized, the "best" age which man has 
known. As a corollary, their science, their religion, their 
art and manners, their political ideologies, in short, their 
explanations of various specific realities are considered to 
be the highest products of human faith, reason, or talent.
The contradiction between intellectual development in a social 
context, the product of the aforementioned tension, between 
experience and prevailing explanations, and a broad-based 
sense of collective self-satisfaction or complacency adds a 
social dimension to what until now has been described as an 
individual epistemological problem. Whereas before the prob­
lem was one of an individual unable to understand his experi­
ence of the world in terms of existing standard explanations, 
there is now the added problem of the reaction of society to 
the individual who is both sufficiently gifted and courageous 
to offer new patterns of esqplanation by which experience may 
be reinterpreted.
It is a curious and difficult collective mental gymnastic 
that permits a pride at being at the vanguard of history and,
at the same time, demands, for reasons of pride, that the 
existing social, moral, and political order be tenaciously 
maintained. It would seem that all men believe that theirs 
is a pivotal age in the history of mankind. While, in a 
sense, this is true, there are certain times which, because 
they initiate a conspicuous alteration of previous ways of 
interpreting reality, are truly pivotal. The "Golden Age" 
of Greek philosophy is one such period. The time of Christ, 
the "Renaissance," and the "Enlightenment" are other periods 
in which man, confronted by new problems or inadequate solu­
tions to old ones, was forced to re-evaluate old ways of 
thinking, to redefine his place in the cosmos. These were 
times of dissatisfaction which paradoxically provided the 
conditions in which individuals could move beyond the exist­
ing bounds of knowledge and opinion, but which stifled these 
same individuals when a threat to the cognitive order was 
perceived. The protagonists of these new ways of thinking 
were too often forced to pay a severe price for their inge­
nuity. Witness the fate of Socrates and the near fate of 
Aristotle, the proscription of Galileo's works, the ostracism 
of Spinoza, the enforced wanderings of Voltaire and Marx, 
and the scorn with which the ideas of Freud were initially 
met. Those societies in which genius was forged were also 
the crucibles in which genius was tested. The fires of 
imagination and of purification are often ignited by a 
common source.
It should be fairly obvious at this juncture that, in 
trying to justify this study of e^qplanation, I am stressing
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two different yet related points, both of which are suffi­
ciently common as to appear platitudinous. The first of 
these points is that ideas, particularly those sets of re­
lated ideas called explanations, have consequences, that 
they exert a tremendous, though generally underestimated, 
influence on individuals and societies. In esqplanations 
are contained our view of the world. Explanations, however 
created or evolved, are the prisms through which the light 
of reality is filtered, categorized and interpreted. Our 
explanations not only allow us to interpret what we know; 
they also direct us in the discovery of new knowledge and 
improved specific explanations. Ejqplanations are also the 
foundation of moral, political and religious systems. The 
forms of understanding by which we interpret the nature of 
reality provide the bases on which our ideas of good and 
evil, just and unjust, sacred and profane, and, one might 
add, scientific and unscientific are established.
Our minds are molded by the form and content of author­
itative explanations, at once bestowing an order to the welter 
of impressions, imaginations, and insights in which the human 
mind is daily immersed and imposing a limitation by defining 
what are "legitimate" ideas or ways of combining ideas. Our 
epistemologies and our systems of logic not only tell us 
what is knowable, how we are able to know, and how we may 
reason from what we know; but also provide us with standards 
of acceptability by which the "truthfulness" of perceptions 
and cognitive processes may be judged. There are, however,
several possible epistemologies, several logics, in short, 
several possible worldviews which have developed during the 
course of civilization. This presents a curious, double-bind 
effect. On the one hand, there exists a situation in which 
an individual presented with a condition, a set of perceptions, 
or a series of insights attempts to render them understandable 
according to some standard of reason, experience, faith, and/ 
or intuition. On the other hand, if the explanation is 
accepted as authoritative, if it is generally taken as a valid 
method of understanding a given phenomenon, then it, in turn, 
affects perceptions, in terms of the types of evidence which 
is admissible, and the processes of thought, in terms of what 
types of reasoning are acceptable. Again, the social compo­
nent of explanation is obvious. Groups (societies, nations, 
religions, etc.) have a stake in preserving the ideas which 
sustain their way of life. These ideas, these interpretations 
of the "way things are," along with evaluations as to their 
essential truthfulness, goodness, or justice provide the basis 
from which morality and authority, for that group, derive.
They are also the standard by which new ideas are judged, 
thus allowing the categorization of these ideas or interpre­
tations as good and beneficial, irrelevant, or dangerous 
relative to the established moral, political, and social 
order. The unquestioned, and, for practical purposes, un­
questionable correctness of an established, institutionalized 
pattern of explanations deemed authoritative by a group is 
the sine qua non for asserting the superiority of "our" way
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of life vis a vis the "alien1 and threatening interpretations 
of others whether at the group, societal, or cultural levels.
It is not enough that an explanation be "true" in terms of 
actually presenting and interpreting our experience of real­
ity, it must also be consonant with those established, 
"authoritative" explanations by which the integrity of the 
group is maintained. Anything less is a threat to order and 
stability.
The second point which I am trying to establish is that 
Western culture is now at one of those pivotal points which 
periodically recur. At the risk of falling into a variation 
of the same sin of epochal hubris that I ascribe to men of 
other ages, the belief that theirs is the pivotal age in 
human history, I would contend that contemporary Western 
civilization is rapidly approaching, or perhaps is already 
in the throes of an historical synapse. Our age is "metaxic", 
strung out between our collective past and an uncertain 
future. We have entered a period in which our roots to the 
past are one by one being severed and in which the umbilicus 
to the future is in danger of rupture. Not since the early 
Renaissance has the existing pattern of interlocking, mutually- 
supportive explanations been so seriously or systematically 
challenged. The United States, seemingly at the vanguard of 
the movement, offers several salient examples. The notion 
of America as a "melting pot" in which heterogeneous minori­
ties are mystically alloyed, an ideal never in actuality 
approached, is being seriously challenged by a spirit of
11
widespread ethnic and racial assertiveness. The "melting 
pot" analogy not only does not describe the existing state 
of affairs in the U.S., it also fails to correspond as an 
ideal with the evolution of minority group relations through­
out U.S. history. Thus, the "melting pot," both as a des­
cription and as an ideal, has been replaced by an emerging 
awareness of race and ethnicity. Similarly, the ideal of 
the monogamous, nuclear family, once considered a bastion 
of American democracy and culture, is under assault on two 
fronts. The first involves esqoerimentation with alternative 
life styles (co-habitation, serial monogamy, group and homo­
sexual marriage, etc.) which directly question the form of 
traditionally prescribed interpersonal relations. The second 
front involves an attack on the roles ascribed to the sexes 
by this pattern. Under the aegis of "Women's Liberation," 
the idea of what constitutes "a women's place," and, by 
extention a "man's place," has been re-evaluated. The 
interest and enthusiasm aroused by this issue has been 
sufficiently intense that an amendment to the U.S. Constitu­
tion establishing "equal rights for women" is currently 
under consideration and is the subject of intense debate.
Further examples are afforded by the recent resurgence 
of interest in astrology, the occult, and in Eastern and 
Indian religions. It would seem that, the current "Jesus 
Movement" not withstanding, traditional Christianity, like 
the family, is not immune to the onslaught of those who are 
dissatisfied by traditional explanations. The traditional
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American economic emphasis on productivity is being chal­
lenged by people concerned with the effects of this emphasis 
on the environment. In a similar vein, the so-called tech­
nological revolution is coming to be viewed as a mixed 
blessing, with its attendent problems of technological unem­
ployment and the depersonalization wrought by computerized 
services. The Viet Nam war has brought into question the 
illusion of U.S. military invincibility, the virtually 
unquestioned wisdom, justice, and morality of our military 
involvements, and the hitherto sacrosanct nature of "defense" 
spending vis a vis other budgetary categories. Finally, in 
opposition to our self-consciously middle-class culture there 
has arisen an alleged "counter-culture," an amorphous, quasi­
movement which more or less rejects the goals, values and 
interests of the conventional culture. While it is true 
that almost none of the examples given are without precedent 
in American history, it is the unique concatenation of all 
of these criticisms of existing patterns of explanation 
during recent years that gives additional warrant to the 
assertion that we, perhaps more than most other ages, are 
"at the edge of history."
What does this have to do with political theory or 
political theorists? If, as I have contended, the appropriate 
domain of theory is the explanation of political phenomena, 
and if, as I have argued, the contemporary spirit of criti­
cal re-evaluation coupled with a restless seeking-after of 
new modes of understanding is at least in part attributable
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to a perceived inadequacy of our several systems of esqplana- 
tion in presenting the world to us in a meaningful, under­
standable way, then the theorist (regardless of his specific 
field of inquiry) whose business it is to make comprehensible 
the welter of perceptions, situations, and relations with 
which we are confronted, must accept the responsibility of 
acting as a guide across the potential historical synapse.
I am not contending that it is necessary that radically new 
theories are essential to this endeavor: it may well be that 
older formulations, that older value systems, are currently 
misunderstood and maligned, and that upon intelligent re- 
evaluation and representation, they might be sufficient to 
the task at hand. It is essential, however, that the theorist 
be aware of what it is that he is doing when pursuing his 
chosen activity. He must understand the nature of explana­
tion, what it is, what it does, and the consequences it holds 
for the subject matter he is investigating, and for the 
society in which he operates. By investigating the process 
of explanation in general and in its more specific formula­
tion as scientific esqplanation, I hope to contribute to a 
critical awareness of the nature of theory leading to the 
development or re-interpretation of patterns of esqplanation 
capable of rendering contemporary experience comprehensible.
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I will attempt to give flesh to 
the skeleton of issues and concerns sketched above. The 
purpose of this inquiry is to define what I consider to be a
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significant problem: What is an explanation in political
science, and, more generally, in social science? The premise 
that makes this problem a significant one is that any partic- 
ular investigation operates within an "explanatory framework," 
and that in any area of inquiry several such frameworks may 
exist. Often these frameworks are "tacit": less frequently 
they are articulated, which is to say that the components, 
and the instructions for properly combining the components, 
are made explicit. Science is one such "explicit" "explana­
tory framework," or, more precisely, possesses several 
"esqilicit" "explanatory frameworks." For each of these, 
claims to being the "correct" or "best" one have been made. 
Contemporary political scientists seem to have accepted an 
explanatory framework from among those which purport to be 
scientific, the Received View. The thesis of this disserta­
tion, as stated earlier in this chapter, is that the explan­
atory framework generally accepted as providing satisfactory 
explanations of political and social phenomena is inadequate 
as a solution to the problem of explanation in political and 
social science, and that, further, many of the theoretical 
and methodological problems of scientific social inquiry 
are at least partially the result of the acceptance of this 
particular version of what a scientific explanation, and 
theory, should be.
In a sense, what is being proposed in this inquiry is a 
relatively different— for political science— orientation to 
analyzing theories, one which takes the theory itself, rather
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than the subject matter of any given theory, as its object.
The validity of this approach is contingent upon the validity 
of two suppositions. The first of these is that the term 
"theory, 1 and the activity it signifies, means something.
When used in phrases like "social contract theory, 1 or "sys­
tems theory," or "Marxian theory," or "coalition theory," 
the term is not simply, like a zero, a "place holder," nor 
is its meaning completely exhausted by terms like "specula­
tion" or "conjecture" or "thought." Rather, the term implies 
that a particular conceptual form or arrangement is being 
used to order and to help understand political phenomena in 
a particular way.
The second supposition, deriving from the first, is 
that the form of a theory and the processes for selecting, 
structuring, analyzing, and interpreting information warranted 
by the theory are essential to any conclusions reached about 
the nature of any political phenomenon. This sounds tautol­
ogous, and one is tempted to mutter, "But of course, one 
doesn1t need to be told that." My point is that one does 
need to be told, to be constantly reminded, that a "theory" 
is more than a set of conclusions: it is a conceptual form 
that carries with it both opportunities and limitations. To 
use good Aristotelian language, it is the particular combi­
nation of form and matter that gives an object of study 
intelligibility. The combination of the two is essential, 
especially to the construction of good political and social 
theory.
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This consideration leads directly to a related, if 
somewhat covert, theme that weaves its way throughout this 
inquiry. This is the belief that political theory as it is 
currently practiced and currently taught as a subdiscipline 
in political science is far too passive an enterprise. It 
emphasizes, for the most part, learning and critiquing the 
"thought," that is, the conclusions, of eminent and near- 
eminent political thinkers with little consideration as to 
what it is that is "theoretical" about them. This disserta­
tion emerged, as much as anything, from the hope that politi­
cal theory could be more than a subspecialty of intellectual 
history. It is the attempt to provide a possible venue for 
the overcoming of this unfortunate stereotype that guides 
this work.
Although the topic of this dissertation is an ambitious 
one, my objectives are fairly modest. For the most part, I 
am attempting to outline and evaluate both existing and 
potential points of contact between two areas of inquiry, 
philosophy of science and political theory, using the concept 
of (scientific) explanation as the basic unit of analysis.
The reasons for selecting philosophy of science are two.
First, philosophers of science have formulated the clearest 
and most cogent explications of the concepts of esqplanation 
and theory, and it is my belief that political scientists 
can benefit from their efforts. Second, as I have suggested, 
work by some philosophers of science has already influenced 
political and social scientists. But although the connections
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between these disciplines have already been established, the 
consequences of this influence have yet to be assessed. Such 
an assessment is a specific objective of this investigation.
To this end, chapter two will initiate a general discussion 
of explanation. Considerable attention will be given to the 
presentation of a general definition of explanation. One of 
the unique features of this definition will be the emphasis 
placed on socio-cultural, group, and individual factors 
which influence the proposing and accepting of explanations. 
The second half of chapter two will be devoted to the develop­
ment of an original, tri-partite model of the general com­
ponents of an explanation and the relationships between these 
components. The purpose of the model is to help to introduce 
some terms basic to what I will later call the "explanatory 
process" and to provide a point of reference for the dis­
cussion and evaluation of different notions of scientific 
explanation and theory and their effect on political and 
social theory. Later, in chapter five, I will return to this 
model and suggest its acceptance as a possible alternative 
to other strategies for constructing explanations of politi­
cal and social phenomena.
Chapter three will narrow the focus of this inquiry 
considerably, and will be concerned with the "explanatory 
tool" of scientific explanation, "theory". After a brief 
discussion of the more recent history of the development of 
the concept of theory, a model of the generally accepted 
components of a theory will be presented. The remainder of
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the chapter will be devoted to the development of an over­
view of the Received View model of scientific explanation and 
theory as developed by Hempel and others.
Chapter four will attempt to demonstrate the influence 
of the Received View on political and social science. The 
writings of philosophers of science who have specifically 
directed their attention to political and social sciences, 
of political and social scientists concerned with the develop­
ment of a scientific mode of inquiry for their areas of 
interest, and of political and social scientists doing re­
search on specific topics will be presented to show the 
pervasive impact of Received View thinking on political and 
social science. Next, I will analyze contemporary political 
and social theory in terms of three specific sets of problems 
along with solutions that have been proposed to them. The 
purpose of this analysis, in addition to further demonstrating 
the influence of the Received View, is to introduce what I 
believe is a cogent and fruitful approach to the understand­
ing of contemporary political and social theory.
In the final chapter, objections to the Received View 
will be investigated, and alternative versions to the 
Received View will be discussed, as will the relatively 
limited impact of these alternative versions on political 
and social theory. Different strategies for dealing with 
the absence of an adequate account of explanation and theory 
for political science will be entertained. Finally, I will 
suggest the advantages and limitations of tentatively
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accepting the idea of esqplanation outlined in chapter two 
as one possible solution to "the problem of explanation."
CHAPTER TWO
Explanation
Explanation; A General Definition
Explanation is the process whereby an understanding of 
a given phenomenon or of the relationship between given 
phenomena is presented for evaluation. This definition it­
self warrants explication and, as will be seen, qualifica­
tion. The salient features of this working definition are 
contained in the terms "process," "understanding," "phenom­
ena," and "evaluation." These terms will each be considered 
in turn.
Process By process is meant a related series of actions 
directed toward some goal. Implicit in this usage is the 
notion that an esqplanation, in the most general sense, is 
not a thing, not an object having an independent ontological 
status. Rather, it is an activity, a description of a par­
ticular pattern of relationships which direct the mind toward 
an understanding of things, or of other processes. Particu­
lar explanations are approximations of an absolute, albeit 
ideal, understanding. They are stages within the larger 
process of attempting to make the world comprehensible. Be­
cause they are approximations, no particular explanation can 
be said to be true in any ultimate sense. This does not 
necessarily entail an epistemological relativism. For while
20
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specific esqplanations of given phenomena are not susceptible 
to criteria of absolute "Truthfulness," the process of expla­
nation, as an endeavor toward ultimate comprehension, can be 
said to be directed toward truth understood as a perfect 
isomorphism between understanding, an activity of the mind, 
and that which is understood, the concrete, objective, 
existential facticity which is the object of understanding.
The process of explanation is dialectical in the platonic 
sense of the term. It involves an asking of questions and 
a proposing of solutions, the latter being refined by further 
questions, clarification, and criticism, leading to the pos­
ing of additional questions and responses. The process, 
while perhaps interminable, does ideally lead to closer, 
more complete approximations of the phenomenon under investi­
gation. The portrayal of explanation as a process under­
scores the dynamic nature of inquiry. Inquiry lacking this 
quality is best exemplified by dogma which is a form of 
explanation that has made truth claims that have resulted in 
a prohibition of questioning. In the case of dogma, as well 
as in some other forms, the process is truncated, and an 
explanatory cul de sac occurs.
Understandinq The second salient term of the proposed 
definition is "understanding." It is, at once, the most 
essential feature of explanation, and the most difficult to 
discuss. The notion of understanding to be presented here 
is limited in that its main purpose is ultimately to help to 
elucidate "scientific" understanding. The idea of understanding
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to be developed is avowedly "activist" to the extent that I 
am interested in those aspects of understanding which attempt 
to make sense of the world. This is not to deny that under­
standing may have a "passive" dimension, one in which the 
intellect is more like a receptacle than an artificer. Nor 
is it to deny that for other forms of ejqolanation, under­
standing, as a device for "relieving curiosity," may be a 
secondary consideration. In the sense that I wish to develop 
here, the primary and ultimate purpose of explanation is 
understanding. To explain something is to make it, in some 
way, understandable, to bring it to comprehension. Under­
standing is that moment in the process of cognition in which 
the mind, figuratively, reaches out and encompasses the 
phenomenon under consideration. It is a moment of illumina­
tion during which the opacity of objects, relations, or 
states of mind are placed in relief against the background 
of experiences and perceptions so as to render them intelli­
gible to the inquirer. This is not to say that all under­
standing is of one type. There are various modes and levels 
of understanding and, thus, of explanation. For example, a 
child curious about the reddish color of the sky at twilight 
might well be satisfied with the explanation that, "Angels 
do their baking at this time." A scientist, however, would 
probably be more satisfied by an explanation emphasizing the 
refractory properties of the ionosphere producing visible 
light radiation within certain spectroscopic parameters as 
determined by pointer-readingsr that is, by atmospheric
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scattering. Both explanations are sufficient to assuage, at 
least temporarily, the curiosities of the respective question­
ers. Both give some means of coping with the observed phenom­
enon; they provide a way of understanding that is appropriate 
to their respective capabilities. It is unlikely that the 
child would have anything added to his understanding by an 
esqslanation employing concepts or devices beyond his ken. By 
the same token, it is unlikely that the scientist, in his work 
as a scientist, would be able to employ the angel explanation.
The example is indicative of a feature of understanding 
that is significant, especially in situations more profound 
than the one given. Understanding emerges, it would seem, 
out of a framework of comprehension. There exists a store 
of accepted understandings and experiences which are central 
to the achievement of new particular understandings. To re­
turn to the twilight example, it can be assumed that the 
adequacy of the angel explanation to the child is predicated 
upon a relatively stable belief in the existence of such 
creatures. Problems would arise if this new understanding 
conflicted with previous information about the nature of 
angels (e.g., angels don't need to eat or drink, therefore 
why should they both with baking?); but, in the absence of 
such contradictory information, the explanation given would 
probably be satisfactory. Indeed, an esqplanation in terms 
of ionospheres and spectroscopes would not only be meaning­
less, because it would fail to correspond to the pattern of 
beliefs and understandings at this particular level; it would 
also fail to answer the initial question for this inquirer.
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I am not saying that the angel explanation is correct 
or incorrect, nor am I saying that it is the only possible 
way of understanding the observed phenomenon. I am not con­
tending that understanding is intransigent, that an explana­
tion once deemed satisfactory will always be considered 
satisfactory. I am saying, however, that the relationship 
between explanation and understanding demands a degree of 
complementarity, that to be acceptable, specific explana­
tions must be given in terms having some correspondence to 
the reality assumptions of the individual to whom the expla­
nation is offered. If it does not, one of two things is 
likely to happen. Either the explanation, because it is not 
understood, will be rejected or, at best, stored for future 
reference, or it will be necessary to instruct the person to 
whom the eaqplanation is offered in an altered, new, or differ­
ent mode of understanding. The latter is done rather rou­
tinely through education, which may be viewed as a systematic 
way of disabusing us of "childish," "simplistic" understand­
ings in favor of more "mature," "sophisticated" ones. The 
former occurs when the explanation is so alien as to render 
it unintelligible, or so dangerous as to threaten the exist­
ing core of understanding by which all explanations, or all 
explanations germane to a particular phenomenon, are judged. 
All of this is not to say that explanations which are not 
understood are not esqilanations at all. On the contrary, 
they are, but they are not relevant or meaningful to a par­
ticular person or group at a particular time.
25
As I stated earlier, understanding is a particularly 
difficult experience to discuss. The sketch of understand­
ing presented above emphasizes a particular aspect of under­
standing which I feel is important to a particular form of 
explanation. In addition, the preceding esqposition, by 
emphasizing the understanding of a particular person of a 
particular phenomenon, neglects the significant social dimen­
sion of understanding. For example, the social phenomenon 
of language, a learned, social activity, is obviously vital 
not only in the communication but also in the formulation of 
understanding. Presently, the social dimension of under­
standing and esqplanation will be discussed more thoroughly.
Phenomena I intend that the third significant term of 
the proposed definition, “phenomena," be taken in the broadest 
possible sense. Its usage encompasses, in the context of 
this inquiry, not only objects of direct, sensory perception, 
but also mental processes, aspects of socio-political inter­
action, and concepts both empirical and intuitive. More 
concisely, "phenomena" refers to anything that can be per­
ceived, thought, intuited, or imagined. Implicit in this 
usage is the notion that all phenomena, so defined, are sus­
ceptible to explanation or attempts at explanation. Moreover, 
relations between phenomena similarly fall within the purview 
of potential explanation.
The above statement entails, at least tacitly, an epis- 
temological position, if only by exclusion. The contentions 
of empiricism, pragmatism, logical positivism, and, to some
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extent, phenomenology as to what is esqolainable are e^qpanded. 
That for which "meaningful explanations" can be offered can­
not be more or less arbitrarily limited to the merely tangi­
ble. To so argue is to make reality assumptions which are 
contradicted by our own day to day esqperience. To say that 
only the measurable, seeable, touchable, hearable, or taste- 
able is the proper domain of knowledge consigns emotions, 
values, beliefs, and predispositions, to say nothing about 
speculation about tangibles and the relation of the mind to 
them, to a limbo of non-being or, at best, non-comprehension.
But if the aforementioned positions are in error because
they exclude all but the concrete, the epistemology of Plato
and his intellectual progeny is unsatisfactory because it has
the effect of making the concrete, the mundane, trivial. I
see little advantage to adopting either extreme. Because we
are beings-in-the-world, our knowledge must account for this
particular here and now: because we are obviously capable of
removing ourselves, through conceptualization and imagination,
from what is simply here and now, we must similarly account
1for such capabilities. The effect of synthesizing the con­
cerns of both of these extremes is to open radically the 
arena of potential ejqplanations by not precluding, as a re­
sult of definition, any subject from its ambit. Hence, the 
broad rendering of the term "phenomena."
^Edward H. Henderson, "Homo Symbolicus: A Definition
of Man," Man and World vol. 4, no. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 132- 
134.
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Evaluation Because of the non-exclusivity of the term, 
phenomena, as it has been defined, and because of what I 
take to be the generally dialectical nature of esqplanation, 
the final term of the proposed definition, "evaluation," 
assumes added significance. Evaluation is a process wherein 
the faculty of judgement is exercised (according to the 
specific interests of this inquiry) as to the acceptability 
or unacceptability of a proposed explanation. Evaluation, 
as an act of judgement, requires criteria according to which 
judgements can be made. The selection of "valid" criteria to 
some extent replicates the problem of selecting "valid" expla­
nations because both tend to be specifications of a more 
general, more basic set of reality assumptions, values, and/ 
or conventions. Thus, Aristotle's defense of slavery in 
certain circumstances would be less odious to an Athenian, 
whose view of the nature of man and the proper ordering of 
society support such an argument, than they would be to con­
temporary, Western man for whom slavery has no such funda­
mental warrant.
The problem, however, is not so simple and unidimensional. 
There are many levels of evaluative criteria and many spheres 
among which standards for evaluation vary. All fall more 
or less within the framework of culturally accepted assump­
tions about the nature of reality, truth, and virtue. In 
order to facilitate discussion, I have collapsed these 
numerous spheres of evaluation and interpretation into three 
basic levels, each of which is subject to further subdivision.
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They are, in order of decreasing generality, the Socio-
2cultural level, the Group level, and the Individual level.
At the Socio-cultural level are found the basic reli­
gious , moral, political, and philosophical predispositions 
which define our general worldview. In the Western tradi­
tion, for example, the basic acceptance of Judeo-Christian 
theology and ethics (including monotheism, belief in a tran­
scendent, personal God, a system of eternal reward and 
retribution requiring individual responsibility for temporal 
activities, the notion of universal brotherhood, a definition 
of specific actions as good or evil, etc.) serves not only 
as a basic framework for dealing with questions about the 
nature of the divine and man's relation to it, but also pro­
vides a set of fundamental criteria for the evaluation of 
the "truthfulness" or "value" of other possible theological 
systems. For example, a Christian, imbued with the spirit 
of Western theology, might well reject Hinduism as polythe­
istic, apersonal, and non-eschatological, that is, for not 
adhering to the "truths" of Western theology.
^The assumption necessary to this taxonomy is that, 
although a number of counterexamples may be presented with­
out any great difficulty, the majority of the members at 
each level adhere to the evaluative and interpretative 
standards at each level. Further, it should be noted that 
these levels, as well as the categories occurring within 
them, are intended as conceptual and heuristic devices, and 
are presented in the same spirit, and with the same purpose, 
as, for example, Locke's "state of nature" argument. Taken 
in this sense, this strategy is not too dissimilar from that 
suggested by Nagel whereby phenomena are analyzed in terms 
of ideal conditions or pure cases. (See chapter 4 below).
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The moral precepts by which the lives of Western men 
are directed are derived from an extension of our religious 
tradition. The codification of these precepts, embodied in 
the Decalogue, are viewed as divine decrees according to 
which man must order his life if he is to attain the rewards 
promised by his theology. The symbiosis between the theo­
logical and the ethical spheres gives ultimate authority 
and indubitability to the latter, and even the rupture 
between the two, a recurring cultural phenomenon, has not 
materially changed the substance of the precepts but has, 
instead, led to a search, again recurring, for alternative,
3non-theological, justifications for existing ethical norms.
As standards for evaluation, these precepts provide the 
basis for judgements concerning the value of alternate ethi­
cal systems, or of specific ethical judgements. For example, 
an ethical system in which virtue is determined by the num­
ber of heads of tribal enemies accumulated, or by the number 
of wives or slaves would be unethical by Western standards.
The evaluative verities of Western political experience 
are more difficult because of the diversity of their evolu­
tion. Indeed, it might be argued that there is as much 
variance within this particular cultural sphere (along a
JSuch attempts may be discerned in works ranging from 
such pre-Christian sources as Aristotle and, to some extent, 
Plato, through certain strains of humanist thought, to some 
social contract-type speculation, to the utilitarians, to 
Marxian ethical speculation, to contemporary atheistic 
existentialism, and to some sociological and social-psycho­
logical theories.
30
temporal dimension) as there is among divergent cultures.
One reason for this might be that the process of seculariza­
tion progressed more rapidly in the political sphere than 
it did within the ethical, and, it goes without saying, 
theological spheres. Still, certain features have provided 
a thread, however tenuous, of evaluative unity.
Among these are the following: First, an interest in
individual freedom, variously formulated, extended, and 
understood, which has endured as a partial justification for 
political action from the struggle for cultural and reli­
gious freedom by the Jews from Babylon and Egypt, to the 
repulsion of Persian tyranny by the Greeks, to wars to make 
the world safe for democracy and to allow political self- 
determination. Second, the notion that God is the ultimate 
source of political authority, or, in a more secular vein, 
that God sanctions, supports, and directs "just" or "legiti­
mate" governments is to be found in such diverse sources as 
Plato, whose ideal rulers derive their right to rule through 
a mystical-philosophical perception of the Good which, though 
not divine in the usual cultural sense, is extra-personal, 
and trans-historical, reaching a zenith in Augustine, John 
of Salisbury, Aquinas, and the notion of the Divine Right of 
Kings, and surviving the radical secularization of political 
thought and the separation of church and state to the extent 
that we still speak of "one nation under God" in the nation 
in which such a separation is most profoundly homaged, and 
in the persistence of "state churches" in other nations.
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Witness also the fact that it is not enough that communism 
he adjured by some on secular, political grounds, but that 
it must bear, for some, the overweening stigma of "godless­
ness. 1 Third, a belief in the "rule of law," a persistent 
chord from Moses to Solon to the Roman lawmakers to the Magna 
Charta to various national constitutions. The emergence of 
legal rationality from charismatic and traditional forms of 
authority is employed by Weber as a primary difference between 
occidental and oriental political development. While Weber 
intended that this observation be descriptive and analytical,
its use as a normative standard of evaluation has not been 
4overlooked. Fourth, and finally, there is the idea of 
individual allegiance to political authority, the assertion 
of which presents an apparent contradiction with the first- 
stated trait, an interest in individual freedom. Much of 
the history of the development of political thought can be 
understood as an attempt to establish the proper balance 
between these two concerns.
The contemporary Western cultural attitude toward polit­
ical allegiance cuts a rather narrow evaluative swath. Tyr­
anny (or despotism) and anarchy are generally used as pejora- 
tives, having reference to slavish obedience or subservience 
on the one hand, or to political apostasy and chaos on the 
other. Our ideal, it would seem, is one of allegiance to an
^Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait,
(Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 388-389.
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authority which permits wide personal discretion, and over 
which we have some degree of control.
The final major set of Socio-cultural criteria to be 
considered are philosophical, more specifically epistemo- 
logical and ontological. These may be reduced to four "laws" 
and what may be best described as a disposition. The dis­
position refers to the recognition (or imposition) of limits 
to the power of the human mind to know reality which leads 
to a bifurcation of understanding into areas most frequently 
characterized by the terms "faith" or "intuition," and "rea­
son. " This mental dualism finds conscious expression only, 
as far as I can determine, in the Western intellectual 
tradition, and thus may be viewed as a fundamental character­
istic of the Western cultural worldview. As a standard of 
philosophical evaluation, its value is difficult to assess.
This is largely because a unitary worldview based upon both 
perspectives has failed to emerge as a well-developed, influ­
ential philosophy. Instead, what has emerged is an alternation
of paradigms whereby first one then the other attitude toward
5the nature of human knowledge has gained predominance. Most 
frequently these modes of knowing have been turned upon one 
another and used as standards by which segments of Western 
thought have been evaluated.
^Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers, (New York: Grosset
& Dunlap, 1959), Parts I and II, passim.
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The four basic "laws" (really axioms or reality pre­
suppositions) which I contend serve as the foundation of 
Western thought are the law of identity, the law of non­
contradiction, the law of the uniformity of nature, and the
6law of sufficient reason. Briefly described, the law of 
identity states that a thing is co-determinant with itself—  
that A is A. Secondly, the law of non-contradiction states 
that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and 
in the same aspect; that is, the statement "All S is P" can­
not be simultaneously and sincerely affirmed and denied by 
the same person. Thirdly, the law of the uniformity of 
nature states that a thing is essentially what it is, and 
remains such, whether or not it is observed, unless acted 
upon by some external agent or by some intrinsic process by 
which it is altered. Though similar to the law of identity 
in that both posit self-consistency, the law of the uniformity 
of nature implies the possibility of the establishment of 
classes of objects sharing similar characteristics over time, 
or similarly affected by similar agents or processes. Final­
ly, the law of sufficient reason states that every occurrence 
is brought about by the action of some antecedent event or 
events which are necessary and sufficient for that occurrence, 
and, secondly, that the relation between prior events and
gThese "laws" are a compilation of basic presuppositions 
characteristic of Western philosophy. I am unaware of their 
origin, in this form, in any literature with which I am 
familiar.
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particular occurrences are, in principle, determinable 
through reason, faith, revelation, or intuition.
Although some of these criteria have been questioned by 
some thinkers (e.g., Hume and the uniformity of nature), no 
one has systematically refuted or denied all four in the 
same system of thought. As criteria of evaluation, they 
have been employed to judge the value of philosophical sys­
tems outside of the Western tradition for which such propo­
sitions are not axiomatic. For example, certain branches of 
Indian philosophy are little concerned with the presence of 
contradictory statements as in the Hindu Koan, "first there 
is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is," 
and could, therefore, be questioned on the basis of the 
second "law."
These then are some of the features basic to Western 
speculation in religion, ethics, politics, and philosophy 
which also function as criteria of evaluation at the socio­
cultural level. They serve the dual purposes of structuring 
our view of reality, of the nature of man, of man's relations 
with other men and with nature itself, while at the same time 
serving as first-level evaluative criteria. However, their 
essential generality not only mitigates their utility as 
standards of evaluation, but also leaves them open to inter­
pretation— in fact, makes interpretation necessary. The 
effect of interpretation is two-fold. The first effect con­
cerns the relationship among the four substantive areas 
themselves. The tendency to regard all four as co-equal
35
partners in a system of evaluation is rare. The concerns of 
any age leads to an ordering of the relative value placed 
upon any four areas mentioned. For example, the subsumption 
of ethical, political, and philosophical speculation under 
the constraint of religious orthodoxy set the ecclesiastical 
tone of the Middle Ages. The imposition of religious criteria 
of evaluation on the other three areas of inquiry had the 
effect not only of dictating certain types of solutions, but 
also of stifling imagination in approaching problems specific 
to politics, ethics, and philosophy. A similar, yet opposite, 
situation emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries with the 
ascendance of "Natural Philosophy" ("Science") and its con- 
commitant criteria of evaluation to a position of predomi­
nance, resulting in a "Watchmaker God" (Paley), a "social 
physics" ethics and politics (Quetelet and Comte), and an 
epistemology based upon the addition and subtraction of 
names of sensations (Hobbes).
Second, interpretation leads to a differentiation of 
emphasis within the substantive spheres themselves. For 
example, in the substantive area of political speculation, 
one interpretation may emphasize (consider pre-eminent) 
individual freedom over individual allegiance to authority. 
Generally speaking, differentiation in this mode refers to 
a system of interpretive ordering of significant considera­
tions. This may take the form of a rank-ordering of the 
features (e.g., in Augustine, God, as the ultimate source 
of political authority, is primary: individual allegiance
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to political authority is secondary; belief in the rule of 
law is tertiary; and individual freedom is tangential), or 
of emphasizing one or two features to the exclusion of the 
others (vide Hegel or J. S. Mill).
The need for interpretation of the general presupposi­
tions at the Socio-cultural level, coupled with a vying for 
pre-eminence among the four substantive areas (and within 
these areas, among the general criteria), provides the 
source and substance of the second level of evaluation, the 
group or associational level. It is at this level that, for 
most people, evaluational criteria are operative. The frame' 
work of "Western culture" with its constituent pre-supposi­
tions, for present purposes considered as criteria of evalu­
ation, lacks specificity and concreteness. Criteria at the 
Socio-cultural level pose too many questions, and provide 
too few solutions to problems of implementation. As was 
stated previously, the generality of these criteria makes 
interpretation unavoidable, and it is through interpretation 
that these general presuppositions become the conceptual and 
evaluative basis for the organization of groups.
For the sake of illustration, assume a society whose 
worldview is composed solely of uninterpreted general pre­
suppositions. Further, assume that, at a given time, there 
is complete acceptance of and satisfaction with these pre­
suppositions by the entire population. If the admission of 
a single question is permitted, and it need not be one chal­
lenging a particular presupposition but merely a request for
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clarification (or interpretation), the stage is potentially 
set for the clash of opinion and the crystalization of 
support around contending positions. For example, if in 
this hypothetical society it is generally accepted that "God 
is the ultimate source of political authority," it might be 
reasonably asked, "To what extent does God superintend, 
sanction, or direct political leaders?" The general belief 
gives no indication of the degree of direction: it simply 
posits that it exists. To answer the question it is necessary 
that an extrapolation from the information provided be made, 
that an inference from the general statement to a more 
specific rendering of the statement be formulated and, in 
some way (persuasion, coersion, etc.) be made convincingly.
The range of responses (providing that a variety be allowed) 
could run from, "The ruler is God, or descended from God, 
and, therefore, his actions and authority are divine, or, at 
least, God-like" to "His office, but not all of his actions, 
has unquestionable divine sanction." Whether for reasons of 
conviction, self-interest, fear, or habit, individuals are 
attracted to and come to support one of this range of re­
sponses, and seek to convert others to the rightness, efficacy, 
or practicality of their opinion. The power to coalesce 
public opinion or coerce acquiescence will determine, for a 
time, which one of these positions will gain pre-eminence, 
becoming the standard position. The process is not termi­
nated by this one resolution. Changes in circumstances or 
experience may again bring into question the existing
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interpretation. But as long as there remains sufficient 
force or reason to support the given interpretation, it 
will remain not only a justification for, in this case, the 
authority of the ruler, but also a standard for evaluating 
other interpretations.
The same process, the formation of groups around opin­
ions, ideas and interpretation, operates throughout society 
on a broad range of issues. Lest this be construed as a 
reductionist approach to, or a total explanation of, this 
phenomenon, let me hasten to add that I do not contend that 
this is the only way, or even the most important way that 
factions are perpetuated. Certainly heritage and habit play 
a significant role in the maintenance of membership or par­
ticipation in large, traditional groups such as churches, 
political parties, and the like. Chance operates, to a 
certain extent, in the constitution of social classes and 
nationalities. But, with few exceptions (e.g., race, eth­
nicity), the formation of groups was aided by constellations 
of opinion around some interpretive position on some issue. 
And, in varying degrees depending upon the nature of the 
group, adherence to certain central positions is critical in 
determining group membership. There is a reciprocity between 
ideas espoused and association which only at a later time 
is mitigated by habit, custom, and conformity.
The third level of evaluation, the most specific and 
fundamental, is the individual. In a very real sense, it 
is only through the individual that evaluation occurs. The
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Socio-cultural and Group categories are, for the most part, 
convenient symbols for aggregations of individuals holding 
certain opinions and activities in common. The influence of 
these aggregates upon the individual in forming evaluations 
is of indubitable importance. Whereas the concatenation of 
several individuals of similar opinion concerning some issue 
is essential to the formation of groups, the influe;- e of 
the group position not only reinforces the individual in 
certain aspects of his thinking, but also provides a subtle 
framework which serves to organize ancillary propositions 
about related matters. This is most obvious in those large, 
broadly based, traditional associations such as churches and 
ideology groups where interpretative authority in widely 
ranging areas of concern is claimed for the orthodox.
The lack of total homogeneity, as evidenced at one level 
by the plurality of groups espousing varying positions around 
a central issue, and at another by the persistence of dissi­
dents within a group about a point of interpretation, is an 
indication of the continuing process by which the individual 
evaluates standard interpretations and finds them wanting.
The genesis of their dissatisfaction may be the result of 
several factors. These may be subsumed under the general 
contention that the standard interpretation, though perhaps
satisfactory at one time, no longer corresponds to the
7experience of the individual. The reasons for this may vary.
^As described in chapter 1.
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New, or more complete information may render basic statements 
more understandable. Perceptions of interest or advantage 
may alter with changing circumstances, making different 
interpretations more practical and beneficial. New inter­
pretations , necessitated by previously unanticipated situa­
tions or information, may conflict with older, standing 
positions and this conflict may require amelioration. Or, 
simply, an interpretation may not "seem" right to an indi­
vidual either singly or in the context of similar explana­
tions.
For whatever reasons, evaluation by the individual is 
a constantly recurring phenomenon. Individuals are contin­
ually responding to ideas, situations, and proposals, evalu­
ating them in such a way so as to reaffirm, rearrange, or 
reappraise aspects of their thinking. The broad framework 
of evaluation defined at the Socio-cultural level by general 
agreement over a long period of time on generalizations of 
the kind mentioned with reference to theology, ethics, poli­
tics, and philosophy, and the more specific renderings of 
these generalizations at the Group level provides the con­
text in which individual evaluation operates. From these 
levels are derived the most fundamental and pervasive of 
conceptual influences, including language, terminology, 
grammar, syntax, and other rules of symbol usage which 
function as a prism in the definition, interpretation, and 
judgement of ideas, situations, and dispositions. The first 
and second levels of the evaluative framework themselves,
41
however, are the repositories of countless individual judge­
ments and evaluations which have been, through time and cir­
cumstance, abstracted, collated, and generalized to the 
status of "standards," "canons," and "truths." The relation­
ship between the first two and the third levels of evaluation 
is one of dynamic symbiosis in which the influence is bidirec­
tional, and change, for the most part, is accretional and 
incremental. The interaction effects between levels are 
constant and pervasive, if not of equal intensity (e.g., the 
influence of a particular group— an organized religion, for 
example— on almost any individual is greater than that of 
the individual of the group). The focus of the process of 
evaluation, symbolized by this tri-partite construct, is 
the individual both as the sole source of new interpretations 
and evaluations and as the subject upon whom this process 
operates. The individual is, so to speak, both the producer 
and the consumer of explanations and their consequences.
Explanation: A Working Model
Theoria The uniquely human proclivity to offer esqola- 
nations arises out of the need to organize esqperience in 
some meaningful, understandable way, to impose or discover 
some order on what I earlier called the welter of impressions 
and ideas with which one is confronted daily. The definition 
of explanation which I have formulated attempts to present 
this organizing tendency intensionally (through the discussion 
of "process," "understanding," and "phenomenon") and exten- 
sionally (through the extensive discussion of "evaluation").
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Much remains to be said about the technical aspects of expla­
nation especially as it pertains to scientific explanation 
and to theory. Any further consideration of the phenomenon 
of explanation necessitates an investigation of its source 
in the cognitive process, and an analysis of its relation 
to two other concepts, description and prediction.
I have contended that there exists a "need” to organize 
experience, and have implied that this need is seminal to 
the explanatory process. I would argue, however, that this 
need itself is a consequence of some more primary urge or 
disposition which gives both impetus and direction to the 
search for explanations, and exists in relation to this need 
as the source of a sound does to the sound made, or the 
source of an action does to an action. This disposition, 
most commonly symbolized by the terms "wonder," "curiosity," 
or "inquisitiveness," is the problem-conceiving or problem- 
formulating aspect of the process of explanation. The cen­
trality of curiosity or wonder to creativity, and hence to 
esqplanation as a creative act, is affirmed by Arthur Koestler 
in his impressive work, The Act of Creation. In it, he states, 
"this oceanic feeling of wonder is the common source of 
religious mysticism, of pure science, of art for art's sake;
Qit is their common denominator and emotive bond." In 
evidence, Koestler presents the following testimony;
®Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1964), p. 258.
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'Men were first led to the study of Natural 
Philosophy' wrote Aristotle, 'as indeed they are 
today, by wonder.' Maxwell's earliest memory was,
'lying on the grass, looking at the sun, and 
wondering.1 Einstein struck the same chord when 
he wrote that whoever is devoid of the capacity to 
wonder, 'whoever remains unmoved, whoever cannot 
contemplate or know the deep shudder of the soul 
in enchantment, might as well be dead for he has 
already closed his eyes upon life.'
Wondering activity is the link between phenomena and under­
standing. It is the nexus joining the world "out there" 
and the symbolization of that world, the gate through which 
that which is external to the mind passes and arouses those 
feelings which are preliminary to attempts at understanding.
Curiosity, wonder, inquisitiveness, the pricking of the 
imagination by something which is not comprehended, or by 
previously unnoticed aspects of things familiar initiates a 
series of activities through which the unexplained is organ­
ized to make it potentially understandable. The object of 
interest is analyzed, identified, and rearranged so that 
speculation about it becomes possible. Thus, when one says 
that a problem is "formulated," there is a tacit recognition 
of this process in operation; the observation is given a form 
which makes it amenable to contemplation.For purposes of
®Ibid. Italics in Maxwell.
•^As adumbrated in chapter 1 and again earlier in this 
chapter, the way in which this formulation occurs is largely 
influenced by pre-existing, accepted forms of thought. In­
deed, the very perception of a problem is likely dependent 
upon these structures. Again, the social component of 
explanation enters the picture. For further information see 
Eugene Meehan, Explanation in Social Science, (Homewood: 
Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 42-43.
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simplification, I will label this whole process, including 
those activities preceding attempts at explanation, theoria, 
that is "looking at" or contemplation, and consider them as 
a prologue to, or preparatory stage for the process of expla­
nation.
If theoria provides the impetus and the initial formu­
lation to prospective explanations, then three activities, 
which may be separated for purposes of analysis, provide the 
substance. These activities, directly the result of contem­
plation, are description, explanation, and prediction. In 
a very superficial way they may be regarded as indicating 
responses to three classes of questions that can be asked
about a phenomenon: What is it? Why is it as it is? And,
11how will it effect (or be affected by) future events? A 
very real semantical and logical problem is presented by 
this trichotomy in that I am employing "explanation" as a 
term in defining the process of explanation which I take to 
include theoria plus some combination of description, expla­
nation, and prediction as activities in that process. The 
solution to this difficulty lies in accepting the term, 
"explanation" in two senses, or, more accurately, on two 
levels. The first usage, that employed to this point, takes 
explanation in its more general, non-technical sense as an
^ A s  will be seen, such syntactical distinctions will 
prove inadequate to distinguishing these activities. They 
are presented here only as first approximations.
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enterprise directed at efforts to broaden human understand­
ing by attempting to make phenomena more intelligible. The 
second sense, or level meaning, of explanation is more specif 
ic and technical. In this usage, the term "explanation" is 
usually preceded by a qualifying adjective, such as "scien­
tific, " "mythical," etc., which indicates that a particular
form of esqolanation having specific attributes and inclusion
12criteria is being discussed. The inclusion of description
and prediction in the trichotomy of eaqolanatory activities
is justified— indeed, made necessary— by dint of the special
relation between these three terms and the activities which
they symbolize. The nature of this relationship will be
made more explicit in the following discussion.
Description A description is a representation. It is
an indication of a specific occurrence. Descriptions are, in
a sense, re-creations. They are symbolic reenactments of
particular experiences. In addition, a description is a
social event, that is, we generally describe a thing to some-
13one other than ourselves. A man, after witnessing, for 
example, an exceptionally exciting sporting event, may wish 
to share it with others who were not present. In order to
12Incalculable damage has been, and is still being, done 
by the failure to distinguish between these two senses of 
explanation. The damage is the result of taking a particular 
form of explanation and asserting it as the form of explana­
tion generally, to the exclusion of all other particular forms.
^Stephen Toulmin and K. Baier, "On Describing," Mind,
LXI, no. 241 (Jan., 1952), p. 16.
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accomplish this he may paint it, or take a picture of it, 
or write a poem or an essay about it. His intention in 
each act is to capture certain features of this experience 
for presentation at a later time. His presentation will 
not be of the total event, nor of each and every feature of 
the event. Rather, he will delimit those features which, 
for him, were meaningful, unique, or significant vis a vis 
similar experiences he has had. His mode of presentation, 
the symbols by which he chooses to esqjress himself, will be 
consonant with his intention in re-creating the experience, 
and directed toward a particular audience.
A description may be seen as a way of specifying e^qoeri- 
ence, of focusing attention toward particular phenomena. In 
describing something, whether it is an object, a process, a 
thought, or an emotion, one presents that thing as distinct, 
or distinguishable, from other accompanying perceptions. 
Because descriptions are social, and because they are repre­
sentations, they are different from the experience of dis­
tinctiveness itself. In offering a description, one is 
abstracting from the experience those salient features which 
are at least potentially communicable. In this sense, 
descriptions can be viewed, with some reservations, as extend­
ed, detailed reports about experiences or perceptions.
It should be noted that not all statements are descrip­
tions. Toulmin and Baier in their article, "On Describing," 
have contended that statements of fact are not, in themselves,
descriptions. Although all statements of fact have ob­
jects, i.e., persons, things, events, processes, etc., to
which they refer, facts themselves, "...cannot be described:
15(they) can only be stated." Further, "description is not 
a word parallel to the phrase 'statement of fact:' it refers 
rather to a type of use to which a sentence may be put."^
For example, to make the statement, "there is an ashtray on 
my desk," is not to describe the ashtray, my desk, the room, 
nor anything else. Such a statement may serve as the begin­
ning of a description, (e.g., "There is an ashtray on my 
desk. It is ceramic, brown and white, and shaped like a 
leaf supporting a large ceramic pipe. A large piece has 
been chipped from it."), but need not do so (e.g., It is hot 
today; it's 11:30 p.m.). Utterances of the "statement of 
fact" type are called "reports" by Robert Brown, and are 
distinguished from descriptions on the grounds that "to 
describe something is to tell someone what some state of 
affairs is like. A successful description enables the audi­
tor to recognize what has been described to him, when he
otherwise would not be able to do so. A successful report
17need not do this...."
14Ibid., p. 17.
15Ibid.
16AOIbid. (emphasis in original)
17Robert Brown, Explanation in the Social Sciences, 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1963), p. 16. It should
be noted that the line distinguishing "report" from "descrip' 
tion" is a tenuous and shifting one determined, for the most 
part, by the use that is made of a particular statement.
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Toulmin and Baier stipulate that a description must
describe its object as it exists at the time perceived {to
deny this is to assert that one could describe "nothing");
that it must state the sort of thing being described and not
simply give characteristics (e.g., saying that "it is ceramic,
brown and white, leaf and pipe shaped, and missing a piece"
would not be an adequate description of the specific object
on my desk, and would probably not edify the hearer); and
that the describer must be in a better position, either
physically, or in terms of knowledge, to describe the phenom-
18enon than the person receiving the description. It is 
Toulmin and Baier's position that a verbal or written descrip­
tion should function much as a picture would. To use their
example, a description of a criminal will be good insofar as
19it, like a picture, aids police in recognizing the felon.
Likewise, the description of a process or procedure "...will
be the better the more nearly it will do instead of a demon- 
20stration." A description is to be judged "successful"
according to these criteria plus the condition that it is
. . 21 "sufficiently full, fair, accurate, and well-balanced."
This is not to argue that there is one and only one
description for any phenomenon. To the contrary, Bertrand





Russell contends, "There are innumerable correct descrip-
22tions of any given object." For example, two persons 
having different interests, training, backgrounds, and abil­
ities, who are standing side by side witnessing the same 
event may arrive at quite different descriptions of that 
event. Both are descriptions if their purpose is to repre­
sent a particular experience. Neither can be said to be 
correct or incorrect as descriptions; particular facts may 
be erroneous, or the total product may be inaccurate; but
23this is not to say that it "is not a description at all."
The possibility of a multiplicity of descriptions for 
any particular phenomenon may be seen as part of a larger 
problem— that for any given situation there are a multiplicity 
of possible descriptions. A zoologist, a botanist, and a 
meteorologist placed in the same forest for a given period 
of time with the instructions to describe their environment 
will each probably come up with totally different pictures 
of their "common" ejqperience. The zoologist will be more 
likely, because of his training and inclination, to describe 
the fauna, the botanist, the flora, and the meteorologist, 
the climatological conditions. The same objective totality 
will be perceived differently by the three observers. It is 
impossible that any observer give a complete description of
^Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philos­
ophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, n.d.), p. 140.
Toulmin and Baier, op. crt., p. 23.
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every facet of the situation. The particular phenomena,
though finite, are (for practical purposes) innumerable. It
becomes necessary to pick and choose, to emphasize and de-
emphasize, to establish foreground and background, according
to some criteria of salience or relevance. Often these
criteria are so basic, so fundamental, that the observer is
24not even conscious of them. The three observers in the 
example, all being "scientifically" trained, probably share 
the same set of reality assumptions, the same general rules 
of observation and evidence, and yet they will probably come 
up with different descriptions because they define different 
features of their environment as being problematical.
The situation is complicated further when descriptions 
are made by persons not sharing the same set of reality 
assumptions, and for whom there are no common symbols by 
which the phenomenon may be described. Imagine, for example, 
a Tassaday indian trying to describe the launching of an 
Apollo rocket, or a television program, or snow, first to a 
fellow Tassaday, and then, in the same terms, to a Westerner. 
There would be no "universe of discourse," no common sphere 
in which terms were understood to apply. The meaning of 
terms and, therefore, the describability of phenomena, are 
dependent upon common definitions not only of symbols, but of 
the reality which those symbols represent.
This is often the case with the items in the three 
levels of evaluation cited earlier. Their application is 
automatic.
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The point being made here is that descriptions are con- 
25textual, that the recognition resulting from a successful
description derives from a common understanding of related
phenomena. Russell contends that a description, "consists
of several words, whose meanings are already fixed, and from
which results whatever is taken to be the 'meaning' of the 
26description." If, as has been argued, description is a 
process of rendering familiar data of experience or intui­
tion according to definitions of what is real, significant, 
or meaningful, a correspondence between the means by which 
understanding is attained ("explanation" in the more general 
sense of the term) and the necessity for defining particular 
phenomena according to symbols given meaning by a particular 
understanding becomes not only obvious, but essential. To 
borrow (and corrupt) a Husserlian tenet, description is 
intentional and perspectival, and both the direction of 
attention and the perspective are provided by those systemat­
ically related concepts called explanations.
Some philosophers have argued that explanation is a
27reduction of the unfamiliar to the familiar. It is my 
belief that this characterization pertains more properly to
7 SMichael Scriven, "Definitions, Explanations, and 
Theories," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
vol. II (1958), pp. 99-195, passim.
^Russell, op. cit., p. 174.
The adequacy of this view of explanation will be 
considered in the next section.
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description. Description, as a process of familiarization,
serves three functions. First, it makes more explicit the
characteristics of phenomena for which we already have defi-
28nite symbols (i.e., definitions, names, etc.). Secondly, 
it helps to specify differences among particular instances 
in classes of phenomena for which we have established cate­
gories. Thirdly, it aides in the identification of unknown 
or unclassified phenomena by stating their characteristics 
according to definite symbols (where possible), thus allow­
ing for comparison with known objects having similar charac-
. . 29tenstics.
The purpose of description is to organize phenomena 
into similar classes, to arrange perceptions in such a way 
so as to make them cognitively manageable, and, thus, intelli­
gible. Description deals with the singular, either as it 
occurs in discrete phenomena or in constructed classes which 
abstract similar characteristics from a number of phenomena.
By establishing such classes, judgements concerning relations 
within classes and between them are facilitated. As will be 
argued in the next section, explanation is primarily con­
cerned with understanding such relationships.
28A definite symbol is one which has an established 
meaning in some universe of discourse.
28It makes no difference if the "unfamiliarity" of the 
phenomenon in question is individual (i.e. I  personally do 
not know what it is) or general (i.e. beyond the scope of 
organized knowledge at the time). The same function is per 
formed.
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Explanation The earlier and extensive definition of 
explanation as a process whereby an understanding of̂  a given 
phenomenon or of the relationship between given phenomena is 
presented for evaluation, while still appropriate, needs 
specification. The earlier formulation of this concept pro­
vides the framework for understanding the entire descrip- 
tion-explanation-prediction complex. In order to provide 
more substance, to detail the linkages between description 
and prediction, a consideration of particular features of 
esqplanation will be necessary.
Explanation is concerned with relationships. It is 
close to meaningless to ask someone to "explain an apple."
One can report, "There is an apple on the table." Or one 
can describe a particular apple, or apples in general— " (An) 
applets) is (are) roundish in shape, yellow to red in color, 
tart to sweet in taste, etc." But one cannot be said to 
esqplain an apple or apples. However, the relationship 
between, for example, apples and nutrition, or apples and 
Newton's theory of gravitational attraction can possibly be 
esqplained or, at least, is susceptible to attempts at expla­
nation.
Often explanations of a single phenomenon, or of a class 
of phenomena are requested. What is usually desired is either 
a description of the phenomenon, in which case the wrong 
question has been asked, or an iteration of related factors. 
For example, if one is asked to explain the voting behavior 
of Black Americans, one can, depending upon how the question
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is understood, discuss the way some percentage of Black 
Americans have traditionally voted over some period of time; 
or one can present the relationship between being Black and 
voting in a particular way by introducing related factors 
{SES, parent's party identification, peer group pressure, 
etc.)* In the first instance, a description has been given; 
in the second, a possible explanation. Similarly, one may 
be asked to "explain" paranoia. The response can be either 
a listing of characteristics {nervousness, a sense of power­
lessness, anxiety, etc.) or a rendition of factors not 
included in the description of paranoia, but which are posited 
as being related to it in a particular way. Again, as in 
the voting example, the first response would be, in the 
strict sense, a description; the second, because it deals 
with a relationship between the phenomenon in question and 
other factors, a tentative explanation. As Norwood Russell 
Hanson has argued, "One cannot explain the properties of a 
class of entities by appealing to entities which possess
30those properties, that is which are members of the class."
John Hospers makes a corollary point in saying that, 
"Explanation is always in terms of something else, and there 
can be no explanation (to request one is to make a demand 
logically impossible of fulfillment) if there is nothing even
30Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, (Cam­
bridge; Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 159. Hanson 
is here elaborating a point made by Heisenberg.
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31hypothecated in terms of which to make it.,r In an expla­
nation, the things being explained, the explananda (um) are
32said to be accounted for by the exolanans, i.e., those 
factors offered in explanation. Although the nature of the 
relationship between explananda and ejqplanans varies from 
type of esqplanation to type of explanation and is the topic 
of continuing debate, a common characteristic of all expla­
nation is this relational quality according to which some­
thing is accounted for in terms other than of itself.
The argument that there are differences between expla­
nation and description does not entail the argument that they 
are altogether unrelated activities. To the contrary, I 
have contended that both are concerned with phenomena or 
classes of phenomena, and that both are involved in the 
effort to render the world intelligible. It would be foolish 
to argue that any explanation which is not totally formalized 
and abstract does not depend on description both for its 
formulation and its application. Even the highly formalized, 
mathematicized explanations of quantum physics require des­
criptions of postulated phenomena if they are to be applied.
I do contend, however, that explanations and descrip­
tions deal with different aspects of understanding. The
31John Hospers, "On Explanation," The Journal of Philos­
ophy Vol. XLIII, no. 13, (June, 1946), p. 350.
32Also called, but in a different context, explicanda 
(um) and explicans.
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relationship between the two is symbiotic. Each effects the 
other in direct and significant ways. A description of phe­
nomena will structure the manner in which relations between 
phenomena are perceived. Concomitantly, a general explana­
tory framework will help to filter significant factors from
33raw perceptions, thus providing guidelines for description.
The relation between description and explanation has
been portrayed in various ways. Some have contended that we
never explain things, we only offer elaborate descriptions
of them. "The sciences, therefore, achieve what are at best
only elaborate and accurate systems of description, not of 
34eiqplanation." Others hold that explanation ''strives to go
beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing
35an explanation of the phenomena it investigates." Kaplan 
has argued that explanations are "concatenated descriptions" 
which function "not by invoking something beyond what might 
be described but by putting one fact or law into relation 
with others. Because of the concatenation, each element of 
what is being described shines, as it were, with light
33See Hanson, op. cit., especially chapter 1 for a 
detailed account of this process.
34Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1961), p. 26. Nagel is 
merely stating a position. It is not his own.
35Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Expla­
nation," in Herbert Feigl and May Broadbeck, eds., Readings 
in the Philosophy of Science, (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1953), p. 319.
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36 . .reflected from all others...." Another position states
that explanation is the reduction of the unfamiliar to the 
37familiar. Aside from demonstrating the vitality (and 
ambiguity) of the concepts of description and explanation, 
this brief recitation presents issues Which, I think, can be 
resolved by the understanding proposed in this paper.
First, the debate over whether description is more than 
or less than explanation is resolved by viewing them, not as 
separate acts, but as aspects of the same process each affect­
ing and being affected by the other toward the same purpose, 
that of understanding. Secondly, Kaplan's "concatenated 
description" view is subsumed, or is, at least, subsumable, 
according to the tenet that explanations are concerned with 
relations between phenomena, thus obviating the "when is a 
description not a description" circumlocution. If Kaplan's 
concatenated descriptions are simply multiple characteriza­
tions of aspects of the phenomenon in question, then these 
characterizations function as descriptions. If they are 
characterizations in terms of other related phenomena, and 
the nature of the relationship can be stated clearly and 
precisely, then the concatenation is ejqplanatory in function. 
It should be emphasized that parallel descriptions are not, 
of themselves, ejqplanatory. It is necessary that something
36Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, (San Francis­
co: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 329.
37Hospers, op. cit., pp. 338-340.
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be posited about the nature of the relationship between them
that is sufficient to account for the concatenation in a
systematic way. Finally, the "esqplanation as the reduction
of the unfamiliar to the familiar" formula becomes a species
or aspect of description, the categorization of phenomena
38according to common characteristics.
This admittedly does not exhaust all of the issues 
concerning explanation, or explanation and description.
Many of these issues will be joined in the next chapters. It 
does, however, demonstrate the utility of the perspective 
here proposed, and helps to establish some of the concerns 
to follow.
Prediction A prediction may best be portrayed as a 
description projected into some future time. It describes 
a state of affairs which is yet to be experienced. Like 
descriptions, predictions usually deal with characteristics 
of particular phenomena or classes of phenomena. They 
generally take the form, "At time so and so, certain con­
ditions having been met, such and such will be (become) the 
case." It should be noted that, when used colloquially, 
either the specific time or the specific conditions may be
38This is perhaps a too facile treatment of this charac­
terization of explanation, particularly in its nomothetic- 
deductive and hypothetic-deductive formulations. It should 
be noted, in contrast to this view, that Popper characterizes 
explanation as the reduction of the "familiar to the unfamil­
iar." Quoted in F. A. Hayek, "Degrees of Explanation," 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 6, pp. 
210-211.
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omitted from the prediction. For example, "If the tempera-
oture in the room gets above 35 , the ice will melt," or "On 
December 14, 1978 at 9:30 a.m., there will be a partial 
eclipse of the sun." When used in its more rigorous sense, 
a prediction usually takes the form of a hypothetical state­
ment in which both time, stated as a rate of change, and 
conditions are stated. For example, "If the number of polit­
ical messages received by a potential voter is increased in 
the three days preceding an election, then he will be more 
likely to vote in that election." But this need not be the 
case, as in the prediction, "The velocity of this ball when
it hits the ground will be proportional to the time it has 
39fallen."
The general, and almost universally accepted function
of predictions is to act as a check on the truth of eaqplana-
tions. If a certain set of conditions are posited as being
factors relating phenomena, then these conditions ought to
40hold for future instances of the same relationship. If
not, then the explanation is disconfirmed, and other explana-
, 41tions are sought.
The damage done to a possible explanation by the dis­
covery that its tenets fail to yield accurate predictions,
39I realize that the conditions supporting these two 
predictions are of a different nature. Here, I am interested 
only in the form of the prediction.
40ceteris paribus.
41 . . .  .Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New
York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 40.
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and the number of inaccurate predictions which can be tole­
rated before an explanation must be transformed or abandoned 
is a matter of some debate. In fact, the exact nature of 
the relationship between explanation and prediction seems to 
be a major point of contention among those concerned with 
the problem of explanation. One school takes the position 
that esqplanation and prediction are symmetrical, that for
an explanation to be adequate it must also be capable of
42serving as a prediction. Another school contends that 
symmetry between escplanation and prediction is not a necessary 
condition of "adequate" or even "adequate scientific" expla­
nations. Norwood Russell Hanson cites numerous examples of 
explanations, or explanatory patterns, having little or no
predictive value, but which, nonetheless, serve to organize
43phenomena in a meaningful way. In contrast, Hanson cites
predictions made regularly and routinely for which no esqpla-
44nations were offered.
42 •See, among others, Hempel, Aspects of Scientific
Explanation: Hayek, "Degrees of Esqplanation,"; Braithwaite, 
Scientific Explanation: Nagel, The Structure of Science.
43Norwood Russell Hanson, "On the Symmetry between 
Explanation and Prediction," Philosophical Review. vol.
LXVII (July, 1959), pp. 350-351. See also Hanson, Patterns 
of Discovery, p. 71 and passim, and Scriven, "Explanations, 
Prediction, and Laws," p. 176 ff., among others.
44Hanson, Ibid., p. 350. As an example of an explanatory 
system with little or no predictive value Hanson cites 
Aristotle's cosmology. As an example of predictions for 
which no ejqolanations were offered, indeed, for which the 
possibility of explanation was ruled out, Hanson cites the 
astronomy of, among others, Eudoxus and Ptolemy.
One of the problems of stipulating a necessary relation­
ship between explanation and prediction concerns the nature 
of prediction itself. Prediction is based on the notion 
that similarities of phenomena and between phenomena persist 
over time. This is one of the fundamental principles of the 
Western philosophical worldview (the uniformity of nature) 
and seems to accord with both experience and with most specu­
lation about experience (Hume not to the contrary). The 
problem revolves around the tautological nature of this ren­
dering of prediction. One may predict, "The sun will rise 
tomorrow morning." The prediction will probably (and hope­
fully) be a true one. If the question is asked, "How did 
you know this would happen?" the predictor may reply, "It 
always has before," or he may cite reasons— the rotation of 
the earth. The first is an esqolanation only in the loosest 
sense, and is hardly satisfactory. There is no necessary 
connection between this "explanation" and the prediction.
It leads, quite naturally, to the further question, "Why did 
it always do so before?" The esqplanation is merely postponed. 
The second explanation is only slightly better. It includes 
the sun as a reference point and, thus, the phenomenon is
explained in terms of itself. Even if the phenomenon were
45explained by "laws" not including the sun, the reference 
would still be to past events (repeated occurrences which
4^More will be said of Laws in the next chapter.
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make a law a law), and the event, sunrise, is implied in the 
ejqplanation. The problem, more simply stated, is that the 
explanation predisposes us to expect and anticipate the pre­
diction because it is part of the explanation, much in the 
same way that the botanist in the previous example described 
his surroundings according to his primary frame of reference, 
plants. Though the two activities, explanation and predic­
tion, are related, they perform different functions. The 
former is concerned with meaning and understanding; the 
latter, with justification and control. To require predicta­
bility, even in principle, as a condition of ejqplanation is 
to ignore this difference. To quote Ducasse, "Prediction is
one thing and explanation of predictability is another 
46thing."
Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented a general definition 
and a working model of explanation. The purpose of these 
activities has been to provide information about a general 
concept of explanation and some of the concerns and problems 
such a concept involves. The next chapters will investigate 
a more narrowly circumscribed notion of explanation, that of 
scientific explanation. This will be accomplished through
ACtC. J. Ducasse, "Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology," 
in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars, eds., Readings in 
Philosophical Analysis, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1949), p. 541.
an investigation of the "explanatory tool" of science, theory. 
I will be particularly interested in what has come to be 
called the Standard or Received View account of scientific 
explanation and of theory because of the considerable influ­
ence it has had upon political and social scientific theory. 
Finally, I will attempt to assess the adequacy of the 
Received View both as an account of scientific explanation, 
and as a guide to the solution of conceptual and theoretical 
problems in political and social science.
CHAPTER THREE
Theory
At root, the purpose of science, as distinguished from 
technology or engineering, is to offer explanations of a par 
ticular kind in an attempt to make the world intelligible. . 
It shares in this endeavor with other similar enterprises—  
religion, mythology— and with them takes as its goal the 
task of discovering or creating order, of changing chaos 
into cosmos.
The tool employed by science in this task is theory.
Theory is the particular conceptual device by which science
constructs the world or, at least, its particular worldview.
The precise characteristics of that worldview are a matter
of some controversy, but there is considerable agreement,
particularly among some philosophers of science, that theory
"explains" differently from dogma and myth, the explanatory
"tools" of religion and mythology, respectively.
The nature of the difference of scientific explanation
from other forms has come to be known as "the problem of 
47demarcation." The problem is an old and vexing one, and
^Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 34. A discussion of theproblem of demarcation is presented here because attempts to resolve it are directly concerned with the problem of what 




it involves as corollaries the problems of induction, and of
meaning. In its various forms it occupied much of the atten-
48tion of Hume and Kant. Comte was particularly concerned
with it, and his "solution" of the problem is contained in
his notion of the three stages of the development of the
human mind, each of which is characterized by a different
type of explanation and attended by a different form of
49social organization. Raymond Aron summarizes Comte's xdeas 
in the following way:
The law of the three stages consists in the 
assertion that the human mind passes through three 
phases. In the first, the mind explains phenomena 
by ascribing them to beings or forces comparable to 
man himself. In the second phase, that of metaphysics, 
the mind explains phenomena by invoicing abstract 
entities like "nature." Finally, in the third phase, 
man is content to observe phenomena and to establish 
the regular links existing among them, whether in a 
given moment or in the course of time. He abandons 
the search for the final principle behind the facts 
and confines-himself to establishing the laws that 
govern them. 0
Thus, the point of distinction between scientific and 
non-scientific thought for Comte is the abandonment of non­
observable entities and forces as explanatory devices in 
favor of the description of observed regularities among 
natural phenomena. This alternative carries with it the 
consequence that science becomes "simpler," that it makes
48Ibid.
49Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought. 
vol. I, (Garden City: Anchor Doubleday, 1968), p. 76.
50Ibid.
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fewer ontological assumptions than do other forms of thought. 
This entails the methodological consequence that "science" 
is to proceed "empirically," that the sine qua non of scien­
tific assertions is a foundation in experience through per­
ception. General scientific assertions are the result of 
the meticulous observation of particular, concrete natural 
phenomena and are simply descriptions of observed regulari­
ties. The direction of inquiry is from the particular to 
the general, and it is the formulation of general statements 
of observed regularity that is the aim of science. In short, 
science proceeds inductively to laws of a descriptive nature 
which are "meaningful" because they are rooted not in specu­
lation involving unobservable forces or entities, but in 
observation.
The fundamental tenets of Comte's solution to the prob­
lem of demarcation were continued and developed in more 
recent times by the neo- or logical positivists of the Vienna 
Circle and their intellectual descendents. To the thorough­
going methodological inductivism of Comte and John Stuart 
Mill, the logical positivists added the epistemological cri­
terion of "meaningfulness." By this was meant that only 
those concepts which were derived from experience, that is,
reducible to sense ejqperience or memory of sense experience
51were meanxngful and subject to verification. Later formu­
lations of this position further reduce the applicability of
^Popper, op. cit. , pp. 34-35.
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the criterion of meaningfulness to the "atomic propositions"
or "protocol statements" of Wittgenstein, Neurath, and Car- 
52nap. Sentences which are not directly reducible to data 
of sense experience, and, as a consequence, are not induc­
tively verifiable, are characterized as "literally sense-
53less" and, therefore, devoid of meaning. A "genuine
statement" is one which is "capable of conclusive verifica- 
54tion." "If there is no possible way to determine whether 
a statement is true, then the statement has no meaning what­
soever. For the meaning of a statement is its method of 
55verification." The criterion of demarcation differentiating 
scientific from other statements was the verifiability cri­
terion of meaning. Theories, as the explanatory tools of 
science, came to be seen, according to this view, as systems
of generalized observation statements which were inductively 
56verifiable.
52Ibid., pp. 35-36, 95. Carnap's notion of "meaning­
fulness" has gone through several formulations. For an 
account of this evolution see Popper's "The Demarcation 
between Science and Metaphysics," in Conjectures and Refuta­
tions, {New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 253-292.
53A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, (New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), p. 31.
^4Morris Schlick cited in Popper, The Logic of Scien­
tific Discovery, p. 40.
55Waismann cited in Ibid. It should be noted that in 
Language, Truth, and Logic, Ayer presents a modified version 
of this extreme verificationism.
5®This, in part, is the foundation of the view, pre­
sented in Chapter 2, that science "only describes."
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The resolution of the demarcation problem, and with it, 
the at least tacit definition of the form and content of a 
scientific theory, presented by the logical positivists of 
the Vienna Circle was attacked at its twin foundations, 
induction and the verifiability criterion of meaning, by 
Karl Popper. The former, contended Popper, was both "logi­
cally inadmissible," and inaccurate as a portrayal of theory 
57construction. The latter, argued Popper, had the effect 
of throwing the baby out with the bath.
Popper rejects the Baconian view that science, and with 
it, theory, proceeds from observations, or singular state­
ments embodying specific observations, to more general state­
ments concerning classes of objects over time. The view 
that scientists collect facts (data), scrutinize them for 
relationships or regularities, and then develop theories 
capable of "ejqplaining" them is erroneousj science begins 
with hypotheses, "conjectures" as Popper calls them, which 
guide and direct observation. It is not fundamentally 
inductive but deductive. Popper credits Kant with this in­
sight concerning the conduct of scientific inquiry, saying:
...Kant shows how well he understood that we 
ourselves must confront nature with hypotheses and 
demand a reply to our questions; and that, lacking 
such hypotheses we can only make haphazard observa­
tions which follow no plan and which therefore can 
never lead us to a natural law. In other words,
Kant saw with perfect clarity that the history of 
science had refuted the Baconian myth that we must
^^popper, Ibid.
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begin with observations in order to derive our 
theories from them. And Kant also realized very 
clearly that behind this historical fact lay a 
logical fact: that there were logical reasons why 
this kind of thing did not occur in the history 
of science: that it was logically impossible to
derive theories from observations.
This criticism derives from the second part of Popper's 
first line of attack on the logical positivist position, the 
notion that induction is logically insupportable. Popper 
argues:
Now in my view, there is no such thing as 
induction. Thus, inferences to theories, from 
singular statements which are "verified by 
experience" (Whatever that may mean), is logically 
inadmissible. Theories are therefore never empiri­
cally verifiable...I am not, of course, here 
considering so-called "mathematical induction;" 
what I am denying is that there is such a thing as 
induction in the so-called "inductive sciences;" 
that there are either "inductive procedures" or 
"inductive inferences." 9
Popper believes, following Hume, that any attempt to
justify a principle of induction involves either an infinite
regress of principles or, it leads to a Kantian-type a 
60priorism. Considering the problems of induction to be
insuperable, Popper offers, in its stead, a deductive view of 
the nature of theory which he summarizes as "the view that a
Karl Popper, "On the Status of Science and Metaphysics," 
in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 189. This article also 
contains an excellent summary of the deductivist view of the 
history of science, and demonstrates that the theories of 
Kepler, Newton, and others did not proceed from observation 
to theory, but vice versa.
59Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 40 and 
f.n. (Emphasis in the original).
60Ibid., pp. 28-30.
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hypothesis can only be empirically tested— and only after it
61has been advanced.1
Popper's second criticism of the logical positivist 
position is that the "verifiability theory of meaning" based 
on observation and induction not only fails to provide an 
adequate principle of demarcation, but also has the effect 
of eliminating the most useful and widely accepted theories 
of what is commonly accepted as "science." In criticizing 
Carnap's notion of the verifiability criterion, Popper con­
tends ,
This criterion excludes from the realm of mean­
ing all scientific theories (or "laws of nature”); 
for these are no more reducible to observation reports 
than so-called metaphysical pseudo-propositions. Thus 
the criterion of meaning leads to the wrong demarca­
tion of science and metaphysics. This criticism was 
accepted by Carnap in his Logical Syntax of Meaning 
and in his Testability and Meaning...
If induction is logically inadmissible, or at best 
63superfluous, and verifiability, which is the methodological 
stepchild of inductivism, is inadequate as a criterion of 
demarcation, what then remains? As one might guess, Popper 
has a proposal which he considers logically acceptable, con­
ceptually and historically accurate in conveying the develop­
ment of scientific theory, and which, in addition, provides
61Ibid., p. 30. (Emphasis in the original).
52Popper, "The Demarcation between Science and Meta­
physics," in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 261. (Emphasis 
in the original).
63Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 29.
71
a sufficient criterion of demarcation between scientific and
non-scientific explanation. The remedy to "positivist dog- 
64matism" is to be found in the union of the deductive 
method and a criterion of falsification. The deductive 
method, Popper understands in the normal way as the deriva­
tion of statements of lesser generality from statements of
greater generality. The deductive inferences from the high-
65er to the lower level are what Popper calls explanation. 
Deductivism has, for Popper, the merit of escaping the logi­
cal dilemma of induction by avoiding a Humean infinite 
regress or a Kantian a priorism. It is also a more accurate
reconstruction of how scientific theory is formulated and
66has been formulated historically. Theories in science are 
not the result of observation; they cannot be reduced to 
observation. Rather, theories are bold conjectures concern­
ing observations: "Our intellect does not draw its laws
from nature, but tries— with varying degrees of success— to
67impose upon nature laws which it freely invents." With 
Einstein, Popper views laws as inventions.̂
^Ibid. , p. 38.
65Ibid., p. 277.
66por examples and elaboration, see Popper's "On the 
Status of Science and Metaphysics," and "The Demarcation 
between Science and Metaphysics," in Conjectures and Refuta­
tions.
^^Popper, "On the Status of Science and Metaphysics," 
in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 191. Popper is here 
paraphrasing Kant.
®®Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Appendix 
XII (Letter from Einstein), p. 458.
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If, as Popper contends, this is an accurate view of 
scientific theory, then how is it to be distinguished from 
non-scientific speculation? Part of the solution to this 
problem lies in what Popper calls the "deductive testing of 
theories" which is described in the following way:
...the method of critically testing theories, 
and selecting them according to the results of tests, 
always proceeds on the following lines. From a new 
idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in 
any way— an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical 
system, or what will you— conclusions are drawn by 
means of logical deduction. These conclusions are 
then compared with one another and with other rele­
vant statements, so as to find what logical relations 
(such as equivalence, derivibility, compatibility, 
or incompatibility) exist between them.”®
The testing of a theory is pursued in four possible ways.
First, the conclusions are tested among themselves to make
sure that they are logically consistent. Second, the theory
is tested to see whether it is empirical in nature or whether
it is tautological. Third, the theory is compared with
other similar theories to determine whether or not it would
add to the understanding of the phenomenon in question, if
it were to prove empirically supportable. Finally, the
theory is tested by empirical application of the conclusions
70(predictions) derived from it.
Although the proposed deductive approach avoids the 




adequate methodology for the testing of conjectures, it is
not yet sufficient to provide a criterion of demarcation.
Such a criterion is provided, according to Popper, by the
idea of falsification. Stated simply: "It must be possible
for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experi- 
71ence."
Popper has two reasons for proposing falsification.
The first is a logical consideration concerning the relations
between singular and universal statements. The relation is
this: no singular statement is sufficient to verify a uni-
72versal statement; but, under appropriate conditions, a
73singular statement can falsify a universal statement. Thus 
for Popper falsification is logically a more pragmatic strat­
egy.
The second reason is epistemological, having to do with 
truth and our means of approaching it. Truth, for Popper, 
is a fragile and elusive thing which, somewhat paradoxically, 
must be pursued boldly by means of audacious assertions which 
can potentially clash with observations. The function of a 
theory, for Popper, is esqplanation, and "the better theory is 
the one that has the greater explanatory power; that explains 
more; that explains with greater precision; and that allows
~̂*~Ibid., p. 41. 
^ Ibid. , p. 86. 
^ Ibid., p. 41.
us to make better predictions." This implies two things. 
First, that a theory, in order to make better, more test­
able predictions, must eliminate some assertions; that is, 
it must refer to a class of events, the existence of which 
can serve to refute the conjecture presented. Such an 
assertion cannot be simply a matter of definition, nor a 
tautology. Rather, it must refer to experience in such a 
way that the assertion can be confuted. Second, that while 
truth, particularly as a regulative idea, is an important 
concern, it is not an overriding one. It is the content of 
a theory that is of at least equal importance. Popper rea­
sons:
Yet we also stress that truth is not the only 
aim of science. We want more than mere truth: what
we look for is interesting truth— truth which is hard 
to come by. And in the natural sciences (as distinct 
from mathematics) what we look for is truth which has 
a high degree of explanatory power, in a sense_which 
implies that it is logically improbable truth.
Popper contends that his emphasis on content is based 
on the "simple and obvious" idea that the informational con­
tent of any conjunction of statements will always be greater
than, or at least, equal to the informative content of any
76of the statements taken singularly. Popper gives the 
following example in support of his position:
74Popper, "On the Status of Science and Metaphysics," in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 192.
7^Popper, "Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Knowl­edge," in Ibid., p. 229. (Emphasxs in the original).
76Ibid., p. 217.
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Let "A" be the statement "It will rain on
Friday;" "B" the statement "It will be fine on
Saturday:" and "AB" the statement "It will 
on Friday and it will be fine on Saturday."77
The conjunction "AB" clearly contains more information
than either "A" or "B" taken singularly. But it has the
consequence that the probability of "AB" will be less than
the probability of "A" or "B" taken alone: or, more generally,
as the content of a theory (statement) increases its proba-
78bility decreases. Popper uses this "trivial though funda­
mental result" against those who argue that it is the place 
of science to propose highly probable (verifiable) state­
ments. If this were adequate, the crowning glory of science 
would be trivial, though highly probable, hypotheses. In­
stead, he contends that science should "much prefer an 
attempt to solve an interesting problem by bold conjecture, 
even (and especially) if it soon turns out to be false, to 
any recital of a sequence of irrelevant truisms...because 
this is the way we can learn from our mistakes: and in find­
ing that our conjecture was false, we shall have learned
79much about truth...." Popper argues that if a high informa­
tive content is the aim of science, then so, as a consequence, 
is potentially low probability, "since a low probability means 
a high probability of being falsified, it follows that a




high degree of falsifiability, or refutability, or testa­
bility, is one of the aims of science— in fact, precisely
80the same aim as a high informative content."
Finally, Popper argues:
All we can ever hope to say of a theory is that 
it explains this or that: that it has been tested 
severely, and that it has stood up to all our tests.
We may compare, say, two theories in order to see 
which of them has stood up better to our severest 
tests— or in other words, which of them is better 
corroborated by the results of our tests. But it 
can be shown by mathematical means that degree of 
corroboration can never be equated with mathematical 
probability...This logical analysis shows that 
esqperience does not consist in the mechanical accumu­
lation of observation. Experience is creative. It 
is the result of free, bold and creative interpretations, 
controlled by severe criticisms and severe tests. ^
Thus, according to Popper's position, the proper criteria of 
demarcation between science and non-science, and, by impli­
cation, the proper form and purpose of a scientific theory, 
is not induction and verificationism as argued by the logi­
cal positivists, but a deductive model in which the methodo­
logical procedure is falsificationism.
After Popper's criticisms, the nature of the demarca­
tion debate changes from deciding on a principle of demarca­
tion, to the more specific problem of determining the proper 
structure and function of scientific theory. As might be 
expected, Popper's views were not immediately and congenially 
accepted. Reichenbach, for example, perhaps in an attempt to
80Ibid., p. 219.
8^Popper, op. cit., pp. 192-193. (Emphasis in the original).
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salvage induction, and with it, verification, argued that
there was a difference between the formulation of theories
and the justification of theories, between what he called
the "context of discovery" and the "context of justifica- 
82tion." Popper had confused the two, and whereas induction 
and verification perhaps did not operate in the former, they 
were certainly germane to the latter. Attention thus shifted 
to the justification of theories and of scientific explana­
tion. The "Deductive-Nomothetic Model" {which will be pre­
sented as the "Received View" of scientific explanation) can 
be viewed as a reconstructed logic of justification incorpo­
rating Popper's deductive model and a modified version of the
83verifiability theory of meaning. The acceptance of this 
view, or a variation of it, has become a criterion for dis­
cerning scientific from non-scientific esqolanation.
What is a Theory?
In its simplest, most reduced form, a theory is generally 
taken to be an interrelated set of propositions consisting 
of an uninterpreted or partially interpreted calculus, a
82Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophical Significance of 
the Theory of Relativity," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, 
eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), p. 197.
83This modification is based on a reinterpretation of 
verifiability in terms of probability and/or verifiability- 
in-principle. Popper, by the way, finds this little more 
satisfactory than the older "naive" verificationism and 
still argues for an admittedly modified falsificationist 
strategy.
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84non-logical vocabulary, and a set of correspondence rules.
Some writers on the structure of theory add to these basic
components another feature, a "model" or "interpretation"
85of the theory. A calculus is the "logical skeleton" of a 
86theory. It consists of rules or procedures for stating 
logical relations among the elements in the theory such as 
combinations, identities, distinctions, disjunctions, and 
legitimate inferences. In addition to these logical compo­
nents, a theory also contains "primitive" (i.e., undefined) 
or "theoretical" terms, and "observation" terms which, taken 
together, form the non-logical "vocabulary" of the theory.
A primitive or theoretical term is one which is understand­
able only in the context of the theory in which it appears.
Its meaning, to a large extent, "derives from the part it
87plays in the whole theory." "Electron," "point," "Oedipus 
Complex," and "functional prerequisites" are examples of 
theoretical terms. They are distinguished, in the non-logi­
cal vocabulary of the theory, from observation terms. Obser­
vation terms refer directly to publicly observable phenomena
84.Proponents of this view of theory include: R. B.
Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1960), Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1961), and Carl Hem-
pel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," in Feigl 
and Brodbeck, Ibid., pp. 319-352, among others.
85See, for example, Braithwaite, Ibid., chapt. IV, and 
Nagel, Ibid., pp. 90 ff.
®®Nagel, Ibid., p. 90.
87Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, (San Francis­
co: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 56.
79
(things, events, etc.), observable qualities or attributes 
of phenomena, and/or gross, easily perceived relations 
between observable phenomena. The meaning of observation 
terms is specified by their correspondence with directly 
observable phenomena via the five basic senses. Examples 
of observation terms include red, hard, large, cold, and 
their relational forms (e.g. redder than, harder than, 
larger than, etc.). Taken together, the calculus of a 
theory provides the logical framework according to which 
elements are defined and inferences are made, along with a 
specification of the domain of the theory as designated by 
the theoretical and observational vocabulary, and to which 
the logical components of the calculus are applied.
The second component of the standard sketch of the 
structure of a theory consists of what are variously called 
"correspondence rules," "dictionaries," "operational defi­
nitions," "epistemic correlations," "coordinating defini-
88tions," or "rules of interpretation." A calculus, of the 
type described above is not sufficient to discriminate a 
scientific theory from other forms of explanation. Taken by 
itself, a calculus could be simply an exercise in mathematics, 
symbolic logic, or abstract thought. The symbolic formula­
tions contained in the calculus must be related more
®®See Nagel, op. cit., p. 93, or Frederick Suppe, "What's 
Wrong With the Received View on the Structure of Scientific 
Theories?" Philosophy of Science, Vol. 39 (March, 1972), 
p. 3.
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specifically and directly to the phenomena being considered. 
Observation terms, which simply denote language for identi­
fying these phenomena, are not of themselves adequate to 
this task. In addition, there must be some way of relating 
the phenomena being investigated, including the language by 
which it is symbolized, with the logical apparatus and theo­
retical terms of the theory. This, according to most philos­
ophers of science, is achieved through the agency of corre­
spondence rules.
The precise nature and function of rules of correspond­
ence is a matter of some controversy even among proponents 
of this more or less standard sketch of the structure of a 
theory. The answer to the question, "What is a correspondence 
rule?" entails an answer to questions concerning the precise 
relation between observation and theory, the "reality" status 
of theoretical entities, the problem of measurement, and the
appropriate method (model) for interpreting a theory (i.e.,
89is a theory a description, an analogy, an instrument).
Despite this lack of concensus, and the "relatively vague 
90schema" by means of which correspondence rules are presented, 
there are certain shared features among versions presented by
®^See, for example, Nagel, Ibid., p. 95 ff., and Wil­
fred Sellars, "The Language of Theories," in Herbert Peigl 
and Grover Maxwell, eds., Current Issues in the Philosophy 
of Science, (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, 1961),
p. 59 ff.
^Patrick Suppes, "What is a Scientific Theory?" in Sid­ney Morgenbesser, ed., Philosophy of Science Today, (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1967), pp. 56-57.
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various philosophers of science. The correspondence rules
of a theory are taken as linking, in some way, theory with
observation. They are seen as "a set of rules that assign
91an empirical content to the logical calculus...." As I 
see it, there are basically three types of correspondence 
rules. First, these sets of rules may be semantic, in 
which case they provide the basis for translating or inter­
preting theoretical terms or statements according to obser­
vational terms or statements. Second, they may be "material" 
in which case they would provide for the correlation of 
conceptual constructs with things which are observable. Or 
third, they may be methodological in which case they would 
establish the means for locating and measuring in the empiri­
cal world properties posited in the theoretical vocabulary. 
Despite the dispute over the proper interpretation, most 
advocates of this view of theory agree that correspondence 
rules are that part of the theory which serves as a nexus 
between the theory, as a system of concepts about phenomena 
or relations between phenomena, and the "actual" phenomena 
itself, as it exists independently of the theory. Corre­
spondence rules are, to some extent, instructions, guide­
lines, or ideas about how to relate the concepts of the theory 
to the "objective," "empirical" world. As such correspondence 
rules would answer such questions, which may be asked of a
91,. . .Ibid.
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theory, as "How are these ideas related to (whatever is being 
investigated)?" "What indications are there that (the proper­
ties, relations, etc.) designated in the theory are opera­
tive?," or, "What does this (object of investigation) mean 
in terms of this (framework of the theory)?."
This, then, is the standard or Received View of what a 
scientific theory, reduced to its essential elements, should 
be. These elements include an uninterpreted or partially 
interpreted logical language on calculus, a non-logical 
vocabulary, and a set of correspondence rules. As was men­
tioned, this view is controversial, both among proponents of 
the Received View who, accepting the basic skeleton, would 
argue over the arrangement and labeling of the parts, and 
among opponents who seek to disarticulate the skeleton, con­
tending that although it has its merits, it is inadequate in 
the final analysis as a description of a theory. A particu­
larly damaging counterargument, one which strikes at the 
foundation of the Received View, attacks the apparently cen­
tral assumption that it is possible to make a meaningful 
distinction between theoretical terms and observational terms. 
According to Hilary Putnam, the dual dichotomy between obser­
vational and theoretical terms and statements is "completely
92broken-backed." The problem which suggested the dichotomy,
2Hilary Putnam, "What Theories Are Not," in Ernest 
Nagel, Alfred Tarski, and Patrick Suppes, eds., Logic, 
Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science, (Stanford: Stan­
ford University Press, 1962), p. 241.
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the interpretation of theoretical terms, is a pseudo-problem 
arising from the effect of prior epistemological considera­
tions, namely those asserting the priority of observation 
or sense-data to conceptualization. Although there are 
generally included in treatments of the observation-theory 
distinction disclaimers that "no sharp boundaries" separate
observational from theoretical terms, and that "the choice
93of an exact line is somewhat arbitrary," the magnitude of
imprecision, coupled with the failure of "dichotomists" to
provide any but "a very few examples of what would count as
..94observation terms and what as theoretical terms," has 
fortified the claim that such a distinction cannot be sus­
tained. As a consequence, problems concerning the nature and 
function of correspondence rules lose much of their importance 
and immediacy.
95Despite these and other difficulties, the Received 
View remains very influential, particularly in the social 
sciences. For this reason it should prove instructive to 
investigate in depth a more fully articulated reconstruction 
of scientific explanation, of theory, and of theory construction
goRudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, 
p. 259, cited in Suppe, pp. cit., p. 5.
94Suppe, Ibid., p. 4.
9^Patrick Suppes, op. cit., pp. 56-57, contends that "it 
is unheard of to find a substantive example of a theory 
actually worked out as a logical calculus," and that simi­
larly, correspondence rules are seldom precisely worked out.
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along the lines of the Received View, that of Carl J. Hem-
Hempel1s Model of Scientific Explanation and Theory
According to Hempel (and Paul Oppenheim), explanation
in the empirical sciences is the quest for answers to the
97question "Why?". However, not any response is satisfac­
tory. For an answer to be considered "scientific" it must 
fulfill certain structural requirements as well as empiri­
cal conditions.
It is Hempel1s position that answers to such questions 
are most reliably provided when the phenomenon under inves­
tigation is subsumed under a general principle which deals 
with phenomena like the one being studied. Explanation, 
for Hempel, is a process whereby a phenomenon is accounted 
for when the appropriate general statements concerning events 
of its kind are provided. The phenomenon is seen as being
^®The reasons for choosing Hempel1s reconstruction over 
that of other Received View theorists (e.g., Braithwaite, 
Campbell, Carnap, Nagel, etc.) are two. First, Hempel's 
position, it seems to me, occupies something of a middle 
ground, synthesizing the positions of other similar theo­
rists, and is, therefore, highly representative of this 
group of thinkers as a whole. Second, Hempel has directed 
considerable attention to the social sciences, making the 
linkages between investigation in these areas of inquiry 
and the so-called "hard sciences."
97Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic 
of Explanation," in Carl Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Expla­
nation, (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p. 245. This
seminal article first appeared in Philosophy of Science in 
1948, and has been reprinted on many occasions in many 
anthologies. Further references will be to the Hempel volume.
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of a kind with other similar phenomena, the occurrence of 
which is sufficiently general and consistent that regulari­
ties concerning it have been established. The explanation 
of the phenomenon is provided in terms of these appropriate 
general statements, and the event is said to be "covered" 
by their invocation. For Hempel, these general statements 
take, or should take, the form of laws; and explanation is 
the result of an inference from these laws to the particular 
phenomenon. For these reasons, Hempel's model of scientific 
explanation has been called the Covering Law model.
The D-N Model of Explanation The particular Hempelian 
formulation of the covering-law model that has received the 
most attention, the one in terms of which the Received View 
is usually presented is the Deductive-Nomological. The D-N 
model of scientific explanation consists of an explanandum 
(a sentence or set of sentences describing the phenomenon to 
be explained) and an explanans (a set of sentences intended 
to account for the phenomenon). The explanans has two com­
ponents which Hempel labels "C" and "L". "C" statements
98are sentences describing "antecedent conditions," "particu-
99 100lar occurrences," "statements of particular fact," or
98Hempel, Ibid., p. 249.
99Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," in Ibid., p. 174.
■^^Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Ibid., 
p. 299.
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101"particular circumstances." As such, C statements stip­
ulate the initial conditions surrounding the occurrence of 
the explanandum as well as the domain of events which can 
be used to characterize it. Ideally, properly formed C 
statements establish the "determining conditions" for the 
occurrence of the explanandum. More explicity, C statements
provide the causal conditions for the generation of the 
102explanandum.
In explanation of the D-N variety, the explanandum (E) 
is shown to be the result of the occurrence of prior (or, 
perhaps, simultaneous) circumstance(s) C. E is seen as 
being of a kind with the sort of phenomena that are dealt 
with by the specific C statements presented. That is, E is 
the kind of event that occurs when C conditions are present. 
The relationship between C and E is generally given a hypo­
thetical formulation,— "If so-and-so is the case (specific 
C statements), then so-and-so will follow (E). Which is to 
say, that, certain antecedent conditions having been present, 
the specific result will follow. The euqplanandum, the event 
for which an explanation is sought, is thus to be expected 
as the result of C. It is C which is said to account for 
E.
101Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," in Ibid.,
p. 331.
102Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," 
in Ibid., p. 232 ff.
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The mere co-presence of C followed by E is insufficient 
warrant for inferring E because of C. It is the second com­
ponent of the explanans, the L statements, which is responsi­
ble for providing the necessary information for linking C 
with E. L statements, in the D-N model of explanation, are
laws. They are what Hempel calls "statements of strictly
103universal form." A statement of strictly universal form
is "...an assertion to the effect that all cases which meet
certain specified conditions will unexceptionally have such
104and such further consequences." General laws establish
"systematic connections among empirical facts in such a way
that with their help some empirical occurrences may be
105inferred...from other such occurrences."
The function of laws in D-N esqplanation is to provide 
the linkages between the phenomenon to be explained, and the 
conditions capable of generating that phenomenon. Laws pro­
vide the criteria according to which C is relevant to E, 
that is, according to which E is adduced to be the result of 
C.
Although laws provide the means by which the linkage 
between C and E can be made, they are not exclusively rules 
of inference. Rather, they are primarily statements of 
empirical regularity and as such egress uniformities about




phenomena of a stipulated kind. The business of providing 
the appropriate logical connections between L and C, be­
tween C and E , and between L , C, and E is accomplished by 
the calculus in terms of which the explanation is structured. 
For Hempel, the "proper" logical form of a D-N explanation 
is deductive. The general laws of the D-N model of explana­
tion fill the logical role of "major premises" in a deduc­
tive argument; but more significantly, they function to 
connect discrete empirical events in patterns of general 
and necessary regularity.
Hempel makes it clear that it is by the proper invoca­
tion of general laws that explanation occurs. In "Aspects 
of Scientific Explanation," he states that "it is in virtue 
of such laws that the particular facts cited in the explanans
possess explanatory relevance to the explanandum phenome- 
106non." E is seen to be an instance of a regular pattern
of events of a kind which occurs under C conditions and
which may be understood in terms of L. To take a simple 
107example, an adequate explanation of the phenomenon, E, 
or answer to the question, "Why does this oar look bent when 
I put it in water," would include a statement of conditions,
C (i.e. There is an oar which is virtually straight, part of 
the oar is in water, and part of it is in the air, etc.),
106Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p. 337.
107Something like this example is used by Hempel m  
"Studies in the Logic of Esqplanation, " p. 246.
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and the presentation of general laws, L, which deal with 
this type of phenomenon (i.e., the Law of Refraction, and 
the law that water is an optically denser medium than air). 
The explanandum— Why did the oar appear bent?— is accounted 
for by the conjunction of C (the oar and its partial immer­
sion in water), and L (the laws of Refraction and Optical 
Density) which form the explanans. Clearly, all of these 
components are necessary to the explanation. C by itself 
does not account for Ej it merely establishes the conditions 
surrounding the event. L by itself is not sufficiently 
specific to directly account for this particular E. And L 
and C alone would only state general expectations for classes 
of events which may or may not apply depending upon what it 
is that we wish to explain.
The preceding example, along with the earlier informa­
tion, implies an additional feature of the D-N model, one 
which Hempel considers to be very important. According to 
Hempel, a scientific explanation is fully adequate only when 
"its explanans, if taken account of in time, could have
108served as a basis for predicting the event in question."
For Hempel, explanation and prediction are symmetrical, or
109structurally identical. As a consequence, whatever is
said "concerning the logical characteristics of explanation
108Ibid., p. 249.
^88Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p. 367.
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or prediction will be applicable to either.... The
difference between explanation and prediction is not one of 
logical structure; rather, they differ in "certain pragmatic 
respects.1 Concerning this pragmatic difference, Hempel
says:
The customary distinction between explanation 
and prediction rests mainly on a pragmatic difference 
between the two: while in the case of an explana­
tion, the final event is known to have happened, and 
its determining conditions have to be sought, the 
situation is reversed in the case of a prediction: 
here, the initial conditions are given and their 
"effect"— which in the typical case, has not yet taken 
place— is to be determined.
Thus, in the oar example just presented, the explanation 
would be considered "adequate" because it could be used to 
predict accurately the "bending phenomenon" before its occur­
rence. The difference between explanation and prediction
113for Hempel xs one of the tense of the explanandum. The 
reason for the symmetry between explanation and prediction 
has to do with the logical structure of the esqplanans, par­
ticularly with reference to the requirement of the presence,
110Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," p.
249.
^^Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p.
367.
112Hempel, "The Function of General Laws xn Hxstory,"
p. 234.
113This also applies to what Hempel, following Reichen- 
bach, calls "post-diction," i.e., the explanation of histori­
cal (past) events. Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," 
pp. 173-174.
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in the ejqplanans, of general laws or universal hypotheses. 
Hempel says that the condition that every adequate explana­
tion is potentially a prediction,
... is an almost trivial truth in the case of 
D-N explanation, since here the explanans logically 
implies the explanandum. But it is also supported 
by a more general principle, which applies to other 
types of esqslanation as well, and which expresses,
I would submit, a general condition of adequacy for 
any rationally acceptible explanation of a particu­
lar event. That condition is the following: any
rationally acceptible answer to the question "Why 
did event X occur?" must offer information which 
shows that X was to be expected— if not definitely, 
as in the case of D-N eaqplanation, then at least 
with reasonable probability. Thus, the eaqplanatory 
information must provide good grounds for believing 
that X did in fact occur; otherwise, that informa­
tion would give us no adequate reason for saying:
"That explains it— that shows why X occurred."
And an explanatory account that satisfies this 
condition constitutes, of course, a potential pre­
diction in the sense that it could have served to 
predict the occurrence of X...if the information 
contained in the explanans had been available at a 
suitable earlier time.114
The D-N model of scientific explanation may be summa­
rized by the following schematization, and the four logical 
and empirical conditions of adequacy. A D-N explanation 
takes the following form:







L , L ,




^■^Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," pp. 
367-368. (Emphasis in the original).
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Where: C , C , ...,C are statements of antecedent 
1 2  1c conditions.
L , L , ...,L are general laws or universal 
1 2  r hypotheses.
E is a description of the empirical phenomenon
to be explained.-1-^
Such a D-N explanation is considered to be adequate if
116these conditions are met: Rl. The explanandum must be a
logical consequence of the explanans; that is, the explanan- 
must be logically deducible from the information contained 
in the explanans if the latter is to provide adequate grounds 
for the former. R2. The explanans must contain general laws 
and these must be required for the derivation of the ejqplanan- 
dum. (This rule, in addition to stipulating the necessity 
of general laws to any adequate explanation, implies the 
requirement that the general law(s) must be appropriate to 
the explanandum. This would preclude, for example, the Law 
of Inertia from being the L part of the explanans in the 
previous oar example.) R3. The explanans must have empiri­
cal content. It must be capable, at least in principle, of 
test by experiment or observation. R4. The sentences con­
stituting the explanans must be true. That is to say, the 
explanans must be factually correct. The condition applies 
not only to the statement of antecedent conditions but also 
to the statements of general laws or universal hypotheses.
115Following Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explana­
tion," p. 249.
116These are derived from Ibid., pp. 246-249.
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While deciding the "truthfulness" of initial conditions is
far from easy, deciding the "truthfulness" of general laws,
117unless they are purely logical, or analytic, is extreme­
ly difficult. This, and other problems with the nature of 
118general laws, has led Hempel to discuss the D-N model m
terms of "potential ejqplanations" employing "law-like"
statements in which all of the above conditions with the
119possible exception of R4 are successfully met. However,
if an esqplanation is to be true, condition R4 would natu-
120rally have to remain in force.
The D-N model of scientific explanation is not the only 
model of scientific explanation provided by Hempel. Because 
of some of the difficulties with the D-N construction (e.g., 
the problem of adequately explicating general laws and/or 
hypotheses, the restrictive nature of the model— the class
^Which they all cannot be by Condition R3.
118Hempel is, of course, aware of all of these diffi­
culties concerning the nature of general laws. Basically, 
they reduce to the problem of developing an adequate expli­
cation of this concept. See Part III in Hempel's "Studies 
in the Logic of Esqplanation, " and Section 2.3 in "Aspects of 
Scientific Explanation," for a discussion of these difficul­
ties. It should be noted that the "facticity" of C state­
ments, and their relation to L statements is a more compli­
cated problem, particularly for the behavioral sciences, than 
Hempel would lead us to believe. A further discussion of 
this will follow in the next chapter.
^®Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p. 388.
120Hempel stipulates that "the same formal analysis, 
including the four necessary conditions, applies to scien­
tific prediction as well as to scientific explanation." 
"Studies in the Logic of Explanation," p. 249.
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of "scientific explanations" included by the D-N model under
strict interpretation may be empty, etc.), and because the
D-N model does not cover all forms of scientific explana-
121tion generally considered to be adequate, Hempel pre­
sents what he calls the Inductive-Statistical model (I-S) 
of explanation.
The I-S Model of Scientific Explanation The Inductive- 
Statistical model of scientific explanation is similar in 
its basic form to the D-N model. The major difference is 
an internal one having to do with the nature of the laws 
employed in the explanation, and, thus, with the nature of 
the conclusions which are permitted. The law-like state­
ments of I-S explanation are probabilistic or statistical. 
Whereas the laws of the D-N model, if true, cover all 
occurrences of a specified kind under given conditions, the 
laws of the I-S model state only the likelihood of an event 
of a specified kind occurring under given conditions. The 
explanans of the I-S model, rather than logically entailing 
the explanandum, presents evidence at some level of confi­
dence. The explanans offers information relative to the 
explanandum; it provides "the grounds or evidence conferring
more or less strong inductive support or confirmation or
122credibility upon some statement...."
121That is, all explanation used in science is not 
"causal."
122Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," p. 384.
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Hempel contends that general statements of the kind
described above are "less stringent counterparts of laws
123that have the universal conditional form" employed in
D-N explanations. The characteristic shared by these two
types of laws is that "both make general claims concerning
a class of cases that might be said to be potentially infi- 
124nite." A law of basic statistical form refers not simply 
to all actual occurrences of an event, but also to all of 
its potential instances. For this reason, it may be said, 
in a loose sense, to cover if not all possible occurrences 
of a class of events, at least a specified proportion of 
those occurrences. Such laws designate levels of expecta­
tion. They do not permit the judgement that event X will 
certainly be accompanied by event Y, but do permit judge­
ments of the kind that, given event X it is highly probable 
(probable, unlikely) that event Y will occur. The occurrence 
of Y, given X, is evidential not causal. Ejqplanations of 
the I-S form give support to the conclusion that we can 
reasonably expect an association of a particular kind. The 
esqplanans of an I-S explanation "confers upon the explanan­
dum a more or less high degree of inductive support or of
125logical {inductive) probability."




Hempel gives the following schematization of a pro-
126posed I-S explanation:
p(G, P) = r 
Fb
=  [ r ]
Gb
Where: p indicates that the statement is a probability
statement.
G and F are events, phenomena, or kinds of
events or phenomena.
b is a specific event or occurrence or phenomena.
r is the statement of probability, between 0 and
1, in the form of a statistical 
law for that class of events.
And, "the double line separating the 'premises' 
from the 'conclusions' is to signify that the 
relation of the former to the latter is not that 
of deductive implication but that of inductive
support, the strength of which is indicated in
square brackets."127
The statement would read: "The probability that G is
F (or that G is associated with F or that G occurs when F
occurs) is some number (e.g., .90) or a statement such as
'highly probable,' 'very likely,' 'improbable.' "b" is an
F-type event, or an instance of F. It is likely or probable,
then, that "b" is also an instance of G.
126Ibid., p. 399. 
^2^Ibid., p. 383.
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A simple, and standard, example may help to clarify 
this model.
Let F be the class of all events of the flipping 
of a fair coin.
G be heads.
b be a particular flip of the coin.
We Know from past experience, experiment, and/or observa­
tion that the probability of a fair coin fairly flipped 
turning up heads is .5. The statistical law in this case 
would be: "The probability of a coin turning up heads (G)
in the class of all possible occurrences of a flip of a fair 
coin is .5 (r)." A particular fair coin, b, is flipped (Fb) 
and the likelihood (probability) is .5 that it will turn up 
heads (Gb).
This example illustrates all of the features mentioned 
about the I-S model of scientific explanation. The law of 
statistical form is a probability statement developed induc­
tively. It makes a claim about a class of events which is 
potentially infinite, and gives evidence, or inductive 
support, concerning the class of events in question.
In what sense, and under what conditions, does the I-S 
model provide an explanation? What factors external to the 
model itself must be considered? Concerning the first ques­
tion, it is more difficult to determine what Hempel would 
count as an adequate I-S explanation than was the case with 
D-N explanation. He gives no "conditions of adequacy" for 
this form. Part of the reason for this lies in the nature 
of inductive explanation itself. A properly constructed
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inductive explanation is not a "proof" in the same sense 
that a properly formed deductive explanation would be.
Rather, it is an evidence-presenting form. Its domain is 
not the necessary, but the probable. Even if it were to 
satisfy a set of valid, binding "conditions of adequacy," 
if such a set were to be constructed, its application to 
particular phenomena would not hold for every case, but only 
for a stated proportion of those cases. This characteristic 
presents a corollary problem— at what level of probability 
(the r statement) must the esqplanans confirm the esqplanan- 
dum? Hempel contends that, "of course, an argument of this 
kind will count as explanatory only if the number r is fair­
ly close to 1. But it seems impossible, without being 
arbitrary, to designate any particular number, say .8, as
the minimum value of the probability r permissible in an 
128eaqplanation. "
In spite of this ambiguity, Hempel is firm in his asser­
tion that probabilistic arguments are esqplanatory:
It is also sometimes thought that because 
probabilistic arguments are not logically conclu­
sive they cannot serve to explain; for even if the 
explanans is true, it is possible that the explanan­
dum phenomenon might not have come about.... But 
this objection to the idea of probabilistic eaqpla- 
nation rests on a too restrictive conception of 
scientific explanation; for many important eaqplana- 
tory accounts offered by empirical science make
1 pQIbid., p. 390. Hempel is here referring to the 
particular circumstance of eaqplanation of individual cases; 
the point, I think, holds generally.
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quite explicit use of statistical laws which, in 
conjunction with the rest of the esqjlanatory infor­
mation adduced, make the esqplanandum no more than 
highly probable.
Further, he argues:
...accounts in terms of statistical laws or 
theories thus play a very important role in science. 
Rather than deny them explanatory status on the 
ground that non-realization of the eaqalanandum is 
compatible with the explanans, we have to acknowledge 
that they constitute explanations of a distinct logi­
cal character, reflecting, we might say, a different 
sense of the word "because".... Statistical explana­
tion in the sense here under consideration...sets 
forth what might be called a statistical-probabilis­
tic concept of "because,"— in contradistinction to 
a strictly deterministic one, which would correspond 
to deductive-nomological explanation.
Taking for granted, for the time being, Hempel's asser­
tion that I-S arguments are at least potentially explanatory, 
albeit in a different sense of the term from D-N type esqpla- 
nation, what factors external to the model itself effect its 
"explanatoriness?" Hempel cites two significant factors 
which he calls "epistemic relativity," and the "requirement
129Ibid., p. 391.
130Ibid., p. 393. This argument is preceded by three 
examples of the use of I-S-type explanation in science—  
genetics, radioactive decay, and Einstein's explanation of 
Brownian Movement. Implicit in the use of these examples to 
justify calling the I-S form "explanatory" is the idea that 
"science is as science does" which is unexceptional were it 
not for the fact that later in the same essay Hempel says 
that, "...These models (D-N and I-S) are not meant to des­
cribe how working scientists actually formulate their esqplan' 
atory accounts. Their purpose is rather to indicate in 
reasonably precise terms the logical structure and rationale 
of various ways in which empirical science answers explana­
tion-seeking why-questions." Ibid., p. 412. More will be 
said about this in the next chapter.
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of maximal specificity." The epistemic relativity of I-S
explanations derives not only from its previously mentioned
ambiguity (i.e., the possibility that the explanandum might
not come about even if the explanans is "true") but also
from the fact that I-S explanation, because it is inductive
in nature, is dependent upon a particular "knowledge situa- 
131tion." An I-S explanation is dependent upon the nature 
and degree of available information about a particular situ­
ation, more than is a D-N explanation. There occurs, in I-S 
explanation, the possibility that "for a proposed probabilis­
tic explanation with true explanans which confers near cer­
tainty upon a particular event, there will often exist a 
rival argument of the same probabilistic form and with
equally true premises which confers near certainty upon the
132non-occurrence of the same event." The adequacy of an
I-S esqplanation is effected by the kind of information avail­
able and employed in the probabilistic framework. From the 
same total set of accepted scientific statements rival sets
of premises can be drawn which lead us to expect that the
133phenomenon both will and will not occur. Hempel provides
131ibid., pp. 395-396.
132 Ibid., pp. 394-395. Hempel continues, "This predic­
ament has no analogue in the case of deductive explanation: 
for if the premises of a proposed deductive explanation are 
true, then so is its conclusions, and its contradictory, 
being false, cannot be a logical consequence of a rival set 
of premises that are equally true."
l33Ibid., p. 396.
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134 . . . .the following example. A patient is ill with a strep­
tococcal infection and is treated with large doses of peni­
cillin. We know probabilistically, i.e., in most cases, 
the recovery rate from such infections given this treatment 
is close to 1; and it is very likely that relative to this 
body of evidence, the patient will recover. But if the 
particular strain of streptococcus is penicillin-resistant 
or if the patient is "an octogenarian with a weak heart," 
the probability of recovery with this treatment is very 
small. Thus, depending upon the information available and 
employed from the same knowledge situation, either of the 
two occurrences are probable. Since there are no explicit 
criteria (or "conditions of adequacy") for choosing among 
the set of possible premises, we are neither compelled nor 
constrained in using any information from the knowledge 
situation.
In an attempt to remedy this predicament, Hempel pre­
sents what he calls the "requirement of maximal specificity" 
which states that in formulating an I-S explanation one must 
employ "a statistical probability statement pertaining to 
the narrowest reference class of which, according to our
information, the particular occurrence under consideration 
135as a member." Hempel, following Carnap, says that this 
requirement is not concerned with the "formal validity" of
134Derived from Ibid., pp. 382, 394, 398. 
135Ibid., p. 398.
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inductive logic or inductive argument. "Rather.it is a
maxim for the application of inductive logic. We might say
that it states a necessary condition of rationality of any
such application in a given 'knowledge situation,' which we
will think of as represented by the set...of all basic
136statements accepted in the situation." In the example
cited above, if the patient were a weak-hearted eighty year 
old with a penicillin resistant infection then that would 
constitute the narrowest reference class, and the require­
ment of maximal specificity would dictate that the proba­
bility statement dealing with that class be employed rather 
than the probability statement dealing with the general 
association between penicillin treatment and recovery from 
streptococcal infection.
Despite the imposition of the "requirement of maximal 
specificity," I-S explanation remains relative and knowledge 
situation-dependent in that one can never be certain that 
all relevant statistical laws in a knowledge situation have 
been employed in the esqplanans. For this reason, I-S expla­
nations are not simply weakened forms of D-N esqplanations; 
but explanations of a basically different form which, Hempel 
contends, nonetheless are genuine explanatory tools within 
the domain of science.
*1 Q g Ibid., p. 397. (Emphasis in the original). Actually, 
here Hempel is citing Carnap's characterization of his "re­
quirement of total evidence," (which Hempel finds unsatis­
factory) but from the context of the discussion, I think it 
is clear that Hempel intends it to similarly characterize his 
"requirement of maximal specificity."
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T,C Reconstruction The preceding discussion deline­
ates Hempel's ideas concerning the nature of scientific 
explanation, and in so doing, makes reference to theory as 
it functions in the context of scientific explanation. In 
order to develop a more complete picture of the role of 
theory in scientific explanation, and to bring Hempel1s 
account into line with the ideas presented in an earlier 
section of this chapter ("What is a Theory"), it will be
necessary to look, briefly, at another of Hempel's reformu-
137lations of the explanans/explanandum relationship.
In this reconstruction, Hempel presents the explanans
138in terms of "the ordered couple of sentences, T,C," where 
T and C are given a semantic interpretation: that is, they 
are analyzed according to the meaning of the language in 
which they are formulated. T and C are expressed by theo­
retical and observation terms, implying an at least tacit
139theoretical/observational term distinction. The C component
 ̂Much of this information is a recapitulation of what 
was said in the earlier section mentioned above. The reason 
for this is that the Received View of theory, like the Re­
ceived View of explanation derives largely from Hempel1s 
work. I risk what perhaps will appear to be a tedious repe­
tition in order to make explicit the specific relationship of 
theory, as the "tool" of scientific esqplanation, to scien­
tific explanation itself.
*^®Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," p. 273.
139In this section I will only consider the "extralogi- 
cal" vocabulary of the theory. I will take it as understood 
that the T,C formulation includes as a part of the framework 
of the explanans, a (minimal) logical syntax expressed by a 
deductive calculus of a type discussed in the previous sec­
tion. For further information, see Hempel, "Studies in the 
Logic of Explanation," p. 270 ff.
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of the T,C reconstruction is written in what is called the 
observational vocabulary, the terms of which make explicit 
reference to phenomena, dispositions, etc., which are 
directly and publicly observable. The T component is pre­
ponderantly written in the theoretical vocabulary: that is, 
its terms make reference to "presumptive objects, events,
and attributes which cannot be perceived or otherwise di-
140rectly observed by us." These terms are either undefined
(no definition is given) or they are implicitly defined in
relation to other similar terms. The T statements serve
the same basic function as L statements in the previous
model. They provide information concerning general and
systematic relationships between phenomena but do so by
employing concepts which are not, themselves, directly the
result of observation. In a loose sense, one might say that
they provide the means whereby the observed is accounted
for by the unobserved. A further analogue between L and T
statements in their respective models is provided by Hempel's
141 , 4contention that "every law is also a theory." Laws (L)
and theories (T) serve analogous functions in their respec­
tive reconstructions.
The combination T and C is said to account for the 
explanandum event, E, when E is (deductively) covered by
^^Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," p. 177. 
141Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," p.
272.
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the esqalanans. Neither T nor C alone constitute an ade­
quate scientific theory for the explanation of E. In order 
for T, consisting of at least some non-observable, or theo­
retical terms, to account for an observable phenomenon, 
there must be some way of translating, interpreting, or 
demonstrating its applicability to the phenomenon in ques­
tion. This is the task of C. The theory, T, is applied to 
the explanandum by rules of correspondence, C. Rules of 
correspondence link the conceptual, abstract, generalized, 
systematically-related entities of the theory with the 
empirical, concrete, observable phenomena of the explanan­
dum. They provide an interpretation or a translation of 
theoretical terms by observation terms. This, in turn, 
delineates the conditions and range of permissible applica­
tions of the theory to the explanandum. Through the "good 
offices" of the correspondence rules, the theory gains 
empirical relevance; it is correlated to the empirical phe­
nomenon, and thus becomes "cognitively significant" within
142the framework of an empiricist epistemology.
The problem of determining precisely how the correspond­
ence rules link the explanatory artifices, expressed by 
theoretical terms, with the phenomenon to be explained is a 
particularly vexing one. Several attempts have been made 
to specify the nature of this relationship by positing
1 AO Hempel, "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Signifi­
cance," p. 101 passim.
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specific functions to correspondence rules. Some approaches 
seek the complete elimination of theoretical terms; and 
their replacement by strictly observational terms, and 
correspondence rules, formulated via Craig's Theorem or by 
Ramsey Sentences, are the devices of this elimination.
Other approaches, for example, Carnap's "bilateral reduction 
sentences," attempt to specify the range of meaning for 
theoretical terms in experimental application. Still other 
approaches, such as operationalism, envision correspondence 
rules as rules of measurement. For the operationalist the
meaning of a theoretical term is nothing other than the
. . 143experimental procedure by which it is measured. It is
generally agreed that none of these approaches is adequate 
to provide a total and complete interpretation of the mean­
ing of theoretical terms. The result of the failure of 
these several attempts to replace completely theoretical by 
observational terms has been complex and mixed. Whereas 
theoretical terms have come to be seen as not only indis- 
pensible but also essential to scientific explanation, the 
continuing quandary of how observable phenomena can be 
accounted for by things unobservable remains. The problem, 
as formulated, strikes at the heart of scientific in contra­
distinction to other forms of explanation, and thus at the
1 43For a discussion and criticism of these various 
attempts, see Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma,'' pp. 187- 
217.
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"demarcation problem" discussed earlier. It also presents 
the issue of whether theoretical terms refer to anything 
"real" or whether they are merely "convenient fictions" 
useful in "explaining" observable phenomena.
Despite these several difficulties, a consistent view 
of the nature of scientific explanation and the relation­
ship between it and theory, according to Hempel1s and the 
Received View, can be summarized as follows. The scien­
tific explanation of a phenomenon entails its subsumption 
under principles of general regularity which deal with 
phenomena of the kind in question. The relationship between 
the explanandum and the explanans may be either deductive 
or inductive depending upon whether the principles of 
general regularity are laws or probability statements. The 
former explanatory relationship is the stronger of the two, 
and provides the paradigm case for scientific esqplanation. 
Scientific explanations are formulated in terms of theories 
which consist conjointly of a logical apparatus, theoreti­
cal terms expressed in laws or probability statements, and 
rules of correspondence which establish initial and boundary 
conditions, as well as criteria for applying the general 
and systematic constructs of the theory to the event to be 
explained. A science is said to progress or develop when 
laws explaining particular kinds of events are subsumed by 
still more general theories which account for and cover the
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144occurrence of these regularities themselves. Thus, not 
only is the structure of scientific e:sq?lanations and scien­
tific theories (predominantly) deductive, but so is that 
of science. Science can be seen as a unified enterprise 
sharing not only a common structure, but also a content in 
which particular sciences are architechtonically related
according to levels of generality wherein the more general
145is said to account for the less general.
It remains to demonstrate the influence of the Received 
View on political science, and on the social sciences gen­
erally, and to assess its utility in developing an adequate 
and appropriate understanding of explanation and of theory 
for these areas of inquiry. This enterprise is the concern 
of the next two chapters.
144por more information on this view of the development 
of science by reduction, see, for example, Hempel, "Aspects 
of Scientific Explanation," pp. 343-347.
■L̂ ‘3Por example, from the "Unity of Science" approach, 
biology, within itself an area of scientific inquiry, may be 
reduced to (accounted for) by chemistry, which, in turn, may 
be reduced to (accounted for) by physics.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Received View in Political and Social Theory
The impact of the Received View (R.V.) on political and 
social theory may best be demonstrated through the writings 
of philosophers of science who are interested in and write 
about the social sciences, through the work of social scien­
tists who are concerned with the development of a "scientific" 
approach to the study of social phenomena, and through the 
work of social theorists who recommend strategies for the 
construction of adequate, scientific social theories, or who 
develop theories along the lines suggested by the R.V. recon­
struction. After presenting examples of the work of each of 
these categories of thinkers, I will address several of the 
concerns and problems which dominate the R.V. approach to 
political and social theory.
Among the R.V. philosophers of science who have written 
on the social sciences, it is not surprising that all con­
sider the D-N or I-S model, in one form or another, appli­
cation to the problem of explanation and theory construction 
in the social sciences. The differences between the physi­
cal or natural sciences and the social sciences are considered 
to be differences of degree rather than of kind: degree of
precision; degree of abstraction or generalizability of law­
like statements; degree of verifiability; and the like. The
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structure of an adequate scientific explanation and the
procedures for justifying esqolanations are considered to
be invariant across disciplines. Hempel argues that, "The
decisive requirement for every sound explanation remains
146that it subsume the explanandum under general laws," and
that this requirement holds for the social sciences.
The purpose of scientific explanation whether in the 
physical or social sciences, according to Hempel, is to 
show that the event (phenomenon) in question occurred not 
as "a matter of chance, but was to be expected" given 
specifiable antecedent conditions. "The esqjectation," he 
continues, "...is not prophecy or divination, but rational 
scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption of 
general laws. "
Hempel contends that the social sciences, he cites 
sociology and history specifically, use something like 
general laws in presenting their explanations. The differ­
ence between explanations in the social and natural sciences 
is that, in the former, these laws are not explicitly 
stated. Hempel sees two possible reasons for this. First, 
it is often assumed that the laws used are familiar to 
everyone, and, thus, are taken for granted. Second, it
l^Carl Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," 
Aspects of Scientific Explanation, (New York: The Free
Press, 1965), p. 258.
147Carl Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in 
History," in Ibid., p. 235.
Ill
would, in most cases, be very difficult to formulate the
laws and their supporting assumptions in a manner which was
both precise and consistent with "all the relevant empiri-
148cal evidence available." Despite their frequent implic­
itness and imprecision, Hempel contends that such laws are 
readily used to link initial conditions and the event to 
be explained. The laws and, hence, the link between con­
ditions and event may be formulated either deterministically 
{i.e., as general "causal" laws), or, as will more likely 
be the case, as probability statements. The main problem 
for Hempel is not so much the manner of their construction
as it is the ambiguity and general lack of clarity of their
149implementation.
Because of the elliptical nature of explanations in
the social sciences, Hempel prefers to call them "explana-
150tion sketches." An esqplanation sketch "consists of a 
more or less vague indication of the laws and initial con­
ditions considered as relevant, and it needs 'filling out'
151in order to turn into a full-fledged explanation." ^ Such 
a "filling out" is accomplished by "further empirical re­
search, the direction for which is indicated by the explana­
tion sketch itself, and the specific statements of initial 






testable. The process of pointing to and testing which de­
rives from the explanation sketch leads to greater precision 
in formulation. The number of possible initial conditions is 
reduced by test; the kind of information considered to be 
germane to the explanation is more rigorously specified, and 
the general principles linking conditions to phenomenon are 
more carefully articulated.
To recapitulate, Hempel sees no essential difference 
between the structure of scientific explanation in the natu­
ral and the social sciences. In both, adequate explanations 
are the result of specifying the relationship between initial 
conditions and the event to be explained by invoking general 
principles, either deterministic or probabilistic, which 
cover such relationships. Because of the elliptical manner 
in which explanations are presented and because of the prob­
lems of fully articulating laws in the social sciences, they 
are better characterized as explanation sketches. An expla­
nation sketch is a potential candidate for an esqolanation if 
it indicates, albeit vaguely, laws and initial conditions 
capable of accounting for the phenomenon in question and then 
only if these vague laws and initial conditions can be sub­
jected to empirical test. Esqplanation sketches become more 
fully articulated, and more precise, through this testing 
procedure. By implication, most social scientific explana­
tions , given the condition that they are empirical in nature 
(i.e., testable), are explanation sketches. As such, they 
are subject to more precise and explicit formulation. This, 
it may be assumed, is to be accomplished by a rigorous test­
ing of predictions which are generated from the logical
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consequences of the explanation sketch. Those predictions 
supported by, or not refuted by, the test procedures remain 
as part of the improved eaqplanation sketch. For example, 
if from the ejqplanation sketch it is predicted that five 
initial conditions are related, either necessarily or at 
some (high) level of probability, to a phenomenon, and an 
adequate test of the prediction yields the constant or con­
sistent occurrence of three, then these three initial con­
ditions are retained as part of the succeeding explanation 
sketch and the other two are eliminated. As a consequence 
of the elimination of two initial conditions, the general 
principle governing the relationship is further specified.
In this manner, the general tenets of the basic covering 
law model are maintained, as is the Hempelian condition 
regarding the symmetry of explanation and prediction. Fur­
ther, it is evident that Hempel is not only describing the 
basic identity of natural and social scientific explanation, 
but he is also prescribing a model for the development of
increasingly scientific patterns of explanation in social 
152science.
152Although Hempel holds out the prospect of achieving "scientific" eaqplanation to the social sciences, he is par­ticularly hard in evaluating such attempts by social scien­
tists. See, for example, his discussion of functionalism 
in "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Hempel, Ibid. pp. 
297-330. In this essay he contends that, although "the 
functionalist mode of approach has proved illuminating, 
suggestive, and fruitful in many contexts" (p. 330) its 
"explanatory import" is "limited and precarious" (p. 314), 
and its predictive ability results from concepts which, far 
from being empirical, are really "covert tautologies" (p. 
316ff.). See also, "Typological Methods in the Natural and 
Social Sciences" in the same volume.
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Ernest Nagel is another philosopher of science who is 
generally considered to be a proponent of the R.V. and who 
argues for the applicability of R.V. tenets of scientific 
explanation to the social sciences. After a lengthy inves­
tigation of the usual objections presented against the use 
of "the e^qplanatory systems and logical methods of the
natural sciences as models to be emulated in social re- 
153search," Nagel concludes, "the net outcome of the dis­
cussion... is that none of the methodological difficulties 
often alleged to confront the search for systematic esqpla-
nations of social phenomena is unique to the social sciences
154or is inherently insuperable." The major difference 
between explanations in the social and physical sciences is 
to be found in the kinds of generalizations which each 
employ. Whereas many branches of science have succeeded in 
providing explanations in terms of universal laws stating 
invariant relationships for all phenomena within their 
domain of application, the generalizations of the social 
sciences are, for the most part, statistical or probabilis-
155tic in nature, and even then, of a low order of generality. 
There are two reasons for this. The first has to do with 
the terms used in each. The "laws" of natural science employ
153Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, (New York: 




terms, the criteria of application for Which are precisely
and unambiguously designated. The terms used in "empirical
social study," Nagel argues,
are, for the most part, adaptations of distinctions 
employed in everyday discussions of social questions, 
and are often used in formulating empirical generali­
zations with little redefinition of their vague, 
common-sense meanings....Moreover, even when the 
meaning of a term is made relatively precise, the 
precision is frequently achieved by way of some 
essentially statistical procedure, so that the 
items falling into its intended designation can 
possess different specific forms of the property connoted by the t e r m . 156
Even those terms which are precise and non-probabilis-
tically formulated (he gives as examples of these, "foreign-
born" and "voting in the last election) refer to "classes
of individuals who often vary widely in other characteristics
15which may be highly relevant to the problem under inquiry."
As a consequence, the terms used in social scientific gener­
alizations tend to be "indeterministic;" "they codify less 
refined or detailed distinctions," and "the items subsumed
under them are less homogeneous in pertinent respects" than
158the terms employed in natural science generalizations.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that, if the terms 
employed are ambiguous and imprecise, then it is to be 
expected that the relations between these terms will not




admit of precise and invariant formulation— thus, the sta­
tistical formulation of social science generalizations. To 
this Nagel adds the expected injunction: "The obvious
moral...is that social scientists should...develop more dis­
criminating classifications of social phenomena, if strictly
159universal social laws are to be established."
The second reason for the statistical nature of social 
generalizations has to do with the failure of the social sci­
ences to employ what Nagel calls "a successful logical strat-
160egy" which is frequently used in the natural sciences.
Nagel notes that the empirical evidence for the universal 
laws of the physical sciences is frequently imperfect. In 
fact, had these laws been formulated strictly on the basis 
of observation, they too would be statistical. Instead, the 
strategy employed assumed that the laws stated were univer­
sally valid under ideal conditions or for pure cases. Be­
cause of the precision of the terms and relationships 
utilized, the discrepancy between observed and postulated 
occurrences could be systematically accounted for. The 
social sciences have followed a strategy of seeking "to
establish relations of dependence between phenomena by
161correlating raw data." The reason for this, Nagel believes,
159Ibid., pp. 506-507. 
160Ibid., p. 508. 
161Ibid.
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is that "adequate theoretical notions have not been devel­
oped in most of these disciplines to suggest how laws
universally valid for 'pure cases' of social phenomena might
162be fruitfully formulated." Because the social sciences 
lack these "adequate theoretical notions," when this strategy 
has been attempted the discrepancy between observed and 
postulated conditions has been considerable, leading the 
strategy itself to be severely questioned. The solution to 
this problem, like the solution to the previous one, resides 
in the achievement of greater precision, in this case not 
so much in terminology, but in specifying "situational fac­
tors" (which I, following Hempel, have been calling "initial 
conditions") relevant to a particular domain.
It should be noted that this prescription flows from 
Nagel's more general treatment of scientific eaqplanation.
As was stated in chapter 3, Nagel is an exponent of that 
variation of the R.V. that considers a model to be a vital
163component of an adequate scientific explanation or theory.
A model may be understood as a representation which aides 
in mapping the range of applicability of a theory. It is 
clear from Nagel1s discussion of models that in performing 
one of their functions, fleshing out the logical skeleton of
162 Ibid., pp. 508-509. It should be noted that such 
attempts have been made, for example, in political science 
by Downs and Riker. These efforts will be discussed presently.
163Ibid., p. 90.
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a theory, models would similarly aid in narrowing the gap 
between the observed and idealized initial conditions men­
tioned above. Thus, it can be inferred that the develop­
ment of adequate models of a theory can be highly instru­
mental for the social sciences in employing the "logical
164strategy" of the physical sciences.
Despite the primitive and imprecise nature of concep­
tualization, the preponderance of statistical generaliza­
tions, and the failure to employ successfully the desirable 
and plausible logical strategies of the natural sciences, 
and while waiting for the implementation of his suggestions 
to remedy these deficiencies, Nagel argues that there is, 
in empirical social science as it now exists, sufficient 
warrant to assert the fundamentally scientific and deductive 
nature of social scientific inquiry. This assertion is 
based on the observation that "the social sciences not only
succeed in establishing statistical generalizations, but
165sometimes also in explaining them...," and that they 
accomplish this in the same way as do the other sciences: 
by considering these statistical generalizations to be prem­
ises in an argument of deductive form. Statistical generali­
zations serve as lower-order premises which are subsumed and 
explained by premises of greater, more universal, generality.
1 See Ibid., pp. 95-96. The model of a theory is not 




The procedure, according to Nagel, is the same in both the
166physical and the social sciences.
Richard Rudner is another philosopher of science who 
argues for the essential similarity between forms of expla­
nation in the social and physical sciences. There are two 
related bases for this assertion, according to Rudner. The 
first is that "the structural characteristics of a social
science theory are precisely the same as those of any other
167scientific theory." For Rudner, a theory is a "systemat­
ically related set of statements, including some law-like
168generalizations, that is empirically testable." The form
of systematic relationship which characterizes a theory is 
deductive; and its purpose, derived from "the ideal of 
science," is "to give an organized account of the universe—  
to connect, to fit together in relations of subsumption the
169statements embodying the knowledge that has been acquired." 
Further, "such an organization is a necessary condition for
1 fifiNagel is none too clear about how this procedure 
operates in the social sciences. He has discussed this re­
duction procedure at some length earlier in The Structure of 
Science, and I assume the procedure is the same. Immedi­
ately after making this assertion, Nagel begins a discussion 
of "varient forms" of interpretation in social inquiry 
which, he admits, he borrows from Paul Lazarsfeld. It seems 
to be only tangentially related to showing the essentially 
deductive structure of social scientific explanation.
X67Richard Rudner, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 




the accomplishment of two of science's chief functions, 
explanation and prediction...the sort of systematic re­
latedness exemplified among statements of scientific theo-
170ries is deductive relatedness." Rudner1s account of the 
structure of a scientific esqplanation is virtually indis­
tinguishable from Hempel1s, and includes an account of 
explanation as answers to "why" questions, a simplification 
of the D-N model, and an emphasis on the symmetry between 
explanation and prediction.
The second basis, related, as I have said, to the 
first, is that the logic of justification is the same for 
both the natural and social sciencesr and this entails that 
they both share the same methodology:
To claim that there is a difference in method­
ology between two disciplines or two types of disci­
plines... is to make a very radical claim. For the 
methodology of a scientific discipline is not a 
matter of its transient techniques but of its logic 
of justification. The method of a science is, in­
deed, the rationale on which it bases its acceptance 
or rejection of hypotheses or theories. Accordingly, 
to hold that the social sciences are methodologically 
distinct from the non-social sciences is to hold not 
merely (or perhaps not at all) the banal view that 
the social sciences employ different techniques of 
inquiry, but rather the startling view that the 
social sciences require a different logic of inquiry. 
To hold such a view, moreover, is to deny that all of 
science is characterized by a common logic of justi­
fication in its acceptance or rejection of hypoth­
eses or theories. 1
171Ibid., p. 5. Rudner is here distinguishing the un- 
controversial claim that the "techniques" of science are 
different from the claim that their methodologies are 
different.
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In the penultimate chapter of his book, Rudner con­
siders the cogency of various arguments to the effect that 
the logic of justification of science, in its extended 
sense, is not adequate to the special problems of the social 
sciences. These he handles with dispatch; all such claims, 
he contends, are based on a mistaken view of scientific
inquiry and/or ambiguity or confusion within the objection 
172itself. Although he considers some of the special prob­
lems of applying the R.V. to the social sciences, he finds, 
like Hempel and Nagel, that these are problems of degree to 
be resolved in a manner already suggested by Hempel and 
Nagel.
To summarize, R.V. philosophers of science who are 
interested in the social sciences, and of whom Hempel,
Nagel, and Rudner are representative, argue for the in prin­
ciple symmetry between explanation in the natural and social 
sciences. Differences in results obtained in these two 
broad areas of inquiry are seen as differences in degree of 
precision and theoretical sophistication, and have little,
17?See Ibid., pp. 68-83. for a detailed account of 
these objections and the arguments against them. For a simi­
lar treatment of objections to the application of the R.V. 
to social inquiry see, for example, "Meaning and Action" and 
"Esqplanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect Knowledge' "by May 
Brodbeck. Both may be found in Brodbeck, Readings in the 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (New York: The MacMillan
Co., 1968). Similar, but not identical, treatments of social 
inquiry by philosophers generally considered to be sympathetic 
to the R.V. may be found, for example, in Kaplan. The Con­
duct of Inquiry, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company,
1964).
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if anything, to do with any inherent or intractable differ­
ences in subject matter. For the most part, with the 
exception of general suggestions as to how to increase pre­
cision and theoretical sophistication, arguments for the in 
principle applicability are negative in that they demonstrate 
that arguments against applying the R.V. to the social 
sciences are based on misunderstanding, misinterpretation, 
fallacious argument, or ambiguity and confusion inherent in 
the objections themselves.
A second source of insight into the influence of the
R.V. on social and political theory and explanation is to be
found in the work of social scientists who are concerned with
the development of a "scientific" approach to the study of
173social and political phenomena.
One of the most consistent, if not the earliest, pro­
ponents of this point of view in political science has been 
David Easton. Easton has long advocated the development of 
a scientifically theoretical political science. It is his 
contention that "the search for reliable knowledge about 
empirical political phenomena requires ultimately the con­
struction of systematic theory, the name for the highest
173The discussion which follows makes no pretense of 
being a complete enumeration. The inclusion of these think­
ers is based upon their having written eaqolicitly on the 
aforementioned subject, their general acceptance of the 
premise that social inquiry is subject to scientific expla­
nation, and an (admittedly subjective) assessment of the 
impact of their writings on social, and particularly, polit­
ical inquiry.
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174order of generalization." He further contends that
"political science is too little sensitized to the need for
inquiry into the problems that stand in the way of such a
175comprehensive or general theory of political activity,"
and that, "without a conscious understanding of the role of
theory and its possibility...political research must remain
fragmentary and heterogeneous, unable to fulfill the promise
176in its designation as political science." Easton argues
that "universal generalizations about social relations are 
possible," and that it is "to the necessary task of develop­
ing verifiable theory" that political science must direct 
177itself.
It is clear that by "systematic theory" Easton intends
theory which is deductive in form and which is capable of
expressing "discoverable uniformities in political behavior"
which have "explanatory and predictive value" and which are
178"testable in principle by reference to relevant behavior."
The model for the development of this theory is to be found 
in the physical sciences, particularly in physics where 
"from a few basic premises, empirically derived, it has
l^David Easton, The Political System, (New York: Al­
fred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 4.
^•^Ibid. , p. 5.
176ibid. (Emphasis in Easton)
^■^ibid., p. 37.
■^®David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 7.
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proved possible to formulate deductively a whole body of
intermediate theory and from this in turn to predict the
179occurrence of empirical events," which, m  their turn,
180serve as an affirmation or denial of the theory itself.
It is true, Easton says, that for political science as
it now exists "such advanced theory is still in the distant
181realm of aspiration" and, further, that the social sci­
ences should beware of "the premature and slavish imitation
182of the physical sciences." But it is obvious that Easton 
intends that these sciences can serve as a guide to the 
development of a mature theoretical knowledge of political 
phenomena.
There is a deeper and more pervasive influence of the 
R.V. of science upon Easton than is indicated by his prescrip­
tions for the development of a mature science of politics as 
sketched above. This has to do with his view of the relation­
ship between facts and the theories by which they are 
explained. Easton is highly critical of what he considered 
to be the dominant trend in political science up to the time 
he wrote The Political System. He labels this trend "hyper- 
factualism" and by this term he means an overwhelming concern





with the collection and classification of "data." This
tendency, which has had as its consequence "theoretical mal-
183nutrition and a surfeit of facts," is the result of an 
inadequate view of the nature of science, a view which sees 
science as being primarily descriptive of individual phenom­
ena and cumulative only when the collection of facts "yield" 
singular generalizations derived inductively. This is, for 
the most part, an older view of science, a view similar to
that of the early Vienna Circle that was so severely criti-
184cized by Popper. The R.V. supplanted this older version
of science and it is to the R.V. that Easton turns for his 
critique, and for his ideas about the nature of science. He 
shares with this newer version of scientific inquiry his 
opinions about the relation between theory and facts. It 
is clear from his criticisms of "hyperfactualism" that his 
major objection to it is that it will never result in the 
kinds of systematic generalization capable of organizing 
information and providing the conceptual basis for directing 
and evaluating research. To put it a little differently, 
from the accumulation of particular facts, one cannot arrive 
at systematic (i.e., deductive) theory. Or, more simply yet, 
you can't get there from here.
183T, . , n nIbid., p. 77.
IQ ASee chapter 3 for a full discussion of this older 
view and Popper's criticism of it.
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The view of science which emerges from his criticisms 
is one in which the emphasis is placed on its organizational 
and explanatory function. Rather than science being an 
accumulation of facts to which theory is an afterthought 7 
for Easton, as for the R.V. philosophers, science is explan­
atory and theory serves a central function in providing 
structure to research:
It begins with a few postulates of empirical 
reference and from these deduces a series of 
narrower generalizations. Prom these, in turn, 
stem singular generalizations capable of empiri­
cal test. This is the theoretical system which 
serves as an analytic model of the concrete 
political system.
A second political scientist who is concerned with the
development of scientific political and social inquiry is
Karl Deutsch. Deutsch discusses theory in terms of "models."
For Deutsch, a model is a conceptual structure intended "to
186aid the economy and power of our thinking." It codifies
187"an agreement on...basic assumptions and methods." For
a model to be effective, it must "lead to inferences capable 
of being confirmed or refuted by repeatable physical opera­
tions, and...it must lead to new observations and esqperi- 
188ments." It guides research by pointing to questions
185Ibid., p. 58.
186Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. (New York: 




worth ashing, propositions worth verifying or disproving
189and data worth collecting.
For Deutsch a model has four functions in scientific
inquiry. First, it serves an organizing function; it serves
"to order and relate disjointed data...to show similarities
or connections between them that had previously remained
unperceived, (and) to make isolated pieces of information
190fall suddenly into a meaningful pattern...." Second, a
model serves a heuristic/explanatory function. It places
information into an understandable pattern and points the
191way to the discovery of "new facts and new methods;" that
19is, it tells us "where to look for something interesting."
Third, a model serves a predictive function. It suggests
"ways of looking for new knowledge, and help(s) to predict
regularities that may or may not be confirmed by later
193experience or measurement." It provides a conjecture as 
to "the pattern of the distribution of a set of known data 
and (extends), tentatively, a similar pattern into some area 
of space or some period of time, from which we have as yet
189Ibid.





194no firsthand data.1' Finally, models indicate a measure­
ment function. In order that a model be effective, it must 
be specifically related to the thing modeled. To demon­
strate this relationship, a model must indicate a measure 
of applicabilityj it must designate the way in which the 
model fits the data. If the "laws" indicating the relation­
ship between the model and the thing modeled are weakly 
formulated or poorly understood, the data "yielded" by the
application of the model serve only as "indicators" to the
195cogency and usefulness of the model. If the "laws" re­
lating the model to the thing modeled are well-formulated
and understood, then the data which it "yields" are "meas-
196ures" of its applicability. In the latter case, the
power and precision of the model in its organizing, explana­
tory/heuristic, and predictive functions is greatly increased. 
The functions of a model are superintended by a structure 
including "a set of rules" {a 'logic' or 'calculus'), some
"laws of operation," and a "set of symbols" to which the "set
197of rules" and "laws of operation" are applied.
This, then, is Deutsch's idea of how science operates 
and his proposal for developing useful political theory
194ibid. 




which would be "comparable to such bodies of knowledge
as economic theory, the theories of evolution and genetics
in biology, or to take an extreme case, theoretical phys- 
198ics...." Although Deutsch is all too brief on the
structure of a model, I think it is clear that what he has 
in mind is something corresponding to the R.V. The func­
tion of models in organizing and directing inquiry, the 
notion of specifiable correspondence between model and 
thing modeled, the emphasis on prediction and testability, 
the somewhat nebulous formulation of the structure of a 
model as a calculus, an extralogical vocabulary {the set of 
symbols) and correspondence rules (laws of operation) are 
central features of the R.V. And, although he does not 
explicitly use the term, I think it is fairly clear that 
the process of explanation according to models is a deduc­
tive one, one in which unexplained events are explained by
199subsuming them by a model.
Another social scientist who has written explicitly on 
the nature of explanation in the social sciences, and other 
sciences, is George Homans. In a monograph entitled The 
Nature of Social Science Homans contends that the social 
sciences, including psychology, anthropology, sociology,
198 .Ibid., p. xxvi.
199It should be noted that Deutsch contends that the 
unfamiliar is explained by reducing it to the familiar, a 
condition of explanation not held by the R.V.
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economics, and political science, are a single science that
200share the "same body of general explanatory principles." 
Moreover, the social sciences are of a kind with the physi­
cal sciences because they share the "aim" if not the results 
of those sciences:
What makes a science are its aims, not its 
results. If it aims at establishing more or less 
general relationships between properties of 
nature, when the test of the truth of a relation­
ship lies finally in the data themselves, and the 
data are not wholly manufactured— when nature 
however stretched on the rack, still has a chance 
to say "No!"— then the subject is a science.201
In what way are the aims of social science commensu­
rate with those of the physical sciences, and how are these 
aims to be achieved? About these issues Homans is straight­
forward and concise. The twin aims of any science are dis-
202 203covery and explanation. The manner in which these
aims are achieved is through theory. He maintains that
"theory of a phenomenon is an explanation of the phenomenon,
2^George Homans, The Nature of Social Science, (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), p. 3.
201Ibid., p. 4.
202Since my concern here is with theory and explanation,
I will not discuss Homans' ideas concerning Discovery. Suffice 
it to say that Homans' idea of discovery as the "stating and 
testing of more or less general relationships between proper­
ties of nature...(when) the relationships were unknown before 
research revealed them," (Ibid., p. 7) is sufficiently simi­
lar to his treatment of explanation and prediction that 
little further need be said of it. It is reasonably clear 
that he is not explicitly presenting a "logic of discovery."
203Ibid., p. 7.
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and nothing that is not an explanation is worthy of the
204name of theory.n
Homans unpacks the notion of theory through a discus­
sion of explanation. Citing Hempel, Homans says that he is
"using explanation in the special sense of explaining why
205under given conditions a particular phenomenon occurs." 
Further,
In the special sense, the esqplanation of a 
finding, whether a generalization or a proposition 
about a single event, is the process of showing 
that the finding follows as a logical conclusion, 
as a deduction, from one or more general proposi­
tions under specified given conditions.20”
For Homans, an explanation is the result of subsuming
propositions stating relationships between properties,
events, or classes of events under more general propositions
given certain specified conditions. The proposition stating
the event to be esqplained "is deduced from, derived from,
the other propositions, the whole set forming a deductive 
207system." Like Hempel, Homans claims that these explana­
tory general propositions are themselves susceptible of 
explanation by subsumption under propositions of still 
greater generality. In each case, the explanation of the
204Ibid., p. 22.




phenomenon to be explained is the theory of that phenome- 
208non. In each case, "explanation is the deduction of
209empirical propositions from more general ones." Homans
suggests that we look at theory as being a game: "The
winner is the man who can deduce the largest variety of
empirical findings from the smallest number of general prop-
210ositions, with the help of a variety of given conditions."
These tenets apply to social as well as physical theory. 
Although the content of the propositions and explanations 
is different in social science, the result only of a differ­
ent subject matter, the requirements for an eaqplanation are
211the same in both. There are, however, some problems of
ejqplanation involved in attempting to employ this "special 
sense" of explanation in the social sciences. They are two 
in number and both have to do with the nature of the propo­
sitions accessible to the social sciences. The first con­
cerns the nature of our general propositions. What are 
they? What are their sources? Of what elements are they 
constructed? The second, devolving from the first, concerns 
whether or not (lower level) empirical propositions can be 
derived from them. The first problem is a conceptual problem
298Ibid., p. 26.
209Ibid., p. 31.
210Ibid., p. 27. 
211Ibid., p. 28.
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resulting from the too-frequent vagueness and imprecision 
in the terms occurring in the propositions. The second 
problem is that, because of this imprecision, it is diffi­
cult to derive empirically testable statements from them.
Throughout his discussion of theory and explanation, 
Homans' reliance upon and acceptance of the R.V. is patent 
and unmistakable. The deductive model of esqplanation com­
plete with general propositions, initial conditions, pre­
diction/testability criteria, and the explanatory function 
of theory is that of the R.V. Even the particular problems 
of applying this model to the social sciences are the prob­
lems of the deductive model generally— the problem of 
relating theoretical constructs to observational phenomena 
via adequate rules of correspondence.
Walter Wallace is another social scientist who is an
advocate of the application of the R.V. model of explanation
to the development of adequate social explanation and theory.
For Wallace, a theory is a conceptual structure that is
capable of explaining known empirical generalizations, and
predicting empirical generalizations that are, as yet, un- 
212known. These functions are possible "...when the set of
propositions that are yielded by conceptual transformation 
of known empirical generalizations are arranged in a
Walter Wallace, The Logic of Science in Sociology, 
(Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), p. 57. For a more con­
cise outline of the same ideas, see Walter Wallace, Socio­
logical Theory, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969).
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specifiable form— especially a deductive form— then not only
can the original empirical generalization be explained but
also new and untested empirical generalizations can be pre-
213dieted or hypothesized." The predictive function of
theories is important because "confirmed predictions
214increase our confidence in theoretic explanations." They
direct our attention to what we should look for and should
215"be able to measure before doing empirical research,"
and they direct our attention "when observations are made,
via interpretation of the hypothesis, scaling, instrumenta-
216tion, and sampling" to the salient testable grounds which 
are the basis of scientific explanations.
In discussing the structure of theories as explanatory
and predictive strategies Wallace restates Hempel's D-N and
217 .I-S models of scientific explanation. The strong impli­
cation is that for a theory to be an esqplanatory-predictive 
device it must satisfy the conditions of an adequate deduc­
tive explanation as presented by Hempel. Wallace also 
considers Kaplan's "concatenated theory or pattern model" as 





217Ibid., PP . 91-100.
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concludes, with Kaplan, that ultimately "a pattern has
explanatory force insofar as thereby we are enabled to show
how what is being explained can be deduced from more general
218considerations.M Therefore, at the present, the concate­
nated or pattern model can be considered as a variation on
219the basic deductive model.
Another group of social theorists, closely related to 
those presented above, accept the general tenets of the R.V. 
of scientific explanation and theory as a model to be emu­
lated by the social sciences. This group including, for 
example, Torgerson, Wilson and Dumont, Blalock, Costner, 
Zetterberg, Downs, and Riker, among others, directs the 
greater part of their attention to the problems of applying 
these generally accepted tenets to social inquiry. For the 
most part, these problems are those adumbrated above. To 
facilitate exposition I will collapse these problems into 
three related categories. The first might be called the 
Problem of Conceptual Imprecision or Conceptual Ambiguity. 
Attempts at solving this problem are concerned with designat­
ing more or less precise referents for the terms of social 
discourse, explicating the intended range of usage for these
218Ibid., p. 95.
9 IQFor other essentially similar accounts of the appli­
cability of the R.V. to social inquiry, see Kaplan, The 
Conduct of Inquiry, Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological 
Explanation, Scott Greer, The Logic of Social Inquiry, Arnold 
Brecht, Political Theory, Anatol Rappoport "Various Meanings 
of Theory," American Political Science Review, vol. 52,
(1958), pp. 972-988.
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terms, or developing indices and indicators from which the 
meaning of terms can be derived. Often such solutions 
entail the development of techniques of measurement.
The second problem may be called the Problem of Corre­
spondence. It is concerned with the relationship between 
the theoretical structure and the phenomenon to be explained. 
"How is it," the question may be posed, "that we can link 
the concepts of a theoretical structure with the intended 
observed events in such a way that these events may be said 
to be explained?" Viewed from one perspective, this is a 
problem of testability; and, as such, it points to and 
suggests the Imprecision Problem— particularly to the 
development of scales, indices, and social measurements as 
ways of increasing conceptual precision and linking "theo­
retical" concept to "empirical" referent.
The third problem may be called the Problem of Axiomati- 
zation. Briefly, this is the problem of providing a deduc­
tive form to social explanations and theories. It is con­
cerned with the characteristics of social generalizations, 
the nature, to use Homan1s terms, of social propositions, 
their source and structure, and the relationship between 
such statements and the phenomena that they explain. As 
such, this problem implies the correspondence problem, and, 
less directly, the imprecision problem. To a large, and 
usually unrecognized extent, the axiomatization problem 
involves a choice between the two models of scientific 
explanation presented by Hempel, the D-N and the I-S. In
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the remainder of this section, I will deal with these prob­
lems and the responses to them by social theorists, with 
the intention of further demonstrating the influence of the 
R.V. on social explanation and theory, and of indicating 
the direction in which social theory has been, and is, 
developing.
The Problem of Conceptual Imprecision is one of the 
most serious and multifaceted difficulties of the social 
sciences. Its resolution must attend not only to the speci­
fication of meanings or empirical referents for the terms 
used in social explanation and theory, but also involves a 
decision as to what those terms should be. Should we, for 
example, attempt to study politics as a set of institutions, 
a system of personal interrelationships, a process for the 
allocation of values, a group of legal constraints, a way 
of achieving and maintaining concensus, a bartering or other 
kind of economic marketplace? Should the unit of analysis 
providing the basic terms of political discourse be power, 
decision-making, the system, an exchange of one sort or 
another, or a function? While I do not want to minimize 
the importance or significance of choices of this kind, it 
should be emphasized that, regardless of the choice made, 
the problem, from the point of view of developing, in this 
example, a science of politics along the lines articulated 
by the R.V., remains constant. What do the terms we have 
selected mean? How are these terms related to what goes on 
politically? How can they be used to understand political
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phenomena? Questions of this form are invariant across all 
scientific disciplines, and explanation in the more fully- 
developed scientific disciplines is facilitated by the fact
that some choices of this kind have already been made.
Attempts at increasing the precision of political and 
social scientific discourse have taken many forms. The 
earliest and most frequent of these is a process of defini­
tion. Definition may be the simple designation of the
extention of the use of a term. In such cases, if the term
is defined in isolation, its usefulness to an adequate solu­
tion of the imprecision problem, according to R.V. criteria, 
is fairly limited. A second form which definition might 
take, one which is more consonant with the dictates of the 
R.V., I will call theoretical or contextual definition. In 
this form the referent, use or meaning of a term is derived 
from its place in a conceptual framework. The meaning of a
term derives from and is dependent upon the meaning of other
220terms defined in a similar fashion, or of primitive terms, 
or of both in conjunction. The paradigm case for definition 
of this kind comes from geometry where "point" is an unde­
fined (primitive) term; "line" is defined as a series of 
contiguous points, "plane" is defined as a series of parallel 
contiguous lines, etc. In cases similar to this, the meaning 
particularly of theoretical terms is constructed relationally,
^^See the discussion in chapter 3 for specification.
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each term deriving a meaning by relation to other theoreti­
cal terms. Examples of the use of this technique include
221 222 attempts by T. D. Weldon, and Lasswell and Kaplan to
specify a uniform vocabulary for political inquiry. Al­
though this technique is widely used, and perhaps even 
essential to the development of a theory, its utility is 
mitigated by the fact that definition of this kind need not 
necessarily specify the criteria for relating the term with 
its empirical referent. This has the effect of regressing 
the problem of this relationship one step— to correspondence 
rules. There is nothing inherently wrong with this; in 
fact, it may be interpreted as the prescribed method accord­
ing to R.V. thinking. Other strategies, ones more frequently 
used to designate the meaning of terms, seem to predominate 
and the work of correspondence rules is usually restricted 
to relating the whole of a theory, not just its constituent 
terms, to the intended phenomenon.
These other strategies for increasing the precision of 
terms may be categorized by the loose label "operational 
procedures." According to these procedures, the terms of a 
theory are defined by the operations or techniques by which 
they are measured. For the most part, this occurs through
221T. D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics, {New York: 
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1953).
222Harold Lasswell, and Abraham Kaplan, Power and 
Society, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).
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the construction of scales and indices which specify the
observational characteristics of the term. The meaning of
a term is designated by the procedures according to which
223it selects and organizes observable phenomena. To use
an overly-simple and hypothetical example, if we were 
interested in the influence one's social status had on one's 
voting behavior (i.e., if we wanted to "explain" voting 
behavior by generalizations containing the term "social 
status"), it would be beneficial to be more precise about 
what was designated by the term, "social status." We could, 
by derivation from other terms in the theory, specify status 
as being primarily socio-economic in nature, and then decide 
on indicators (education, occupation, and income) which 
could be measured in some way, that is, for which indices 
could be constructed (education in years, occupation by the 
Hatt-North Occupational Prestige Rating, income in dollars), 
and, then, relate these measures to one and other. The 
meaning of "social status" would then be defined according 
to the characteristics indicated by the procedures for speci­
fying the term "social status." The logic and techniques of 
constructing and using such scales is widely employed as a
method for specifying the observational consequences of social 
224science terms. For example, the same fundamental procedure
223Warren Torgerson, Theory and Method of Scaling, (New 
York: John Wiley &  Sons, 1958), p. 4.
224See, for example, Ibid.
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has been used to increase the precision of terms like "prej­
udice" (social distance), "intelligence," "authoritarian," 
"political efficacy," "powerlessness," "alienation," and a 
multitude of other terms.
In addition to increasing the precision of terms, the 
construction of indices facilitates the determination of the 
degree to which the term applies, and therefore allows for 
comparisons and rankings of various kinds. For example, a 
properly constructed index for "alienation" will permit not 
only the judgement that a person is "alienated," but will 
also allow a judgement as to how much a person is alienated.
Operational procedures, as strategies for increasing 
the precision of terms, are not without difficulties. For 
one thing, it is possible to develop a set of indicators 
for virtually any term. But this possibility will not, of 
itself, increase the esqplanatory capability of the social 
sciences. A set of indicators taken by itself is, at best, 
a descriptive device. For a term whose meaning is specified 
by the construction of a set of indicators, or other opera­
tional procedure, to gain explanatory significance it must 
be lodged with other terms in those specified systems of 
relation-statements that I have been calling theories. Warren
Torgerson implies this criterion when he talks about "measure-
225ment by fiat" and "measurement by fundamental process."
225Ibid., pp. 21-23.
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In the former, the magnitude (measurable property) of the
term is decided on or selected on the basis of intuition,
hunch, educated guess, or the like. In the latter, the
magnitude of a particular term is decided on because of the
theory. The theory provides information not only about
which terms can serve to help explain a particular phenomenon,
but also about which property or dimension of these selec-
226ted terms needs to be made more precise. The main
difference between the physical and social sciences for
Torgerson is that in one the rationale linking "construct"
to observable "data," and, therefore, dictating measurement,
is spelled out and justified by the theory, which itself is
explicit; and in the other this rationale is either implicit
227or non-existent.
Dumont and Wilson, two sociologists, have attempted to
provide a stratgey for increasing the precision of the terms
of social discourse which remedies the short-comings of
operational procedures while, at the same time, permitting
228the introduction of isolated theoretical terms. What
they suggest is, in effect, a combination of what I have 
called "theoretical or contextual" definition, and the
226Ibid.
22*7I b i d . gee diagrams, and discussion, pp. 2-6.
2^®Richard Dumont and William Wilson, "Aspects of Con­
cept Formation, Explication, and Theory Construction in 
Sociology," American Sociological Review, vol. 32, no. 6 
(December, 1967), pp. 985-995.
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operational procedures discussed above. For a term to be 
considered precise it must occur in an esqplicitly formu­
lated theory, and its observational consequences must be
non-arbitrarily specified by the appropriate operational 
229procedures. Thus the precision or lack of ambiguity of
a term depends not only upon whether a term has observational 
consequences, but also upon how esqplicitly formulated or 
articulated is the theory in which it occurs.
A second problem with operational procedures has to do 
not so much with its use as a strategy for increasing con­
ceptual precision, but with how extensively it should be 
applied. It was once thought that for a theory to be "scien­
tific" that all of its non-logical terms must be reduced
(or reducible) to observational terms. Several attempts to
231demonstrate this were made, and the general prescription 
to reduce theoretical statements to observational statements 
came to strongly influence the social sciences under the 
auspices of "operationalism." The uneasiness with which the 
imprecision of theoretical terms in the social sciences were 
regarded was perhaps justified, but the start made toward 
remedying this situation by operationalism was a false one.
Ibid., pp. 989-994. The authors discuss concepts in 
terms of "significance" rather than precision.
230Given this construal the relationship between the 
first and third problems cited becomes even closer and more 
interdependent.
231See chapter 3 for a brief discussion of these.
The several conceptual difficulties with operationalism
232have been extensively discussed by Hempel and by 
233Kaplan, among others. The main problems are that no 
particular set of operations can completely exhaust the 
meaning of a theoretical term. For example, there is no 
good reason for assuming that the concept of intelligence 
is exhausted by its operational definition via a particular 
intelligence test. The test may partially specify some of 
the meanings of the term, but there is no reason to insist, 
as do the operationalists, that intelligence is purely and 
simply defined by its measurement procedure. A second prob­
lem with operationalism is its restrictiveness. For example, 
if, following operationalist strictures, we consider intelli­
gence to be defined by one's score on a Wexler I.Q. test, 
then what is the result to be called for the score on a 
Stanford-Binet test? Here we have two different operational 
definitions. It follows from the operationalist position 
that we have two concepts of intelligence. Shall we label
them Intelligence^ and Intelligence^ What would be gained?
234What criteria could be offered for choosing between them?
It is now generally recognized that the meaning of theo­
retical terms cannot be specified with absolute precision.
232Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," in Aspects of 
Scientific Explanation, pp. 187-189.
233Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, pp. 39-42.
Another, perhaps niggling, objection to operational- ism concerns how one would go about giving an "operational 
definition" of operationalism.
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They are not even viewed as being in-principle replaceable
by observation terms. Other attempts at replacement have
also been less than satisfactory. As a result, the call
for total interpretation of a theoretical vocabulary by an
observational vocabulary has yielded to a criterion of
"partial interpretation," where not every term is given an
observational interpretation, and the explanatory function
235of statements containing theoretical terms is maintaxned.
A consideration of the function of theoretical terms leads 
to the second and overlapping problem confronting social 
scientists in attempting to apply the R.V. to social theory, 
the Problem of Correspondence.
As was stated earlier, the Problem of Correspondence is 
the problem of delineating the connections between the con­
ceptual structure that is a theory and a phenomenon which 
the theory is said to account for. From another point of 
view, the problem is, or implies, a problem of testability: 
What test can be made— what evidence can be provided— that 
will demonstrate a significant relationship between the 
event to be esqplained and its eaqplanation? Correspondence 
rules are the nexus between theory and empirical phenomena. 
They state the conditions by which a connection is made, and 
also establish at least minimal expectations about the kind 
of evidence that would warrant the acceptance or rejection
23^See chapter 3. For a more fully-articulated dis­
cussion, see Hempel's "Theoretician's Dilemma."
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of a theory. Depending upon the "maturity" or "sophisti­
cation" of the theory, the conditions and expectations will 
be stated with varying degrees of exactness. For example, 
in what Hempel calls an "explanation sketch," the correspond­
ence rules of the theory "point to" or "indicate" the pro­
cedures for relating theory to phenomenon and loosely speci­
fy acceptance criteria. In a mature, fully articulated 
theory the connections between the constructs of the theory 
and the phenomena to be accounted for, the data, are pre­
cisely stated; and the conditions for accepting or rejecting 
a theory are explicitly established. Furthermore, in the 
more fully articulated theory, the justification for choos­
ing a particular set of correspondence rules derives from
236the theory itself.
All of this points to the obvious similarity between 
the Imprecision Problem, with its "solution" in more precise 
empirical statements of the meaning of terms, and the 
Correspondence Problem, with its "solution" in a more pre­
cise statement of the connections between theory and phenom­
ena. The two may be viewed as opposite sides of the same 
coin in that both are concerned with establishing venues by 
which increasing precision may be reached and with construct­
ing criteria capable of guiding judgements about conceptual 
formulations. Therefore, it should not be surprising that
^®See Torgerson, op. cit., pp. 2-7. Also Dumont and 
Wilson, pp. cit., pp. 988-990.
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some of the strategies for dealing with problems of corre­
spondence are also similar to the strategies for increasing 
the precision of specific terms. Let me reiterate: The
difference between the Problem of Conceptual Imprecision 
and the Correspondence Problem is the difference between 
increasing the precision of terms and increasing the pre­
cision of statements as to how they function in explaining 
and predicting phenomena.
The first strategy for establishing correspondence 
between a theory and its referent phenomenon is operational­
ism. Although it is primarily a strategy for increasing 
the precision of terms, it also implies, and has been used 
as, a strategy for formulating correspondence. For the 
operationalist, the meaning of a term resides in the proce­
dures of its measurement and application. To use the pre­
vious example, we can meaningfully use the term "intelli­
gence," according to the operationalist, because we know of 
and can specify operations by which it can be isolated, 
measured, and applied. Operational strategies can be used 
as a means of establishing correspondence when all of the 
terms of a theory are given operational definitions, and 
operational meaning. The correspondence of a theory to a 
phenomenon is demonstrated when operations for measuring all 
of the observational consequences of all of the non-logical 
terms of the theory are given. A theory thus becomes a kind 
of "short-hand" or "code" for the complete and complex set 
of esqperimental and measurement techniques. This is
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admittedly vague and unsatisfactory, especially in its 
extreme form. It is heir to all of the difficulties, dis­
cussed above, of operationalism as a solution to the Problem 
of Conceptual Imprecision. In addition, I think it begs the 
question of how a theory is related to a phenomena in such 
a way that it eiqplains it; that is, it fails to come to 
grips with the function of a theory. Furthermore, it has 
the debilitating effect of blinding a researcher to other 
dimensions, other observational consequences, which may be 
implied by a theory by focusing attention on only those 
consequences specified by the particular selected operation­
al procedure. This is a particularly odious consequence, 
the likelihood of which is increased by the fact that most 
social theories are, at best, inexplicitly articulated with 
the result that any choice of one operation over another is 
more or less arbitrary. To return to an earlier example, 
we can assume that because there is no fully articulated 
theory of social status, there is no significant reason for 
choosing to operationalize status in terms of income, educa­
tion, and occupation as indicators of S.E.S. over, say, the 
number of bathrooms or telephones in one's home or the num­
ber of cars one owns. And in either case, nothing specifies 
the relationship between status and either set of indicators. 
In any case, operationalist strategies for constructing 
rules of correspondence fail, as did operationalist strate­
gies for specifying the meaning of terms, because it cannot 
be demonstrated that such rules would exhaust the range of 
applicability of the theory.
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Two other procedures for specifying the correspondence 
between theories and phenomena have been investigated by 
social theorists. In an article in Sociology and Social 
Research, William Wilson and Richard Dumont consider "reduc­
tion sentences" and "translation rules" as alternatives to
237operationalism.
The reduction sentence strategy, first proposed by 
Carnap, maintains the demand for empirical reference in 
defining terms and establishing correspondence, like opera­
tionalism, but it allows for greater flexibility. Instead 
of insisting that the meaning of a term or of a theory is 
the procedure, and only the procedure, by which its obser­
vational consequences are measured, the reduction sentence 
approach views any particular procedure as a part of the 
meaning of a term. No procedure would exclude the possi­
bility of other procedures in constituting the meaning of 
a term or the correspondence between a theory and a phenom­
enon. Instead of one procedure exclusively and exhaustively 
providing the esqplicit definition of a term, a series of 
procedures, taken together, provide a partial definition of 
a term or a partial interpretation of a theory. As Wilson 
and Dumont correctly contend, "whether an operational
William Wilson and Richard Dumont, "Rules of Corre­
spondence and Sociological Concepts," Sociology and Social 
Research, vol. 52, no. 2 (Jan., 1968), pp. 217-227. These 
authors also discuss operationalism at some length. Their 
general discussion follows closely that of Hempel in the 
"Theoretician's Dilemma."
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definition provides a complete or full definition of a 
concept...i.e., there remains no possibility for alterna­
tive meanings being attached to {it)..., reduction sentences
238specify the meaning only partially...." This permits
terms to have an "openness of meaning," and theories to be 
applied in cases where their applicability can be demon­
strated: "...the provision for a set of different, and
mutually supplementary, reduction sentences...reflects the 
availability, for most theoretical terms, of different
operational criteria of application, pertaining to different 
239contexts."
The form and technique for constructing correspondence 
rules and for increasing the precision of terms for reduc­
tion sentences would be similar to that used by operation-
ialists. Reduction sentences are different from operational 
procedures mostly in terms of strategy rather than tactics. 
The reduction sentence strategy provides a different, less 
restrictive, interpretation of correspondence and meaning 
techniques than does operationalism without seriously effect­
ing empirical content or empirical relevance. For this 
reason, the authors imply that it is preferable to opera­
tionalism, particularly in lesser developed areas of 
scientific inquiry like the social sciences.
238yjiig0n an(j Dumont, Ibid., p. 220.
There are some obstacles to the use of reduction 
sentences as rules of correspondence or techniques for 
improving the precision of terms in the social sciences.
As presented by Carnap, and interpreted by Hempel, reduc­
tion sentences seem to require rigorous forms of measure­
ment and detailed statements of test conditions to be 
240applicable. Further, the condition that not all terms
be given operational definition seems to suggest that these 
non-defined terms have some contextual meaning in order 
that the theory be saved from vacuousness. This would re­
quire that the internal relationships among these terms in 
the theory be fairly well delineated. This is tantamount 
to the requirement that they occur in a more or less fully 
articulated theory. This brings us full circle to the 
problem which, for the social sciences at least, initiated 
the discussion— the dearth of fully explicated theory— in 
the first place. Still, despite these difficulties, reduc­
tion sentences seem to be a more fruitful correspondence 
and meaning strategy than operationalism. Potentially, the 
same result is achieved without imposing the limitations 
carried by the operationalist program.
Another form of correspondence rule considered by Wil­
son and Dumont is what they call "translation rules." Again 
following the lead of Carnap and of Hempel, Wilson and
240Ibid., pp. 221-222.
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Dumont contend that correspondence can be demonstrated and
precision of meaning increased via the translation rule
strategy if it can be demonstrated that an observation
sentence corresponds to a theoretical sentence, and is 
241true. The authors argue that, following this strategy,
a theoretical term is "implicitly defined" "by connecting
the sentence in which it is embedded to an observational
242sentence." Although their discussion of this particular 
strategy is brief, I think that it is obvious, particularly
in light of the more extensive discussion of this subject
243by Hempel, that the translation rule strategy requires 
fully articulated theory in order to be fruitfully applied. 
Recognizing this, Wilson and Dumont suggest that it might 
be used to aid theory construction in the social sciences; 
but they provide little specific information about how this 
would be accomplished.
There is another trend in the construction, interpre­
tation and use of correspondence rules that has been and is 
developing in the social sciences. According to this view, 
the function of correspondence rules in interpreting theory 
and in establishing the connections between a theory and 
the phenomena with which it is concerned, remains unchanged.
241Ibid., p. 223. 
242Ibid.
243Hempel, "Theoretician's Dilemma," pp. 189-210.
What advocates of this position argue, and what separates 
them from "orthodox" R.V. thinkers is the notion that, 
properly conceived, correspondence rules are not part of a 
theory. Rather, correspondence rules are auxiliary 
theories which delineate ways of establishing and, perhaps 
more importantly, of testing the relationship between a 
theory as a conceptual and logical structure and observed 
{or in principle observable) phenomena. I do not think 
that, as a first approximation, it would unduly oversimpli­
fy this position to say that those procedures falling under 
the general term "methodology" are the kinds of things 
referred to as "auxiliary theories." Thus, for example, 
the several procedures described by Torgerson in Theory and 
Method of Scaling would provide auxiliary theories for 
establishing the empirical (testable) correspondence between 
propositionally related concepts and their observational 
referents. Such procedures are attempts to specify criteria 
by which one can judge (or test) whether or not the relation­
ships stipulated to hold among terms also obtain among the 
things in the world to which the terms refer. Strictly 
speaking, these procedures, or the rationale for them, would 
not "belong" to any particular theory but, rather, would 
be appropriable by any moderately well-formulated theory 
the object of which is some empirical social phenomenon.
This line of thought concerning the nature of corre-
244spondence rules was first brought to the social sciences,
244This interpretation of correspondence rules had been 
developed earlier by some philosophers of science. See Fred­erick Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theory, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 15)74), pp. 102-109.
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as far as I can determine, by Hubert M. Blalock. Blalock
is concerned with what he calls "the inherent gap between
245the languages of theory and research." More specifically,
he is concerned with the development of "causal models that
246have implications that are indirectly testable." The
problem is this: Causality is a characteristic of theoret­
ical systems, while testability is a characteristic of 
empirical systems. Causal thinking is helpful in construct­
ing theories about social phenomena but to be scientifically 
useful, these theories must be testable. In order for the 
social sciences to provide explanations rather than simple 
statistical descriptions, causal thinking and language must 
be incorporated in social science explanations; but such 
thinking must be "warranted" or "underwritten" by observa­
tions expressed in an observation language. "The whole
matter depends, then, on our ability to specify the rules
247for going back and forth from one language to another."
For Blalock, "...causal laws are essentially working assump­
tions or tools of the scientist rather than verifiable
248statements about reality." But for these working
Hubert Blalock, Causal Inference in Nonexperimental 
Research, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1964), p. 5.




assumptions to be useful, it will be necessary "that auxiliary 
theories be constructed applying the general theory to par­
ticular substantive problems and testing the general theory
249{indirectly, to be sure) in specific research settings."
Thus, for Blalock, the establishment of correspondence
is dependent upon developing testable auxiliary theories.
Since Blalock is interested in causal inference, it can be
supposed that these auxiliary theories be susceptible of
causal interpretation. Linear causal models, such as path
analysis, provide one such methodology; and it seems to have
become the auxiliary theory of choice among causal social 
250theorists. Indeed, Herbert Costner has outlined a program
for "representing the auxiliary theory in the form of an
explicit causal model;" and, following Blalock, he argues
that such auxiliary theories provide explicit rules of
251correspondence. Costner also contends that the development
of "more complex and intricate auxiliary theories" than the 
one he presents "would help provide a needed integration of
249Hubert Blalock, Theory Construction, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 5.
250See, for example, 0. D. Duncan, "Path Analysis: 
Sociological Examples," in Hubert Blalock, Causal Models in 
the Social Sciences, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company,
1971), pp. 115-138.
251Herbert Costner, "Theory, Deduction, and Rules of 
Correspondence," in Blalock, Ibid., pp. 299-313.
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high levels of abstraction and testable deduction in socio-
252logical theories."
By this point, I think it is fairly obvious that the 
Problem of Correspondence, as presented and interpreted 
through the R.V., has had considerable impact on and 
received much attention from social theorists. Torgerson 
summarizes the significance of the construction of rules of 
correspondence to social theory in the following way:
The best of theoretical models is of no use 
if rules of correspondence are chosen unwisely or 
unfortunately. Yet chosen they must be, since 
models without constructs which are anchored 
firmly to observable data have no scientificimport whatsoever.2^
The Problem of Axiomatization shall be considered in 
terms of two components. The first of these concerns the 
form of social scientific theories and explanations. The 
second is concerned with the nature of our general proposi­
tions. Concerning the form of social scientific theories 
and explanations, we have seen that the paradigmatic form 
for a R.V. explanation is deductive— one in which the 
explanandum is subsumed or covered by the explanans. The 
Problem of Axiomatization, as generally interpreted by 
social theorists, is one of providing the proper, deductive, 
propositional form to social scientific theories and explana­
tions. In one sense, this is tantamount to requiring that
^^Costner, Ibid., p. 319.
253Torgerson, op. cit., p. 8.
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social science theories be explicitly formulated or fully 
articulated. Reference has been made to the difficulties 
of solving the problems of Conceptual Imprecision and 
Correspondence when no explicitly formulated theory is 
available. Stipulating, for the moment, the perceived 
benefit of axiomatization by some social theorists, the 
questions now are: "What does an axiomatic theory look
like?" "How is it to be developed?" And, "What is the 
advantage of fully-articulating our theories?"
An axiomatized, fully articulated theory is one in 
which all of the elements of the theory are given full or 
nearly full exposition. Assumptions are stated clearly and 
precisely. Terms are given meaning "operationally" or in 
context. Hypotheses are presented clearly using only those 
terms previously "defined." The criteria for accepting or 
rejecting an hypothesis, or even an assumption, are stated 
unequivocally. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
interconnections among all of these elements are precisely 
set down. The calculus, or logical framework, of the theory 
is given; and it is applied in stating the relationships 
between the aforementioned elements.
The putative advantages of axiomatization are several. 
Few would deny that social theory would benefit from clear 
statement of the assumptions underlying a theory. A more 
careful statement of the meanings of terms and the relation­
ships between them, a precise notation of their range of 
applicability, would be helpful in almost all cases. A
158
statement of the logical connections between elements may 
very well help to control the intervention of bias on the 
part of the researcher, and help to guard against post 
factum and/or ad hoc attempts to "save the phenomenon" or 
the theory. Axiomatization would also facilitate the com­
parison and evaluation of different theories about the same 
phenomenon, and make it potentially easier to interrelate 
similar theories about different phenomena. But most 
importantly, I think full articulation could provide not 
only more precise meanings for terms or correspondence 
between theory and phenomena, or even more precise proce­
dures for establishing meaning or correspondence, it could 
also provide the justification for selected meanings or 
correspondences or the procedures by which they are selected, 
within the context of the theory. For example, if the theo­
retical terms of a theory and the interconnections were 
stated causally, one would know not only that the meanings 
of these terms via a measurement procedure must be of a 
certain (high) level of precision (e.g., interval), and the 
correspondence rules, or auxiliary theory, must be suscepti­
ble of causal interpretation (e.g., path analysis), but why 
this is so. In a fully articulated theory, the rationale 
or justification for adopting these particular procedures 
would be given both logical and substantive warrant by the 
theory, including its component criteria of acceptance or 
rejection.
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If, as we are stipulating, axiomatization is bene­
ficial— a stronger version of the R.V. would say "necessary"—  
why are not social theories fruitfully axiomatized? One 
reason is that theorists have not made the effort to pre­
sent their theories in this form. A second reason has to 
do with the requirement of the R.V. that the axiomatic 
theories be partially interpreted, that is, that the obser­
vational consequences of at least some of the terms be
254precisely spcified. It seems that some social theorists
are not concerned with the precise specification of these 
consequences, or the possible procedures for delineating 
these consequences. A third, and for present purposes, the 
most important reason has to do with the nature of general 
propositions in the social sciences. In the previous chap­
ter, during a discussion of the R.V. of explanation, it was 
seen that a necessary part of the eaqplanans was laws or law­
like statements for the D-N model, or probability statements 
for the I-S model. Further, such general propositions when 
conjoined with initial conditions (D-N model) or instantiation 
(I-S model) were said to esqplain the explanandum if they 
fulfilled certain conditions. For simplicity's sake I will 
reduce these to two. The first condition is that these
254See chapter 3. It will be remembered that this re­
quirement was intended to eliminate purely mathematical or 
logical axiomatizations from being considered "scientific." 
It might be added that, in terms of social theory, it serves 
to eliminate most "metaphysical" or "normative" theories.
general propositions be sufficiently general to encompass 
phenomena of the kind under consideration within their 
scope. The second is that they provide sufficient, detailed 
information about the kind of relationship for which an 
explanation is sought. The problem with the general propo­
sitions of the social sciences is that they fail to satisfy 
one or both of these conditions. Concerning the first con­
dition, many of the general statements found in the social 
sciences are definitional rather than propositional; they 
state characteristics rather than relationships. They take 
the form of assertions like "Power is..." or "Liberty i^..." 
or "Authority involves...." Such statements are important. 
They can be given propositional form or can be used, in 
conjunction with other similar statements, to form proposi­
tions. Too frequently, however, this is not done; statements 
such as these are left to stand on their own. The reason I 
say they are insufficiently general is because they are not 
extended to state relationships. And some statements which 
do occur in the social science literature state relation­
ships, but are insufficiently general because they refer only 
to a specific time or particular instances. For example, a 
statement of the relationship between "sense of citizen 
duty" and "proclivity to vote" in the 1960 presidential 
election, or a statement of the relationship between the 
"industrial capacity" or "morale" of the United States and 
its "ability to'mount a successful war effort" are too
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restrictive to serve as the kind of proposition for which 
the R.V. position is looking.
There do exist in the social sciences statements of 
propositional form which are temporally unbounded and unre­
stricted to specific instances or events. The frequent 
difficulty with these propositions is that they fail to 
satisfy the second condition mentioned above; they fail to 
provide sufficiently detailed information about the relation­
ship postulated. Most propositions of this kind take the 
form, "A change in X is caused by (results in, is associa­
ted with) a change in Y," "There is a strong (weak, no) 
correlation between X and Y," or "The relationship between 
X and Y causes (is associated with, etc.) Z." The point to 
be made here, with reference to the R.V. of theory and 
explanation, is that for propositions to serve as explanans 
statements, it is insufficient that they state only that a 
relationship exists, or that a change or attitude is associ­
ated with something else; in addition, they must tell "how," 
"when," "how much," "to what degree," "over how long." The 
paucity in the social sciences of statements conveying this 
kind of information is perceived as one of the main reasons 
why our theoretical formulations are considered to be expla­
nation sketches rather than explanations.
In spite of these criticisms, or perhaps because of 
them, the suggestion that social theory should be axiomatized 
has frequently been voiced in recent years; and the effort 
to present axiomatic or axiomatized theories has been and is
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being made. In sociology, one of the earliest efforts at
providing a format for the development of axiomatic theory
was presented by Hans Zetterberg. Zetterberg argues that
sociological propositions be designated as "theoretical" or
"ordinary" depending upon their informative value, and that
the arrangement of these propositions should be such that
255the latter can be deduced from the former. The benefit
to be derived from such an arrangement is that, properly 
done, it will aid in the synthesis of already completed 
research and serve as a guide in the construction of theory. 
Zetterberg suggests to the theorist "that he arrange his 
propositions in the axiomatic way" because "it forces him 
to spell out his assumptions, to make explicit his deduc­
tions; and it will remind him of any by-passed implica- 
256tions." To demonstrate the utility of his approach,
Zetterberg offers an axiomatization of theory and research
findings on social solidarity deriving from Durkheim's
257theory of the division of labor. Zetterberg's framework
for axiomatizing theory, as well as the particular axiomati­
zation he presents, has been subjected to rather severe 
criticism. Costner and Leik argue that the types of inference 
Zetterberg employs do not support the kinds of conclusions
255iians Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in 
Sociology. 3rd ed., (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1965),
p. 80.
256Ibid., pp. 99-100.
257See Ibid., pp. 159-174.
he wishes to draw, and they present an alternative proce-
258dure for axiomatizing and testing theories. In a more
recent discussion, Movahedi and Ogles argue that Zetter- 
berg's rules for deriving ordinary from theoretical propo­
sitions are faulty and that Zetterberg offers no clear 
criteria for deciding the informative value of propositions. 
For these reasons, the authors find that Zetterberg's pro-
25posal "is not self-consistent and leads to contradictions."
Furthermore, Movahedi and Ogles contend that in applying his
schema to particular cases, Zetterberg "seems to violate
the most fundamental rules of deductive logic, whether tra-
260ditional or modern." This is a particularly telling
criticism since this is exactly one of the things that 
Zetterberg hopes that axiomatizing theory will help to avoid. 
It should be noted that, despite their sometimes severe 
criticisms, neither pair of critics questions the utility of 
axiomatization as a strategy to be emulated by the social 
sciences.
Hubert M. Blalock is another proponent of the develop­
ment of axiomatic theory in the social sciences. Blalock's
25®Herbert Costner and Robert Leik, "Deductions from 'Axiomatic Theory'," American Sociological Review, vol. 29, no. 6 (Dec., 1964), pp. 819-83HTI
O C Q Siamak Movahedi and Richard Ogles, "Axiomatic Theory, 
Informative Value of Propositions, and 'Derivation Rules of Ordinary Language'," American Sociological Review, vol. 38 
(August, 1973), p. 423.
260Ibid.
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favorable attitude toward this strategy is implicit in much
of what is said in Causal Inference in Nonexperimental 
261Research and is developed eaqplicitly m  Theory Construc­
tion. Blalock feels that axiomatization is most beneficial 
in developing causal theories. In Theory Construction he 
advocates that
Our axioms should be causal assertions that 
strictly speaking will be untestable because of 
the fact that it will never be possible to control 
for all "relevant" variables. For example, if we 
assume that a change in X causes or produces a 
change in Y, even if we observe covariations and 
temporal sequences we can never be sure that these 
have not been produced by some extraneous factor.
But if our axioms contain such causal assertions, 
and if we make certain additional assumptions 
concerning the operation of extraneous factors, we 
shall then be in a position to derive from our 
axioms testable theorems about covariances and 
temporal sequences.
Blalock makes it clear that three benefits would accrue
from an axiomatization strategy. First, axiomatization
would provide a structure for arranging propositions in such
a way so as to make explicit the linkages between causally-
written theories and their auxiliary theories, thus facili-
263tating the comparison of theories. Second, because 
axiomatization would make explicit the relationship between 
propositions, the testability of a theory would be increased, 
and warrant would be provided for evaluating causal claims
^^See especially pp. 5-11.
Blalock, Theory Construction, p. 11.
^^See section above on The Correspondence Problem.
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by covariance statements. Third, axiomatization would
facilitate the translation of verbal theories into mathe-
264matical reformulations. Although Blalock's primary con­
cern is with the evaluation and testability of theories, 
because he does see axiomatization as a way of facilitating 
the former and enhancing the latter, he provides two rules 
for stating theories axiomatically :
Rule 1: Select as axioms those propositions that
involve variables that are taken to be 
directly linked causally: axioms should 
therefore be statements that imply direct 
causal links among variables.
Rule 2: State theorems in terms of covariations
and temporal sequences, thereby making 
them testable provided adequate measures 
of all variables can be obtained.
There have been numerous other suggestions that axio­
matization is a potentially useful strategy and several 
additional efforts at restating sociological theories axio­
matically. Stinchcombe seems to imply the utility of the
axiomatic approach, among other approaches, in his Construct-
266inq Social Theories. Wallace suggests a type of axiomati­
zation in his discussion of the "theory component" of his 
"model of the scientific process" and his application of that
o  C. A Blalock, Theory Construction, pp. 17-26.
265Ibid., p. 18.
Arthur Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1968), see
especially chapter 2, sec. 4.
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267model to Durkheim's Suicide. Additional attempts to
axiomatize existing sociological propositions include Hugh
D. Duncan's effort to axiomatize symbolic interactionism in
268Symbols in Society. the presentation by Hamblin, et. al.
of a theory of social change "using axioms from general
2mathematical systems theory and from behavioral sociology,"
Schwirian and Prehn's "An Axiomatic Theory of Urbaniza- 
270tion," Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin's "Urbanization,
271Technology, and the Division of Labor," among others.
In political science, as in sociology, axiomatization 
of theories has received strong support in some quarters.
One of the earliest and most influential efforts towards the 
development of axiomatic theory in political science was 
Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy. In this 
book Downs attempts to provide "a generalized yet realistic 
behavior rule for a rational government similar to the rules
2®^Wallace, The Logic of Science in Sociology, p. 28. 
See also chapter 6.
288Hugh D. Duncan, Symbols in Society, (New York: Ox­
ford University Press, 1968).
269Robert Hamblin, et. al., A Mathematical Theory of 
Social Change, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973). See
especially chapter 10.
270Kent Schwirian, and John Prehn, "An Axiomatic Theory 
of Urbanization," cited in Costner and Leik, op. cit., p. 
819.
271Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin, "Urbanization, Tech­
nology, and the Division of Labor: International Patterns,"
cited in Costner and Leik, Ibid.
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272traditionally used for rational consumers and producers."
It is Downs' concern to present a series of assumptions
about democratic government, and to derive and trace the
implications of these assumptions. For the most part,
Downs' assumptions are borrowed from economic decision
theory, particularly that of Kenneth Arrow. For Downs,
democratic government is party government of a kind that
273satisfies certain critera, and this inclines him to
orient his model to the ways in which parties "maximize
274political support," and to the ways in which citizens
make social (especially political) choices.
The purpose of Downs' economic theory is the derivation
of testable, empirical propositions which emanate directly
(by deduction) from the assumptions (axioms) of the theory 
275itself. For Downs "theoretical models should be tested
primarily by the accuracy of their predictions rather than
276the reality of their assumptions." Seemingly, the only
limitations Downs places on the choice of assumptions is 
that, taken together, they be internally consistent, and 
that from them can be deduced propositions which are
27^Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New 






susceptible of empirical test. The former condition would 
serve to preclude the possibility that any possible concate­
nation of assumptions could serve as a theory and also 
implies that the theory be constructed in such a way as to 
be corrigible; the latter condition, in addition to providing 
an empirical check on the accuracy of the model, would also 
serve to insure that the assumptions were explicitly related 
to the subject matter.
Downs is not overly concerned with specifying in any 
great detail the exact nature of the relationship between 
his "assumptions" and the testable propositions that are 
derived from them. Nor is he very explicit about what would 
count as an adequate empirical test. His advocacy of axio- 
matization is mostly by example. And the manner in which 
An Economic Theory of Democracy is presented, with a state­
ment of propositions to be proven initiating each chapter 
and a summary chapter consisting of derived "testable propo­
sitions," exemplifies the influence of axiomatization on his 
theory.
William Riker is another influential proponent of axio­
matization as a strategy for improving the quality of polit­
ical theory. Writing in The Theory of Political Coalitions, 
Riker comments, with envy, on the success of the physical 
sciences and suggests that, while "slavish imitation" is 
not advisable, "...there is no reason why the general methods 
of formulating provisional generalizations, of rendering 
them susceptible to verification...cannot be taken
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over." Riker is somewhat more explicit than is Downs 
about how this might be accomplished:
The essential feature of this method is 
the creation of a theoretical construct that 
is a somewhat simplified version of what the 
real world to be described is believed to be 
like. This simplified version or model is a 
set of axioms (more or less intuitively justi­
fiable) from which nonobvious general sentences 
can be deduced. These deduced propositions, 
when verified, become both an addition to the 
model and a description of nature. As more and 
more sentences are deduced and verified, greater 
and greater confidence in the validity of the 
axioms is felt to be justified. Conversely, 
the deduction of false or inconsistent sentences 
tends to discredit the axioms. 78
Riker is primarily concerned to demonstrate the appli­
cability of the axioms of game theory to political phenom- 
279ena. Like Downs, he is interested m  the derivation of
testable hypotheses, in the form of predictions, as an 
indicator of the utility of his theory. In fact Riker's 
work is a specification and elaboration of both the substance 
and method of An Economic Theory of Democracy. In effect, 
Riker revises and supplements Downs’ axiomatic theory. He 
illustrates the utility, and attempts to demonstrate the 
"universality" of his model by offering examples from U.S. 
and Indian politics where the model would yield accurate
William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 7. He continues,
"Those who are interested in creating a science of politics 
must, therefore, first become students of scientific method 




280predictions. In addition, he offers what might best be
described as a formalization or abstract strategy applicable
281to coalitions of a given kind. It is interesting to
note that much of the literature generated in response to
Riker's seminal work questions not the applicability of
axiomatization as a useful theoretical tool, but rather
whether or not specific hypotheses are warranted empiri- 
282cally.
Riker has recently suggested that axiomatization be 
employed not simply as a strategy in research on political 
coalitions, but as a general approach to theory development 
for political science. In An Introduction to Positive 
Political Theory, Riker and Ordeshook contend that political 
science has moved beyond the stage where information gather­
ing or data collection is of primary importance. It is 
essential now that political scientists "...begin to theorize, 
subsuming much empirical detail under abstract sentences, 
and generating models as simplifications of the complexity
of the real world— simplifications that presumably esqplain
283the most significant features."
280Ibid., pp. 54-66, 66-76, 149-158.
n O iIbid., pp. 127-145.
282See, for example, the exchange between Robert Butter- worth and Riker on the "reality" of the "size principle," American Political Science Review, vol. lxv, no. 3., (Sept., 
1971), pp. 741-748.
28^William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice HallT
Inc., 1973), p. xi.
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In this book the authors propose to introduce "theory
284of an axiomatic, deductive type" as the best way of 
accomplishing this end. For the most part, Riker and 
Ordeshook's Introduction is a compendium in which are 
described a number of approaches to axiomatizing theory.
That these methods are employed is demonstrated by copious 
examples from and references to their utilization in recent 
political science research.
The preceding discussion I think demonstrates that the 
Problem of Axiomatization is a significant one to which much 
attention has been directed. The injunction to social 
scientists to axiomatize existing theories and to present 
new theories axiomatically may be separated for purposes of 
analysis— one might add only for purposes of analysis— from 
the corollary and related problems of the specification of 
meaning and the development of adequate criteria of correspond­
ence as described earlier. In practice, the problems are 
inextricably intertwined. Whether axiomatization of theories 
is the key to developing more nearly "scientific" explana­
tions of social phenomena is a matter over which there can 
be reasonable disagreement. It should be noted, in passing, 
that the centrality, and even the utility, of axiomatization 
to the R.V. of scientific explanation and theory is a
284ibid.
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subject of some controversy even among R.V. philosophers of 
285science.
I think that it has been shown that the philosophy of 
science, and in particular the Received View of scientific 
explanation and theory, has had a significant and pervasive 
impact on recent social theory. This influence has been 
exerted by philosophers of science who are interested in 
social theory, by social theorists who are concerned with 
seeing that social inquiry become more scientific, and by 
social scientists who have directly addressed themselves to 
specific problems with regard to social inquiry which have 
emerged from the R.V. reconstruction of scientific explana­
tion and theory. It remains to consider the criticisms of 
the R.V. by other philosophers of science and the as yet 
limited effect of these criticisms on social theory, and to 
re-introduce the concept of explanation in light of these 
criticisms.
2®^See, for example, Frederick Suppe's excellent criti­
cal introduction to Suppe, op. cit., pp. 62-66, 110-114.
CHAPTER FIVE
Political Theory and the Problem of Explanation
Dissents from the Received View in Philosophy of
Science and in Social Science
The Received View, as a reconstruction of the nature of 
explanation and of theory in science has from its earliest 
formulation been subjected to severe scrutiny and criticism 
from within the philosophy of science. No sooner had it 
been articulated than its adequacy as a model of explanation 
and as an account of the structure of theory was questioned. 
So persistent and unrelenting have been these attacks that 
today there are few remaining proponents, among philosophers 
of science, of the Received View in the form it was presented 
in chapter 3. Despite the fact that most philosophers of 
science have moved away from the Received View reconstruction 
of scientific esqplanation and theory, its influence on 
political and social scientists has been and continues to 
be considerable. Indeed, it may be contended, and I believe 
that the information in the previous chapter supports the 
contention that the last bastion of Received View thinking 
in its purer form is to be found in political and social 
science.
Although the R.V. account of explanation has exerted 
substantial influence on the development of scientific social
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inquiry, the reception of the R.V. and attempts to adopt 
social inquiry to its major tenets has not been entirely 
enthusiastic. Criticisms of the susceptibility of social 
phenomena to scientific explanation, and of R.V. scientific 
explanation, can be made on two grounds. The first of 
these I will call extrinsic or external grounds. Critics of 
this disposition argue that social phenomena cannot be 
accounted for according to the canons of scientific inquiry 
because they are too complex, cannot be predicted or require 
different categories than those provided by science. Though 
many such criticisms are interesting, insightful and informa­
tive, most of the difficulties they present have been deflected 
by R.V. philosophers or social theorists. In the final analy­
sis, exchanges of this kind between this type of critic and 
proponents of the R.V. as a model for social inquiry turn
into duologues— people talking past one another— or polem- 
286ics. Neither situation is conducive to the solution of 
the problem at hand.
286An excellent example of these tendencies is provided 
by two exchanges in recent issues of the American Political 
Science Review. In both cases, what might be called "moderate 
critics" of contemporary practice in scientific social inquiry 
were taken to task by advocates of this view. See John 
Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific 
Inquiry," and Responses, American Political Science Review, 
vol. LXIII, no. 4 (Dec., 1969), pp. 1233-1262, and Eugene 
Miller,"Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," and 
Responses, American Political Science Review, vol. LXVI, no.
3 (Sept., 1972), pp. 796-873. For a similar example in 
Sociology, see Lewis Coser, "Two Methods in Search of a Sub­
stance," American Sociological Review, vol. 40, no. 6 (Dec., 
1975), pp. 691-700, and responses in The American Sociolo­
gist , vol. 11 (Feb., 1976), pp. 4-38.
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A second basis for criticizing the R.V., and its appli­
cability to social and political science, may be called 
intrinsic or internal grounds. Criticism of this type is 
directed to questions of the adequacy and efficacy of the 
R.V. itself. Although criticisms of this kind are only 
beginning to have an impact in the social sciences, I think 
it is obvious that they are extendable to social inquiry.
As was demonstrated in the previous section, the R.V. has 
greatly influenced recent efforts in the development of 
political and other social scientific theory. I do not 
think that it is too much of an overstatement to say that 
the concerns of the R.V. have increasingly become the prob­
lems of political and social scientific inquiry. If it can 
be satisfactorily demonstrated that the R.V. is inadequate 
as an account of scientific explanation and theory, then I 
think it would be reasonable to conclude that its utility 
as a model for social and political scientific inquiry is 
questionable; and the attempt to construct social theory 
according to its guidelines would be misdirected. In order 
to assess the cogency of the claims that the R.V. is inade­
quate as a reconstruction of scientific explanation and 
theory, it will be useful to summarize and collate the 
criticisms of components of the R.V. made by philosophers of 
science and to present some arguments about the general 
limitations of the R.V. approach.
One of the most strongly criticized components of the 
R.V. model is the dichotomy between observational and
theoretical terms, a distinction which is fundamental to the 
R.V. reconstruction. It is generally agreed that the obser­
vational-theoretical term distinction is unwarranted.
Attempts to present a cogent and consistent account of the 
nature of the distinction have been unsuccessful. Further, 
the rationale for the distinction is questionable. The 
intent of the observational-theoretical term dichotomy seems 
to have been to insure that theoretical terms will be meaning­
ful according to empiricist criteria and that this meaning 
will be supported by, and derived from, an empiricist 
methodology. Theoretical terms are interpreted, or partially 
interpreted, according to the indirect or direct reference 
made to them by observational terms. There seems to be no 
good reason why theoretical terms have to be interpreted in 
this way. Further, it is uncertain that the distinction 
between theoretical and observational terms distinguishes 
anything at all, especially since it seems apparent that 
classical observation terms can be used to characterize 
things which are indirectly observable or unobservable, and 
that theoretical terms are frequently used in making obser­
vations. The distinction between observation and theoreti­
cal terms seems to be overly simpler and there is some doubt 
that, even if the distinction could be meaningfully drawn, it 
would reveal much of significance about scientific theory 
and esqplanation.
Correspondence rules have fared little better at the 
hands of R.V. critics. Again, the brunt of the criticism is
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borne by the argument that the R.V. formulation of corre­
spondence rules is overly simple. It is clear that the 
purpose of correspondence rules is not to provide explicit 
definitions for theoretical terms nor to insure that they 
are cognitively significant, as Hempel implies, but rather 
they are intended to provide "the admissible experimental 
procedures for applying theory to phenomena and/or the
various sorts of correspondences asserted to hold between
287the theory and observable phenomena." It is in this
regard that the R.V. is overly simple. The R.V. notion of
correspondence rules is unable to provide a precise
characterization of the ways in which a theory is applied 
to phenomena because of the variety of ways this may be done.
To the extent that a precise characterization of correspond­
ence rules is impossible, any generalized characterization 
will be misleading. To the extent that only a very gener­
alized characterization is given by the R.V., the account is 
vague and of minimal utility in the formulation of theories. 
Because of this, there is an increasing tendency to consider
at least some correspondence rules to be independent of the 
288theory. This has the effect of recognizing the role 
played by auxiliary hypotheses, independent experimental
287Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theory, p. 103.
288As previously noted this refinement of the R.V. has 
found its way into the social theory literature via Blalock's 
writings.
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procedures and antecedently available theories in applying 
a given theory to a set of observable phenomena, while, at 
the same time, permitting the formalization of the remain­
ing theoretical components.
The importance of formalization or axiomatization to 
the R.V. is itself a matter of some controversy. The con­
troversy has two parts. The first concerns whether or not 
all scientific theories can, or more strongly, must, be 
fruitfully axiomatized. The answer seems to be that they 
cannot. Suppe provides a lengthy list of theories generally 
considered to be scientific which do not admit of fruitful 
axiomatization, including, for example, Darwin's theory of
289evolution and Hoyle's theory of the origin of the universe.
For Suppe, axiomatization characterizes a stage in the
development of a body of knowledge that occurs when enough
is known about the systematic interconnections between the
concepts of the theory that the theory can be reformu- 
290lated. To require fruitful axiomatization as a condition
of the R.V., or of scientific theory, would severely restrict 
the domain of science, perhaps only to some areas of physics.
The second part of the controversy over axiomatization 
concerns the advantages of axiomatization. Some philosophers 
of science consider axiomatization to be essential to solving
289suppe, Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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most of the problems that have been posed. Others feel that
axiomatization obscures almost all of the interesting and
significant problems considered by philosophers of science.
Still others, taking a middle position, find axiomatization
to be of some usefulness, but contend that this usefulness 
291is limited. This part of the controversy seems to be 
over the selection of tactics in approaching theories.
Those who tend to view theory as sets of logical rules 
appear to favor the former position. Those who are con­
cerned with "meaning” and "logical significance" are more 
dubious about the benefits of axiomatization. Despite the 
fact that the issue is not yet resolved, it is clear that 
there is some reasonable doubt over the necessity of axio­
matization in the R.V. reconstruction.
The arguments summarized thus far have, for the most 
part, been directed at specific elements of the R.V. There 
is another line of argument that is more sweeping and which 
calls for a more complete rejection of the R.V. Indeed, 
some of the thinkers representing this line of argument find 
it necessary to present alternative analyses of scientific 
explanation and theory. Although there are some considerable 
differences among those proposing what I will call alterna­
tive versions, these more radical criticisms share a number 
of common premises.
291Ibid., p. 110.
One common complaint among those who reject the R.V. 
account of explanation and theory is that it bears little 
resemblance to what actually goes on in science or to 
scientific theories as presented by scientists. Few, if 
any, theories are presented as axiomatic calculi with 
specified correspondence rules. Further, the R.V. emphasis 
on rational (i.e., logical) reconstruction leads to a rather 
static view of theory and of science. The emphasis by the 
R.V. on the "structure" of theory and on formal "relation­
ships" among "parts" of a theory results in a highly 
stylized and artificial notion of science. Robert Causey 
has likened the R.V. to a "stillshot" and suggests that
"sometimes these stillshots are subjected to a great deal
292of retouching; this is called 'logical reconstruction'."
Further these "...still pictures are taken through a very
narrow lens with a filter. They usually do not show theory
293growth and change." While not denying that, at times,
294"still pictures of theories can be very illuminating," 
motion pictures, which emphasize not so much the structure 
of scientific theory as the nature of scientific processes, 
would present a more accurate and less misleading view of 
science.
0Q0 Robert Causey, "Professor Bohm's View of the 
Structure and Development of Theories," in Ibid., p. 392.
293Ibid.. p. 400.
^ ^Ibid., p. 393.
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Probably the primary reason for the static nature of 
the R.V. lies in the insistence by most of its proponents 
on the separation between supposedly distinct contexts of 
discovery and of justification. Most R.V. accounts are 
concerned only with the justification of explanations and 
theories, with establishing structural and logical con­
ditions under which one would be justified in accepting a 
theory and in applying these conditions to existing theories 
to assess their adequacy. The investigation of the act of 
discovering or formulating theories and explanations is con­
signed to areas of inquiry like psychology or the sociology 
of knowledge. The result is a tendency to view theory as a 
"thing," as a finished product to be evaluated according to 
criteria of logical and structural adequacy, rather than as 
a process. The emphasis in the R.V. account of theory is 
not so much on an accurate representation of theory as it is 
actually done, but on theory as it should ideally be done. 
Most of the alternative versions of theory and explanation 
are more historical. They emphasize the use of case histo­
ries of theories, and are more concerned with how theories 
come about and how they change. The gap between the "context 
of discovery" and the "context of justification" has narrowed 
considerably.
Several alternative versions to the R.V., for example, 
295Hanson's, have attempted to show how intimately related
295Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, (Cam­
bridge: The University Press, 1969), and "Is There a Logic
of Scientific Discovery?," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Max­well, Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston' 1961), pp. 20-42.
these two contexts are. As a consequence of the rejection 
of a hard and fast distinction between discovery and justi­
fication, the idea of a theory is opened up; but it simul­
taneously becomes less elegant and less precise. This 
decline in elegance and precision is tolerable to most who 
present alternative versions not only because it better 
reflects real as opposed to idealized theories; but also 
because, as Stephen Toulmin contends, the "gaps, incoherences 
and contradictions...give rise to the conceptual problems of 
(a) science, and so compel the scientists concerned to in-
296troduce conceptual changes into its intellectual content."
Toulmin well reflects the general attitude of those who
propose alternatives to the R.V. when he argues that "gappi-
ness" is characteristic of science and that science and its
theories need to be considered not merely as logical systems,
297but, more importantly, as "rational enterprises."
Par from a science forming a complete logi­
cal system, it is its logical gaps and incon­
sistencies that keep the subject alive as an 
active, developing field for scientific inquiry; 
and its very atypical, unsystematic, non-axio- 
matic character is what generates the real head 
of steam behind its problems. With this in 
mind, we may think it better to speak...not of 
"theoretical calculi and their structures," but 
rather of "scientific enterprises and their 
problems." In order to understand the true 
nature and function of scientific concepts, we
296Stephen Toulmin, "The Structure of Scientific Theory, 
in Suppe, op. cit., p. 611.
297Ibid., p. 609.
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need to analyze not just their logical relations 
with other concepts of the same theoretical cal­
culus, but also the rational procedures by which 
conceptual problems are dealt with in a develop­
ing science. The crucial defect of the traditional 
approach lies in itsQequation of the "rational” 
with the "logical.1,298
In addition to their agreement on the historical and 
analytical inaccuracy of the R.V. account, and the conse­
quences of this inaccuracy, most of those who think it 
necessary to provide alternative versions of scientific 
eaqplanation and theory pay special attention to the relation­
ship between theory and observation. Unlike those who 
merely criticize the R.V. formulation of the theoretical- 
observational dichotomy and point to its technical deficiency, 
most proponents of alternative versions argue that the 
distinction is fundamentally erroneous and seek to replace 
it with an understanding that emphasizes a relation of 
dependence between "observation" as a process, and world- 
or phenomena-ordering conceptual structures, such as theories. 
Norwood Russell Hanson, for example, contends that observa­
tion is nothing like the pristine activity portrayed by R.V. 
theorists. An observer does not simply, passively record 
visual or other sense data. Rather, he is actively involved 
in the process of observation. Observation is not simply a 
matter of "seeing," but rather of "seeing-that." The 
observation of a phenomenon is shaped by prior knowledge,
298Ibid., p. 611. (Emphasis in the original).
184
e^qperience, and by the theories we have. Observation is
2991 theory-laden. " And, far from having observational terms
provide independent, empirical meaning to theoretical terms,
theories "provide patterns within which data appear intelli- 
300gible." "There is more to seeing," says Hanson, "than
301meets the eyeball." Further, most of the terms used in
a scientific theory depend on that theory for their meaning.
Terms like "pressure," "temperature" and "stress" depend on
the theory in which they occur for their meaning. In this
respect, they are similar to terms used in sports and games,
words like "check-mate," "home run," "ace," and "slam-dunk,"
302that depend for their meaning on the game being played.
The strong implication is that any view of science and theory
that fails to account for this complexity, any account that
considers observation simply as a neutral recording process,
"a retinal reaction...a physical state— a photochemical 
303reaction" misses the point. "People, not their eyes, see" 
and scientific observation is not so much a physical state 
as it is a complex experience involving the entire conceptual 
organization of the observer.
Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p. 19. 
300Ibid., p. 90.
301Ibid.. p. 7.
^ ^ Ibid. , p. 61.
303Ibid.. p. 6.
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Stephen Toulmin presents a parallel criticism of the
R.V. distinction between theoretical and observational
terms, and a parallel alternative. Toulmin agrees that a
fundamental component of any scientific explanation, an
element not accounted for by the R.V. reconstruction, is
what he calls Ideals of the Natural Order. Ideals of the
Natural Order are "general notions which make sense of the
observed regularities, and in terms of which they all hang 
304together." They specify a certain conception of the
"regular course of events" as being natural, expected and
part of the order of things. As such they do not themselves
305require explanation. To clarify this idea, Toulmin uses
the following example of Ideals of the Natural Order: For
Aristotle, the natural course of events for a body which was 
not acted upon by external forces was for it to remain at 
rest. Bodies at rest required no explanation. However, 
bodies in motion did require explanation— they were phenomena 
and had to be accounted for by discovering the forces that 
made them move. For Galileo, bodies moving in a circular 
orbit followed the ideal of the natural order. Objects at 
rest, or objects exhibiting non-circular motion, or bodies 
which change their rate of motion were phenomena and needed 
to be explained. For Newton, bodies at rest, or bodies
^O^Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding, (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961), p. 33.
305Ibid., pp. 45-46.
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moving in straight lines at a constant rate of speed were
acting naturally and, thus, required no explanation. Only
bodies which deviated from this pattern were phenomena
306whxch needed to be accounted for. Each Ideal of the
Natural Order does more than separate the problematical from 
the non-problematical, it also determines the conditions of 
discourse, "Every step of the procedure (of explanation)—  
from initial identification of phenomena requiring ejqplana- 
tion to the final decision that our eaqolanation is satis­
factory— is governed directly by the fundamental conceptions
307of the theory." The consequence of this is that there
is no uniquely preferred observation language to give mean­
ing to theoretical terms. To the contrary, "Men who accept 
different ideals...have no really common theoretical terms 
in which to discuss their problems fruitfully. They will 
not even have the same problem: events which are 'phenomena'
in one man's eyes will be passed over by the other as
308'perfectly natural1."
Paul K. Feyerabend presents what is perhaps the most 
radical and thorough-going attack on the R.V. version of the 
observational-theoretical term distinction. For Feyerabend,
306Ibid., pp. 50-57. This treatment of the example 
follows that of William Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Conscious­
ness," Polity, vol. 6, no. 1 (Fall, 1973), pp. 9-10.
307
*Ibid.
Toulmin, op. cit., p. 57. 
308.
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not only are all terms occurring in a scientific explana­
tion "theory-ladenr" they are also completely "theory- 
dependent." This includes all so-called observation terms. 
Feyerabend denies what he calls the R.V. principle of 
"meaning invariance" for observational terms. There are no
terms in a theory, even observation terms, the meaning of
309which remains constant between theories.
Far from theoretical terms deriving their meaning from 
observational terms, observational terms are meaningful only 
in the context of a given theory. For Feyerabend all obser­
vation presupposes a theory. He goes so far as to deny 
that the same term (i.e., same word or arrangement of
letters) used in two different theories means the same thing 
310at all. And since the description of observables depends 
upon the theory in which they are lodged, no independent 
"test" of the theory is possible. As a consequence, com­
peting or alternative theories about the "same" phenomena
are "incommensurable." There are no independent grounds for
311choosing between them.
There are other salient differences between alternative 
versions of scientific explanation and theory and the R.V.
3® Paul Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction, and 
Empiricism," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. Ill, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 29.
310Ibid., pp. 36-37.
311Ibid., pp. 31, 78, passim.
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version, but the range of variation among the alternatives 
is also broad, and nothing like the general concensus 
around the above issues exists for these other differences. 
For example, Thomas Kuhn's alternative version of develop­
ment or progress in science is as severely criticized by
proponents of alternative views of science as by R.V.
312theorists. Similarly, although there is broad-based
agreement that the R.V. version of theory is erroneous, for 
the reasons cited above, there is little specific agreement 
as to what a "proper" account of theory would be like. Toul­
min considers a theory to be composed of three elements, 
Ideals of the Natural Order, other laws which are used to 
account systematically for regular deviations from the 
Ideals of the Natural Order and hypotheses, the purpose of
which is to express regularities of a more conjectural 
313nature. For Toulmin, theories are not hierarchically 
organized deductive structures. Rather, they are rules for 
making inferences. In this regard, they are more like a 
"conceptual map" depicting the conceptual terrain than they 
are like a logical (deductive) argument delimiting procedures
312Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
2nd Edition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1970). For criticisms of Kuhn's work, see Imre Lakatos and 
Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
*51 Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theory, pp. 128-
130.
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314 . .of verification. Like maps, theories are neither true
nor false; but rather, their value is instrumental— they
work or do not work, are fruitful or not fruitful— in
approaching and accounting for phenomena and in making
predictions.
For Hanson, a theory provides patterns for making data
316appear intelligible. They are not so much road maps or
rules of inference as they are "conceptual gestalts" that
make it "possible to observe phenomena as being of a certain
sort, and as related to other phenomena" by putting phenomena 
317into systems. A theory, argues Hanson, "is a cluster of
318conclusions in search of a premiss." It provides a set
of possible explanations.
The number of different versions as to what comprises 
an "adequate" or "fruitful" account of theory can be multi­
plied by the number of persons presenting an alternative 
version. There appears to be little specific agreement as 
to what should replace the R.V. of theory and explanation, 
other than that the R.V. needs to be replaced and that the
For Toulmin's analogy of theories as "maps," see 
Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science, (London: Hutchinson's
University Library, 1953), Chapter IV.
315Ibid., pp. 161-162.




replacement must account for the considerations presented 
earlier in this section. There are similar disagreements 
over such issues as the relationship between particular 
theories and the contexts in which they occur, the nature 
of the process by which science changes and develops, how 
and why new concepts emerge, the precise nature of the
frelationship between theories and the phenomena they are
intended to explain, and the criteria, if any, for choosing
between competing theories. The range of these issues and
the debate over their solutions will probably define the
subject matter of the philosophy of science in coming years.
The ability of philosophers of science to provide generally
accepted solutions to these problems will determine whether
there will be an accepted alternative version to replace the
R.V. It should be noted that there is some disagreement as
to whether such a project is desirable, or even possible, to
the extent of denying that "a formal and 'objective* account
319(can) be given."
The Influences of Alternative Versions of Scientific 
Theory and Explanation on Political and Social Science
Given the pervasiveness of the influence of the R.V. on
political and social scientific theory, it should not be
surprising that alternative versions have had relatively
little impact on these areas of inquiry. The reasons for
this are several. First, there appears to be a time-lag
319Feyerabend, op. cit., p. 95.
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between the articulation of innovations in the philosophy 
of science and their communication to and adoption by polit­
ical and social scientists. Alternative versions are 
generally newer than the R.V. and they may simply not have 
had enough time to "trickle-down" yet. Second, alternative 
versions and the critiques of the R.V. emanating from them 
are, like the R.V., abstruse, technical and difficult to 
deal with. Couple this with the fact that critics of the 
R.V. and proponents of alternative versions are usually 
concerned with theory and explanation in the physical 
sciences, that unlike R.V. thinkers, few have written anal­
yses dealing with political or social science, and one is 
confronted with the problem of not having a direct and 
immediately usable interpretation at hand. Third, the 
variability of formulations among alternative version 
thinkers, when compared with the "neatness" and "elegance" 
of R.V. constructions, provides a less readily accessible 
model of scientific inquiry. Fourth, there already exists 
a tradition of criticism of the applicability of scientific 
methods within political science, and social science 
generally. It seems that those who are critical of "scien­
tific" political or social science are unlikely to avail 
themselves of the kind of critiques provided by proponents 
of alternative versions because their interests lie else­
where. Their criticisms are based on what I earlier 
characterized as extrinsic or external grounds.
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Despite the fact that alternative versions have neither 
received the attention, nor had th= impact of the R.V. on 
political or social theory, there are several examples in 
the recent theoretical literature indicative of a growing 
awareness of alternative versions of scientific theory and 
explanation and their applicability to political and social 
inquiry.
In an article entitled "Theoretical Self-Conscious­
ness," William Connolly employs Toulmin's conception of 
theory and discusses additional concepts from Kuhn and
Peyerabend to analyze concensus and conflict models of 
320democracy. The main difference between these models,
according to Connolly, is that each assumes different Ideals
of the Natural Order. Concensus-model theorists assume that
concensus is the ideal of the natural order: it is ejected,
natural and requires no further eaqplanation. Conflict and
coercion, however, are "phenomena" for concensus theorists.
They need to be explained and accounted for by introducing
"auxiliary hypotheses which either square the unejqjected
deviations with basic theoretical presumptions or require
321minimal adjustment of them." For conflict model theorists, 
the opposite is the case. Conflict is the ideal of the 
natural order and requires no further explanation, but con­
census and cooperation do.
^2®William Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," Polity, vol. 6, no. 1 (Pall, 1973), pp. 5-35.
^2^Ibid., p. 15.
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Connolly's interests in "Theoretical Self-Conscious­
ness" are larger than just trying to account for the 
differences between conflict and concensus models of democ­
racy. He is making a statement about the nature of social 
theory by attempting to demonstrate that the conflict and 
concensus perspectives are not simply two "complementary 
faces of society," but, rather,
...each theory incorporates presumptions 
about the organization of society which are 
quite incompatible with those adopted by the 
other. Neither is it the case that one per­
spective pays attention to "conflict" while 
the other deals only with "concensus." Each 
deals with both, but within the framework of 
its own assumptions and esqoectations... .The 
concepts employed reflect the presumptions of 
the perspective and tacitly gear perceptions 
to fit these presumptions.^22
Connolly further contends that the "incorporated pre­
sumptions" and the "concepts employed" influence decisions 
about test procedures, and the determination of what will 
count as "evidence" for or against a theory to the extent 
that communication between proponents of both models becomes
difficult because they have no common theoretical terms in
323which to discuss their problems fruitfully.
Although Connolly is obviously indebted to Toulmin1s 
alternative version, and in spite of the fact that he is at 
least tacitly promoting its acceptance by political and
322Ibid., pp. 17-18.
323Ibid., p. 21. (Connolly citing Toulmin.)
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social theorists, his emulation is not slavish. He seems, 
for example, unwilling to accept Toulmin's instrumentalist 
interpretation of theory (i.e., theories are instruments 
for making predictions). Further, he seems to be more 
skeptical than Toulmin about the possibility of specifying 
criteria for choosing among competing theories. Despite 
these departures, Connolly inherits some of the difficulties 
of Toulmin's analysis, the most obvious being that we some­
times seek explanations of the natural order. In any event, 
the influence of Toulmin's alternative version on Connolly 
is manifest.
Another example of the influence of alternative versions
on political and social theory is provided by the use of the
work of Thomas Kuhn, particularly The Structure of Scientific
324Revolutions, and of Kuhn's concept of "paradigm.1 In a
1972 American Political Science Review article entitled
"Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," Eugene
Miller cites with apparent favor Kuhn's idea of paradigm and
the attendant notions of "normal" and "revolutionary" science
and credits Kuhn with being one of the main sources of the
contemporary revolt against what he calls "positivism" in the
325philosophy of science. Miller seems to suggest the
adoption of an essentially Kuhnian orientation to analyze
324Kuhn, op. cit., p. lOff.
323Miller, op. cit., see especially pp. 804-811.
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recent political theory and to suggest new directions for 
its development. Although Miller's analysis is frequently 
confusing, and his conclusions far from obvious, it is rea­
sonably clear that in his criticisms of "positivist” accounts 
of theory construction and in his favorable comments about 
Kuhn's notion of paradigm and ideas about scientific change. 
Miller's orientation is more compatible with the outlines 
of alternative version thinking than with the R.V.
Sheldon Wolin also employs Kuhn's notions about science
326and paradigms to make the seemingly bizarre suggestion
that definite and recognizable parallels exist "between
327scientific theory and traditional political theory."
Wolin further contends that the conflict between behavioral 
theory and traditional political theory "resembles" the 
difference between normal and revolutionary science respec­
tively, and that it would be more fruitful to view these two 
trends in political theory as compatible components of a
general political scientific enterprise rather than hostile 
328competitors.
Several articles have appeared in the past few years in 
the journal, Political Theory, which also make use of Kuhn's
Sheldon Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theory," in 
Preston King and B. C. Parekh, eds., Politics and Experience: 
Essays Presented to Michael Oakeshott, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968), p. 129.
32^Ibid. (Emphasis is mine.)
328Ibid., p. 152.
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model of science and his concept of a paradigm. Phillip
Beardsley makes what he calls "limited use" of the idea of
a paradigm in his analysis of contemporary political science
to determine whether or not it has a paradigm as Kuhn uses 
329the term. He concludes that it does not, that political
330science is "unparadigmatic," and suggests that rather
than developing one dominant paradigm, political science
ought to move in the direction of becoming "multiparadig- 
331matic." Richard Ashcraft makes similar reference to Kuhn's
work in attempting to illuminate the controversy over the
relationship between theory and methodology between "tra-
332ditionalists" and "methodologists." Ashcraft applauds
Kuhn for presenting "a different assessment of scientific
methodology, one which moves away from a definition of
science in terms of the thought processes of individual
scientists or philosophers of science...to one framed in
terms of the historical activities of groups of scientists
333within a scientific community." He suggests that such a
3^Phillip Beardsley, "Political Science: The Case of




333Richard Ashcraft, "On the Problem of Methodology and 
the Nature of Political Inquiry," Political Theory, vol. 3, 
no. 1 (Feb., 1975), p. 12ff.
333Ibid., p. 12.
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perspective might be fruitful in understanding political
theory if it were to focus on a similar understanding of
334what was intended by the term "political."
Finally, in sociology, Robert Friedrichs has attempted
to analyze contemporary developments in sociological theory
and research. In the course of his analysis, Friedrichs
suggests two "modes" of sociology, the "Priestly" and the
"Prophetic," corresponding roughly to Kuhn's normal and
revolutionary science, and concludes by arguing, a la
Feyerabend, for "epistemological pluralism" as a tactic for
dealing with "the wealth and depth of all socially relevant 
335experience."
Other political and social scientific theorists have 
employed alternative version thinking in either criticizing 
the current conduct of political and social theory, or in 
suggesting alternative theoretical approaches themselves. 
John Gunnel, in a 1969 American Political Science Review
•̂̂ Ibid., p. 16.
335Robert Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 297-298. It should be 
noted that most of those who utilize Kuhn's work rely on 
Kuhn's earlier formulation found in The Structure of Scien­
tific Revolutions. Since its publication, Kuhn has sub­
stantially altered his position by substituting for the 
troublesome and overly vague concept of "paradigm" the twin 
notions of "disciplinary matrix" and "exemplar." (See: Kuhn, 
"Second Thoughts on Paradigms," in Suppe, op. cit., pp. 459- 
482). Although Kuhn does not explicitly reject the dis­
tinction between normal and revolutionary science, the effect 
of his reformulation is, in the words of Stephen Toulmin, to 
show Kuhn to be "far nearer than he had previously appeared to be to the traditional logical empiricist position." (Toul­
min, "The Structure of Scientific Theories," in Suppe. p. 607).
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article, criticizes the application of the D-N model to 
social theory, and, following Toulmin and Michael Scriven, 
another proponent of an alternative version to the R.V., 
argues that the task of the philosophy of science is to 
render "scientific practice intelligible rather than attempt­
ing to construct formal and definitive representations of
336scientific explanation.1 He then proceeds to argue for
the superior applicability of what he calls the "contextu-
alist position" and against the use of the deductive model.
Similarly, in a work entitled Abandoning Method, Derek
Phillips suggests that sociologists should turn away from
"vulgar imitations of what we mistakenly think physical
337scientists do," and favorable cites the work of Kuhn, 
Hanson, and Feyerabend as indicating the foundation of a 
new direction for sociological inquiry.
In addition to the work of the authors mentioned above, 
several recent contributors to the literature on social 
explanation and theory share the conviction that the R.V. 
version of explanation and theory is overly restrictive, at 
least as it applies to the social sciences. Most of these 
thinkers, including Brown, Louch, Winch, Taylor, Connolly, 
and Harre and Secord, agree that the R.V. is inaccurate as
336Gunnel, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scien­
tific Inquiry," American Political Science Review, vol. 
LXIII, no. 4 (Dec., 1969), p. 1238.
337Derek Phillips, Abandoning Method, (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973), pp. 121-122.
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a description of how social scientists go about explaining
phenomena, and inappropriate, in varying degrees, as a model
for constructing social theory. Concerning the proper
approach to explanation, the kinds of elements that would
be counted as explanatory, and the appropriateness of
"scientific" approaches to the social sciences, there is
considerable disagreement among these thinkers.
As a final example, Paul Deising characterizes his work
as "parallel in spirit" to the work of Kuhn, Feyerabend, and 
338Toulmin. In Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences,
Deising proposes to deal with "the whole process of inquiry,
the whole process of 'discovering' or creating or developing
339knowledge, and not just the verification aspect." In
taking as his task, the study of "the four or five different
methods or modes of procedure...that social scientists use 
340today," Deising further demonstrates the influence of
alternative version concerns on his work.
To summarize, although the impact of alternative version 
thinking on political and social theorists is not as pervasive 
as that of the R.V., there are indications that the influence 
of the work of philosophers like Hanson, Toulmin, Kuhn and 
Feyerabend is spreading. Whether any particular alternative
■^®Paul Deising, Patterns of Discovery in the Social 




version will come to dominate political or social theory to 
the extent that the R.V. has is a matter over which reason­
able men may reasonably disagree. I personally think not, 
since it is not the concern of most alternative version 
thinkers to construct one overarching reconstructed logic 
for explanation, nor a model of what a theory should be 
like. This does not preclude the possibility that a philos­
opher of science or a political or social theorist who is 
interested in these matters will propose a "process for 
constructing esqplanations" or a "set of theoretical con­
cerns" for the political or social sciences which will be 
highly influential. If this occurs, it will probably not 
be of the form "X is an adequate scientific explanation of 
phenomenon P if and only if it satisfies the following 
conditions...," but more of the form "the process of esqpla- 
nation in the political or social sciences usually proceeds 
along the following lines...."
To return, briefly, to the conjecture which initiated 
this discussion, there seems to be little doubt that the 
R.V. is inadequate as an account of the nature of explana­
tion and theory. There are but a few remaining adherents 
of this position among philosophers of science. Even Hempel 
has abandoned much of the R.V. position, and has presented 
an admittedly moderate alternative version of his own 
designed to remedy many of the deficiencies of his earlier
201
341formulation. I do not feel that it is too much of an
overstatement to say that the last bastion of R.V. thinking, 
in its purer form, is to be found in the political and 
social sciences. Given the failure of the R.V. to provide 
an adequate account of theory and explanation in the physi­
cal sciences, where problems of measurement, concept and
theory formation and testing seem less intractable, it 
would be unlikely, then, that the R.V. would be any more 
adequate as a model for theory and explanation in the polit­
ical and social sciences.
Political Theory and the Problem of Explanation
The problem that remains for this inquiry is to consider
the nature and function of explanation in political and 
social science in light of the preceding consideration of 
the R.V., its influence on political and social science, the 
criticisms that have been leveled against it, and the 
alternative versions that have been proposed. Ideally, what 
should follow would be a concise, rigorous, and functional 
esqolication of a concept of explanation uniquely capable of 
helping to solve most of the theoretical problems which be­
set political and social science, or, perhaps, a dialectical 
synthesis which incorporates the strengths of the R.V. and
Carl Hempel, "On the 'Standard Conception' of Scien­
tific Theories," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, eds., 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. IV, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), pp.
142-163.
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alternative versions, eliminates their respective weaknesses, 
and is immediately and apodictically applicable to political 
theory. Unfortunately, no such ideal conclusion will be 
reached here. However, several alternative strategies for 
dealing with the absence of an adequate formulation of the 
concept of explanation can be suggested.
The first of these strategies would be to deny that 
there is a problem. The "problem of explanation," the argu­
ment would run, is a pseudo-problem. Its "solution,1 if 
one were possible, would make no difference to the develop­
ment of theory in political science. Furthermore, specula­
tion about explanation has no effect on how theories are 
developed either in political or in natural science. That 
I consider this strategy as unsatisfactory should come as 
no surprise. The premise of this inquiry is that explana­
tion is a significant problem, and my present inability, 
and the apparent inability of others, to provide an adequate 
solution does nothing to diminish its importance. My 
objections to this strategy may be summarized on two grounds. 
First, this strategy is empirically false; and, second, it 
is epistemologically naive, if not pernicious. That this 
strategy is empirically false should be obvious from the 
information presented in the previous two chapters. Specu­
lation about eaqplanation and the nature of theory has 
directly and substantially influenced inquiry in political 
and social science. This is particularly evident in the 
rejection of the older, "positivist," science-is-the-
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accumulation-of-facts view in favor of the R.V. with its 
emphasis on explanation and the justification of explana­
tory structures. Whether political science should consider 
explanation a pseudo-problem is a separate question, the 
answer to which is the basis of my second ground for reject­
ing this strategy.
The denial of the importance of explanation as a prob­
lem is naive and/or pernicious because it seems to entail 
the image of the scientist, political or natural, as a 
passive, "objective," observer recording data and seeking 
to "discover" regularities manifested by that data. This 
is naive because the process is more complicated than that.
If there is a distinguishable line of development in the 
philosophy of science, and in science itself, it is in the 
direction of recognizing the complexity of observation and 
the inability to characterize science strictly in terms of 
sense experience. This thread is exemplified by the change 
that has occurred since the time when theories were held to 
be only "notational, " a convenient short-hand for escpressing 
observation statements, to Hempel's demonstration that the 
meaning of theoretical terms could not be exhausted by 
procedures attempting to reduce them to observation terms. 
Further changes include the rejection of a hard and fast 
observational-theoretical term distinction and the recognition 
that, to some extent, observation is "theory-1aden," and that 
something like Ideals of the Natural Order provide the 
framework within which inquiry, including observation, is
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conducted. There is, to use Nietzsche's apt phrase, no 
such thing as "immaculate perception." Rather than being 
passive, observation is an active process, and involves 
imposition as much as discovery. A proper regard for 
developing a concept of explanation provides the opportunity 
for becoming self-conscious about the nature of our imposi­
tions and the effect they have on what we observe. It helps 
to focus our attention on the very close relationship 
between what we assume we understand and how we approach 
that which we do not understand, including what we expect, 
what we observe and what we will count as evidence. The 
extent to which we are willing to discount the significance 
of speculation about the activity of explanation or the 
purpose of theory is precisely the extent to which we give 
up the project of becoming conscious and critical of what we 
do as theorists.
A second alternative strategy for dealing with the 
absence of an adequate account of explanation in political 
science is to acknowledge the nature of the problem, acknowl­
edge the deficiencies of the R.V., and resolve to accept 
the R.V., or some slight modification of it, anyway. This 
is not an altogether unattractive strategy. There are many 
useful and beneficial features of the R.V. As a model for 
political and social science for explanation, and as a guide 
to theory construction, it would be better than no model at 
all, or the model provided by the earlier positivists and 
logical positivists. The R.V. does have the merit of
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demanding precision and rigor, of directing attention to the 
need for specifying connections between theories and support­
ing observations, of making clear under what conditions an 
explanation can be said to have been adequately provided, of 
stressing the importance of meaning and presenting procedures 
for specifying meaning and of emphasizing the desirability 
of "cumulativeness" as a concern in the development of 
theories. None of these concerns would be detrimental to 
political or social science at its current stage of develop­
ment, and the R.V. version of these concerns need not be 
disqualified simply on the grounds that it is inadequate or 
inaccurate. Indeed, it may well be that an understanding of 
explanation and theory according to the R.V. is necessary 
for evaluating and improving inquiry in political and social 
science, especially because of the considerable impact it 
has had on them.
The major problem with accepting this strategy is in 
the limitations it imposes. Although the R.V. is beneficial 
in many respects, it is also deficient for the reasons dis­
cussed previously and at length. It is also difficult to 
see how the major theoretical problems discussed in the 
previous chapter could be solved within the framework of the 
R.V. since it may very well be that that framework is 
responsible for these problems. The pattern, at least in 
terms of the social sciences, seems to be viciously circular. 
To put it simply, in order for the meaning of terms to be 
precisely and non-arbitrarily determined, the procedures for
specifying or increasing the precision of meaning of these 
terms must be justified and flow naturally from a well- 
articulated theory. But, for a theory to be well-articu­
lated requires that the connections between the constructs 
of the theory, and the phenomenon to be accounted for, be 
precisely stated. This is tantamount to requiring precision 
of meaning, or, at least, precision of measurement, and 
brings us back full circle. One may be willing to loosen 
these conditions somewhat, and settle for the kinds of 
connections present in Hempel's "explanation sketch" as 
adequate to the needs of political and social theory; but to
do so is to consign political and social theory to a second-
342class scientific citizenship, perhaps permanently. Even 
the adoption of Nagel's suggestion to employ the "successful 
logical strategy" of the physical sciences by presenting and 
treating "ideal conditions" for "pure cases" of phenomena, 
and, then, systematically accounting for discrepancies seems 
to depend on the availability of precise, non-arbitrary 
measurement to determine what, and to what extent, is dis­
crepant, and to normalize and idealize conditions.
342^ further suggestion may be made that the political 
and social sciences consider more systematically Hempel's 
I-S model, rather than the D-N model It may well be true 
that the I-S model more accurately depicts what goes on in 
social, and particularly survey, research. In addition to 
the appearance Hempel gives of presenting I-S explanation 
as a sort of "consolation prize," another indication of 
second class scientific citizenship, there are considerable 
problems with the I-S model as a pattern of explanation, as 
was discussed in chapter 3.
Finally, the emphasis of the R.V. on the form of expla­
nation and the structure of theory may very well detract 
from the substantive concerns of political and social 
science. It may lead to an overemphasis on the "science" 
in the descriptive, discipline title "political science" to 
the detriment of an understanding of the qualifying adjective, 
"political." This should not be taken as a suggestion that 
the methodological and theoretical concerns of science in 
political inquiry be extirpated. Rather, and in line with 
the suggestions of some of the R.V. critics, the suggestion 
is that by emphasizing the function of scientific explana­
tions and scientific theories rather than their structure 
the substantive interests of the political and social 
sciences will be given greater consideration. It may well 
be more fruitful for science, as for art, that form follow 
function.
A third alternative strategy for dealing with the 
absence of a well-formulated concept of explanation may best 
be characterized as acknowledging the problem, but denying 
that there is a solution. According to this strategy, one 
would deny that any single account of esqjlanation, or of 
theory, is adequate to deal with the variable and complex 
demands which can be made of a theory, or for the contexts 
in which an explanation can be given. In its more extreme 
form, the denial would be that it is not only practically 
impossible but also logically impossible because each theory 
and form of explanation carries with it its own framework
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for deciding on problems, defining terms, formulating 
measurement procedures and establishing criteria for decid­
ing what will or will not count as a test, that is, for 
declaring under what conditions one would be willing to 
give up a theory. In short, because there are no inde­
pendent, "objective" grounds for deciding between theories, 
much less patterns of esqplanation, there is no justifica­
tion for prescribing one version over another: They are
343"incommensurable."
I am unwilling, at this time, to accept this radical 
alternative. But I would suggest a more moderate form of 
this third strategy as an appropriate way of confronting 
the absence of an adequate notion of e^qplanation for polit­
ical and social science, and the obvious difficulty in 
forming one. I would suggest that a number of plausible 
notions of explanation be entertained. And, as one such 
plausible notion, at least for political and social science,
I propose the extended definition of explanation presented
344in the second chapter of this dissertation.
343Kuhn, for example, is caught m  the middle m  this 
problem in wishing to affirm, simultaneously, the "incommen­
surability of paradigms" and "anomolies" which imply an 
independent observational base. See Harvey Siegel, "Dis­
cussion: Objectivity in Science," Philosophy of Science,
vol. 43, no. 3 (Sept., 1976), pp. 441-448, for a discussion 
of this problem.
3440ther such "plausible notions" of explanation are 
presented by Wesley Salmon, Peter Achinstein, Toulmin, Put­
nam, Hempel (second formulation), Brown, Louch, and Harre 
and Secord.
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The concept of explanation in chapter two has a number 
of features to recommend it. Sharing more in common with 
alternative versions than with the Received View, this 
account of explanation emphasizes explanation as a process.
It focuses attention on explanation more as a rational 
enterprise than a logical structure, and emphasizes "under­
standing" over axiomatic, deductive rigor. As a consequence 
it does not prejudge or impose premature closure on what 
will or will not count as a science, allowing this to be 
determined by historical and developmental, practical or 
research-related considerations rather than supervenient, 
exclusively logical factors.
The proposed "plausible version" of explanation is 
sufficiently general to accommodate a number of explanatory 
forms. The treatment of "evaluation" in this definition 
provides the foundation for systematically understanding 
factors leading to the adoption of a type of explanation 
and the conditions under which a change in explanatory form 
would occur. The worldview from which an explanation 
develops becomes more ejqplicit.
Of considerable importance to the political and social 
sciences this definition of esqplanation permits a considera­
tion of the influence of socio-cultural, group and individual 
factors in the formation and evaluation of any particular 
explanation. In this respect, this general notion of 
explanation is more responsive to the particular substantive 
interests of political and social scientists. It directs
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attention to the fact that explanations of social behavior 
are themselves social phenomena; and, as such, they are, or 
may possibly become, part of the phenomena being investi­
gated. Because this account points to factors influencing 
the political or social scientist, it provides the oppor­
tunity for becoming critically self-conscious of the sources 
and limitations of his particular explanations.
Finally, the discussion of description, explanation and 
prediction as explanatory activities, or as constituent parts 
of the explanatory process, provides a minimal set of 
structural characteristics for an esqplanation. The symbiotic 
relationship between description, explanation and prediction, 
and the function served by each component, as discussed in 
chapter two, when combined with the more general perspective 
set down in the definition of explanation provides what I 
feel is a plausible outline for constructing plausible expla­
nations in political and social science.
There are some severe limitations to the proposed con­
cept of explanation. The first of these is that the general­
ity and complexity of this definition makes it unwieldy, to 
say the least. It is difficult to imagine the conditions 
where a political scientist, working on a specific problem, 
would use such a cumbersome formulation. Part of this 
difficulty may possibly be remedied by an improved articula­
tion of the concept and by the specification of specific 
"eaqplanatory frameworks" compatible with this general con­
cept.
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A second limitation of this plausible conception of 
explanation is that it offers no basis for discriminating 
"scientific" from "non-scientific" explanations. I per­
sonally do not consider this to be an overwhelming diffi­
culty. All attempts with which I am familiar fail to pro­
vide any satisfactory, precise criteria for making this 
judgement. They fail by either including too much or by 
excluding most of what is usually considered to be science. 
More tellingly, this notion of explanation only implicitly 
provides any but the most general criteria for discriminating 
"good" from "bad," or "useful" from "useless" explanations. 
This partly because it makes no claims as to what ultimately 
and exclusively constitutes the explanation of a phenomenon 
and partly because this definition, less than others, carries 
with it its own criteria of adequacy. Again, this deficiency 
may be remedied by carefully articulating specific "esqplana- 
tory frameworks" in which the conditions of adequacy and 
boundary conditions are more fully articulated.
The third and final limitation, the one indicated as 
the "remedy" to the other limitations, and the most severe 
deficiency of this inquiry, is that it fails to present any 
adequate account of an "explanatory tool" for political or 
social scientific explanation, that is, of theory. Many of 
the difficulties which can be presented require such an 
account for their solution. Moreover, a precise statement 
of how a particular explanatory framework, theory, is related
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to a plausible conception of explanation seems to be essen­
tial.
My consternation concerning my present inability to 
construct an alternative account of explanation and theory 
adequate to the at least temporary solution of theoretical 
and methodological problems in political and social science 
is mitigated, if only slightly, by the apparent inability 
of anyone else to do so. What follows will not, I hope, be 
interpreted as a set of rationalizations for the short­
comings of this inquiry, but as a set of notes to myself and 
others about why the kinds of problems discussed above seem 
so intractable. I believe these speculations to be extend­
able to others who have grappled with the same problems with 
much the same results.
The main difficulty is, I think, the result of the 
extreme generality and abstractness of the problems them­
selves. A framework of inquiry, the combination of a con­
cept of explanation and a model of a theory, for which I 
have been looking is the product of a natural conceptual 
relationship between two levels of abstraction. It derives, 
however, from speculation on what might be characterized as 
a third level abstraction, sometimes referred to, somewhat 
inelegantly, as "meta-theory." At the first level of 
abstraction would be concepts which have as their specific 
referents phenomena or precise and limited relations between 
phenomena. The second level of abstraction would consist of 
forms of relationships between concepts and would contain
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various conjectures and prescriptions about how concepts are 
to be meaningfully related to one and other. This is the 
level we normally associate with "theory," that is, with 
specific, sometimes competing conjectures about the proper 
understanding of the relationships between phenomena repre­
sented by concepts. Examples would include Darwinian and 
Lamarkian theories about the phenomenon "evolution" in 
biology, "steady-state" versus "big bang" theories about the 
phenomenon of the origin of the universe in astronomy, 
"classical" and "quantum" theories in microphysics, and 
things like pluralism, Marxism, structuralism, functionalism, 
systems theory in political and social science. The third 
level of abstraction is, as I have said, the level of the 
explanatory framework. This level consists of conjectures 
about the nature of theories, and contains prescriptions, 
organizing principles and criteria about how theories are to 
be constructed, interpreted, evaluated and justified. The 
analysis contained in this dissertation is conducted, for 
the most part, at this third level of abstraction, at the 
level of the explanatory framework and its effect on specula­
tion at the other "levels." It has been my contention that 
a theory is an extension of an explanatory framework, that 
"theory" in the particular sense in which I have been using 
it is the "explanatory tool" of a particular esqplanatory 
framework, that of "science." The "theory" part of "a 
theory of (anything)" is warranted and underwritten by the 
particular esqpectations and prescriptions of the esqplanatory
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framework employed, in the present case, that of "science."
It implies that the "proper" way has been used to conduct 
an inquiry of the object under investigation.
The analogy of levels of abstraction, though useful in 
illustrating the generality and complexity of the problem 
being considered, is overly simple and, in the final analy­
sis, misleading. It is overly simple because it presents a 
too-neat picture of the conceptual components involved in 
scientific inquiry and the relationships between them. The 
portrait is reminiscent of a layer cake— each level easily 
distinguishable from the other, one layer resting neatly on 
the other— when in reality if inquiry were a confection, it 
would be more like a marble cake— where each part flows in 
and out of the other to the point where separation is a 
practical impossibility.
The analogy is misleading because it implies a simple 
solution to a complex situation. One need only to articulate 
the content of the explanatory framework, the third level of 
abstraction, and then specify the necessary and sufficient 
connections between it and the other levels of abstraction, 
demonstrating how one level derives from or is supported by 
the other; and the problem is solved. This is essentially 
what the Received View tries to do. The difficulty, in 
retrospect, is that the connections specified by the Received 
View are neither necessary nor sufficient to account for any 
but a very limited number of cases of scientific explanation, 
and then only with limited applicability.
It is not inappropriate to ask why, given these diffi­
culties, one should bother with an analysis of this kind.
From a practical point of view, what difference does it 
make? I have attempted to answer this question throughout 
the course of this inquiry by demonstrating the consequences 
which attend the acceptance of a particular concept of expla­
nation. I might cite again the by now familiar recitation: 
The acceptance of a c.oncept of explanation and a model of 
theory is a prescriptive activity which helps us to decide 
what is to be considered a "problem," what kinds of topics 
are amenable to investigation, how investigations of selected 
phenomena ought to be conducted, what forms of analysis are 
fruitful or unfruitful, what kinds of information ought to 
be gathered, what should or should not count as evidence and 
how that evidence may be interpreted. I take it to be uncon- 
troversial that all investigations operate within the context 
of a framework of inquiry, the combination of a concept of 
esqplanation and a model of theory. All of us have learned 
or, less frequently, formulated, a set of rules which help 
us to make decisions of the kind sketched above. On a 
practical level, we are influenced by considerations of a 
highly abstract nature, and I take it almost as an article 
of faith that it is in our best interests as political and 
social scientists to become more aware of the conceptual 
influences that help to shape our work. On a still more 
practical concept of explanation and model of theory derived 
largely from the philosophy of science, the Received View,
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has strongly influenced political and social scientists. In 
point of fact, I would, and have, argued that much of the 
conceptual apparatus we employ is borrowed from or derived 
from the highly abstract considerations of the Received View 
philosophers of science. Indeed, the three "major problems" 
(the problem of conceptual imprecision, the problem of 
correspondence, and the problem of axiomatization) which I 
contend, in chapter four, absorb a goodly amount of the 
attention of political and social theorists attempting to 
develop scientific methods of inquiry are in their present 
form artifacts of the Received View reconstruction of scien­
tific explanation and theory. It seems reasonable, then, 
that ~or practical reasons we should attempt to understand, 
as fully as possible, the benefits and limitations that 
attend the acceptance of this particular concept of explana­
tion, to understand not only how we do what we do but also 
why.
Another benefit of analysis at this level of abstraction 
is that it provides the opportunity to approach theory as 
theory. Theory, as a structure or a process, becomes a 
proper object of inquiry. The immediate benefits of such an 
opportunity are not so obvious as those outlined above; but 
I believe, for reasons I find difficult to articulate, that 
the step from studying "So and So's theory of such and such," 
or "A (particular) theory of (such and such)" to understand­
ing what it is about such theories that makes them "theoret­
ical" is an essential stage in the maturation of political
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and social science. It has been my contention that what it 
is that makes theories "theoretical" is that they provide 
explanations of the phenomenon under investigation, they 
provide us with the means to understand what is being investi­
gated. To approach theory from the perspective of explana­
tions, or as the tool of more general explanatory frameworks, 
provides the opportunity to separate the form or process of 
understanding from the object or relationship that is under­
stood. Such a strategy may be fruitful in that it may pro­
vide guidelines for determining the particular strengths and 
weaknesses of particular explanatory forms, as well as the 
basis for extending strong forms to other phenomena. At the 
very least, I believe that this approach forces us to become 
more conscious of the theoretical choices that we make, and 
of the consequences of these choices. For these reasons, I 
believe that it is at this level that theory in political 
and social science ought to be approached.
The notion of explanation and the tri-partite model of 
explanatory activities presented in chapter two, and later 
suggested in chapter five as a tentative alternative to the 
Received View, moves in the direction prescribed above. 
Although it is cumbersome and lacks the detail and precision 
necessary to aid directly in the construction of theories, I 
believe that it provides a useful perspective for analyzing 
and interpreting the relationship between existing esqjlana- 
tory frameworks and theories. In a sense, it attempts to 
establish minimum expectations for explanatory frameworks
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and directs attention to the implementation of the framework 
in the form of a theory. It does this by allowing what I 
believe are the proper questions to be asked: What phenome­
non or relationship is being investigated? What process is 
being used to account for that relationship? How is the 
phenomenon understood? What is the nature of the understand­
ing involved? How may this understanding be evaluated? What 
factors influence the presentation, interpretation and 
acceptance of this understanding? Further, the elementary 
tri-partite model of explanatory activities, in terms of 
description, explanation and prediction, provides in outline 
form what I believe are the minimum structural characteris­
tics for any particular esqalanatory framework and for any 
particular theory that derives from that framework. It does 
this by providing expectations concerning what these frame­
works and their accompanying theories should do— they should 
describe, explain and possibly predict phenomena and/or re­
lations between phenomena in such a way that the phenomena 
are accounted for and are capable of being evaluated.
I realize that this set of considerations is far from 
conclusive. The nature of the preceding discussion is such 
that all manner of explanatory frameworks would be included 
as satisfying these minimal conditions, including the 
Received View. In a very real sense this proposal indicates 
a step backwards from the elegance and precision of specific, 
existing explanatory and theoretical conjectures. Although 
I am aware of this consequence, I find that, at present, I
219
am unable to propose a more constructive strategy for deal­
ing with the problems discussed.
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